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I. INTRODUCTION
A seminal series of articles has used quantitative methods to scrutinize
the legal roots of diverging ownership structures, and varying market depth
and liquidity findings around the world.' Recent scholarship challenges
law and finance literature's purely functionalist explanation, which rests
upon the alleged fundamental idiosyncrasies of legal families, at least with
respect to the evolution of developed economies within the second half of
the last century.' Yet, the law's dispositive role within the institutional
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1. E.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998)
(presenting a positive correlation between the degree of investor protection, in terms of both
legal rules and enforcement, and the robustness of capital markets around the world); Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (looking at ownership structures in large, publicly-traded firms
from the twenty-seven richest countries); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (exploring how a country's legal environment
affects the size and extent of its capital market); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) (examining
the relationship between the laws governing initial public offerings and various metrics of
stock market development).
2. E.g., MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003)
(explaining the relationship of ownership concentration to the agency cost-increasing effect
of "social democratic" polities); Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The
Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents, 114 J. POL. ECON. 145, 168
(2006) (explaining the subsequent restriction of capital markets in central Europe as a
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arrangement necessary to establish viable capital markets remains well-
substantiated.3 Even the regulation-hostile position, articulated early by
George Stigler4 and later taken up with regard to disclosure duties, partially
relies on the legal system to protect investor interests, but considers the
safeguards of general contract and tort law sufficient.5
reaction of the economically and financially pummeled middle class to the Great
Depression); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of
Financial Development in the 20th Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (arguing that the key
factor is the relative political strength of incumbents opposing or favoring financial
development). See also MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994) (linking the development of U.S. capital
markets to the statutory elimination of alternative sources of corporate finance).
3. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 789-99 (2001) (highlighting certain investor protections
fundamental to the development of a strong securities market); Andrei Shleifer & Daniel
Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2002) (considering
the particular choices of a model entrepreneur who took a company public under a weak
investor protection regime); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate
Ownership and Control 1-37 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203,
1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203 (evaluating the choice between
concentrated and dispersed ownership as influenced by the value of private control under
different legal frameworks); Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities
Regulation Around the World, 1-63 (Harvard Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion
Paper No. 492, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-631221 (arguing for stronger
mandatory disclosure requirements to reduce inefficient control premiums by reducing
agency costs).
4. George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 120-
24 (1964) (finding no difference in the average returns on new securities issues from 1925-
1928 and 1949-1954, respectively). See also Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of
Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1981)
(employing the Capital Market Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate risk-adjusted
abnormal returns and finding no difference in the average returns earned prior to and after
federal securities regulation); Seha M. Tinig, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of
Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1988) (explaining IPO underpricing as an insurance against
prospectus liability under federal securities laws). For indications of the positive effects of
U.S. securities laws, see Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor
Information and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 305-6 (1989)
(showing that abnormal returns, due to investors' erroneous forecasting of unseasoned, non-
NYSE-listed issuers, were significantly lower after the promulgation of the Securities Act).
5. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35
J. FIN. 323 (1980) (discussing the effects of requiring positive disclosures in takeover bids,
beyond a simple prohibition against making false statements, particularly with regard to
disclosures relating to any intention to dilute the rights of shareholders who do not tender).
See also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-79 (1984) (showing how a mere rule
against fraud could deter unscrupulous managers from habitually overstating corporate
prospects and depriving investors of any reasonable method by which to discern actual share
values); Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure
About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981) (arguing that disclosure incentives,
which exist in private business relationships, ensure that sellers disclose the highest possible
quality short of overstating); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of
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The parallel debate, regarding the potential for convergence among
standard configurations of governance institutions and securities
regulations akin to the current U.S. model,6 finds variation in a widespread
explanation of international cross-listings. If the focus on corporate and
securities laws' content, administration, and enforcement as quintessential
decoys to attract investors was correct, and if readily available means could
subject business entities to a superior legal regime, then issuers could easily
avoid cumbersome domestic law reform simply by moving to a system that
reduces the firm's capital costs and optimizes its growth prospects. Some
commentators have argued that cross-registering shares with U.S.
exchanges is the best method to facilitate the above described opt-in
scenario with regard to a firm's corporate governance regime. This
mechanism is particularly attractive for corporations in search of credible
commitment opportunities to promote their equities that their jurisdictions
of origin do not provide. This is known as the legal bonding hypothesis.
Although intuitive in its basic propositions, the legal bonding
hypothesis does not resolve all doubt in the cross-listing puzzle, and the
empirical evidence of its validity is mixed. There are indicators that the
success of U.S. exchanges and quotation systems represents a snap-shot of
the 1990's, and was superseded by a reversal that advantaged European
equity markets in the wake of corporate scandals, such as Enron and
Worldcom, and the federal legislature's sweeping response. Moreover,
general evidence on investors' appreciation of specific corporate
governance regimes does not comport with the legal bonding hypothesis'
demanding presumptions about impounding the regulatory framework into
equity prices.
This Article argues that precisely-measured bonding premiums are
unlikely to exist within relatively similarly-developed corporate
governance and disclosure regimes. Alternative corporate governance
standards and disclosure regulations governing the world's primary capital
markets serve investors primarily as relatively easily observable
benchmarks for permissible variations in acceptable behavior of foreign
issuers. Disparities in legal details alone would not trigger precise
adjustments in law-related risk premiums. Yet, comparative evidence
suggests that investors distinguish between marketplaces if they differ
palpably with regard to the enforcement of securities laws, which are, on
the books, comparably hospitable to shareholder interests.
Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18 (1986) (investigating the factors relevant to
information revelation by interested parties attempting to influence a decision maker).
6. For an overview, cf CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004) (collecting opinions on the prospects for
global convergence to the U.S. system of corporate governance).
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Given this rather feeble link between a marketplace's legal regime and
the cross-listing firm's costs of capital, even the incentives of foreign
issuers in search of bonding opportunities are limited in an important way.
It is unlikely that a race to the top will ensue among issuers engaged in a
relentless search for a superior legal framework pertaining to the detailed
ramifications of specific securities laws. Rather, it is more likely that
investors in globally-integrated markets are willing to acquire shares
without a noticeable "inferior law" discount for firm-specific reasons, so
long as the issuers bond to governance and disclosure standards that
investors consider to be equivalent. Therefore, if investors incrementally
consider the governance and disclosure rules of major exchanges and
quotation systems as equivalent, foreign issuers can buy their tickets to the
arena of integrated global equity markets from a plurality of booths without
sacrificing bonding-premiums. Consequently, competitive forces do not
push towards an absolute peak or formal convergence but, at best, toward
distinguishable levels of equivalent investor protection that may exhibit
considerable variation in functional detail.
Against this backdrop, the recent success of the London Stock
Exchange in attracting foreign issuers does not indicate that its legal regime
protects investors as well as U.S. securities laws. The regulatory
environment in the U.K. allows issuers to submit to comparably stringent
standards of investor protection with regard to black letter law, however,
significantly lower enforcement levels account for measurable differences
in bonding premiums. Issuers seeking cross-listings in London pursue
partly different goals compared to their counterparts who are attracted by
New York's exchanges. Hence, the City's success represents evidence for
the occurrence of a separating equilibrium in the global market for
international cross-listings.
To support these hypotheses, Part II first introduces some observations
about the recent and relative success of the U.S. and U.K. stock markets.
After introducing the main explanations proffered for international cross-
listings in Part III, Part IV relates the data to the diverging regulatory
framework governing the pertinent markets and the observed levels of
enforcement. These empirical and legal insights will segue into an
assessment drawn from a discussion of the extensive economic literature on
cross-listings in Part V, and will finally lead to some conclusions and
outlooks in Part VI.
II. INTERNATIONAL CROSS-LISTINGS ON U.S. AND U.K. MARKETS - THE
DATA
Beginning in the early 1990's, the world's largest stock exchanges
became aware of an increasingly international dimension in their pursuit of
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additional listings and increased trading volumes. Consequently, these
stock exchanges enhanced their efforts to inspire equity issuers to conduct
capital-raising activities on their markets.7  Previous studies, which
scrutinized the pattern of international cross-listings for the period ending
around the millennium, found U.S. markets to be the winners of the
international competition for listings, at least with regard to their European
rivals. 8 A look at the latest years, however, suggests that fortunes may
have reversed to grant some European competitors a considerable lead in
the quest for listings. In particular, the London Stock Exchange (LSE),
with its Alternative Investment Market (AIM), seems to have captured a
growing fraction of international cross-listings in recent years. In this
section, I examine data provided by the World Federation of Exchanges
(WFE) and the exchanges themselves.9
7. Reports in the mid-1990's indicated that U.S. exchanges discovered international
cross-listings as a welcome business opportunity. Support for this position also stems from
statements made by then-member of the NYSE's executive committee, James L. Cochrane,
Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
58, 59, 61 (1994) (arguing that U.S. markets must relax regulatory requirements for foreign
firms to remain competitive with British markets in the critical competition for international
listings), and from supportive regulator, William E. Decker, The Attractions of the U.S.
Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the U.S.
Markets: From the Issuer's Perspective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 10, 22-23 (1994)
(discussing the high degree of international interest in entering the U.S. investment market,
and the improving regulatory climate for such entry).
8. Marco Pagano et al., What Makes Stock Exchanges Succeed? Evidence from Cross-
Listing Decisions, 45 EuR. ECON. REv. 770, 773-75 (2001) (identifying factors relevant to
firms' selection of international markets for cross-listing, including market size, liquidity,
regulatory environment, and market familiarity with their industry); Marco Pagano, Alisa A.
Roell & Josef Zechner, The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List
Abroad?, 57 J. FIN. 2651, 2660-65 (2002) (reporting a 291% increase in cross-listings of
European issuers on U.S. markets compared to a 16% increase in cross-listings within
Europe for the 1986-1997 period). Cf Asher Blass & Yishay Yafeh, Vagabond Shoes
Longing to Stray: Why Foreign Firms List in the United States, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 555
(2000) (reporting Dutch and Israeli firms choosing NASDAQ); Edward B. Rock,
Greenhorns, Yankees, and Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital, IPOs, Foreign Firms, and U.S.
Markets, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 711 (2001) (finding Israeli high-tech firms moving
to U.S. markets).
9. The WFE's annual market statistics constitute the general data source. World Fed'n
of Exchs., Index of Annual Market Statistics (1996-2006), http://www.world-
exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=27. As the WFE does not separate
the LSE's main and parallel markets, the data for the LSE's Main Market and AIM is taken
from the LSE Main Market fact sheets covering 1999-2006, London Stock Exch., Main
Mkt. Fact Sheets, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-
gb/about/statistics/factsheets/mmfs.htm (last visited July 29, 2007), the LSE's Main Market
historical statistics, London Stock Exch., Historic Statistics,
http://www.londonstockexchange.con/en-
gb/pricesnews/statistics/othermarketstatsihistoricstats.htm (last visited July 29, 2007), and
the LSE's AIM market statistics, London Stock Exch., AIM Mkt. Statistics,
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/about/statistics/factsheets/aimmarketstats.htm
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A. Proportion of Cross-Listing Firms on the Respective Markets
Although the percentage of international issuers with shares listed on
London's Main Market has remained consistently high (between 19.71%
and 20.83%) over the past ten years, AIM, which never saw a percentage of
foreign issuers larger than 7.14% from its launch in 1995 until 2002, saw
the percentage of companies cross-listing shares on the LSE's parallel
market almost triple (from 6.68% to 18.73%) since 2001, marking the
largest growth since 2003 (Table 1, Figure 1). Of course, the Main Market
represents a long-established market segment in which predominantly
mature issuers trade their shares, while AIM remains a rather fledgling
trading platform, which caters to younger, high-growth-oriented
companies. Each market's development mirrors these strategic differences,
with an overall decline in the number of issuers listing shares on the Main
Market (from 2534 in 1994 to 1606 in 2006), but a rapid increase in the
total number of companies with listings on AIM (Figure 2). With regard to
the analysis conducted here, however, this relevant aspect remains
unchallenged: AIM seized an incrementally larger portion of international
issuers, forcing its number of international listings to grow significantly
faster than the domestic ones (Figure 2).
Looking across the Atlantic to U.S. primary equity markets, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) consistently increased
their percentage of international listings during most of the period under
scrutiny. The NYSE performed particularly well, nearly doubling its share
of foreign issuers trading on its market, up from 10.15% in 1994 to 20.19%
in 2003 (Table 1, Figure 1). Nevertheless, the proportion of foreign listings
on both markets has stagnated since 2002 and 2003, respectively (Figure
1). This most recent development coincided with equal trends in the
overall number of companies listing their shares on NASDAQ and the
NYSE, falling from 5556 (1996) and 3025 (2000) to 3133 (2006) and 2270
(2005), respectively (Figure 2, Table 1). Yet, the decline in domestic
issuers originated earlier, back in the mid (NASDAQ) or late (NYSE)
1990's, and represents a trend that can also be observed at the other
exchanges, with AIM constituting a notable exception (Figures 1 and 2,
Table 1). In stark contrast to New York's most prominent exchanges, the
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) was able to increase its share of
international issuers with shares listed on its market during recent years
from 7.7% in 2000 to 16.89% in 2006. Similar to the development at AIM,
AMEX's surge originated in 2001, but peaked in 2006 with foreign issuers
accounting for more than one-sixth of the listed companies, a proportion
(last visited July 29, 2007).
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twice as high as in 2001 and the average percentage during preceding years
(Figure 1). AMEX doubled the total number of foreign issuers from fifty
in 2000 to 100 in 2006 (Table 1, Figure 2). Still, it is important to note that
the AMEX hosts by far the smallest portion of international issuers in
absolute numbers (Figure 3, Table 1). Moreover, contrary to the
development on AIM, in which the proportion of international issuers rose
in lockstep with an increase in the number of domestic issuers (domestic
growth was outperformed by international growth), the respective
parameter at AMEX declined: the number of domestic issuers fell from
599 in 2000 to 492 in 2006 (Figure 2, Table 1). In order to put AMEX's
success into perspective, note that the latter instance obviously boosts the
relative effect of rather small augmentations on the international side.
TABLE 1: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUERS ON U.K. AND U.S
MARKETS.
This table shows the total number of domestic and foreign issuers on U.K. and U.S. markets
for the period between 1994 and 2006, and the proportion of cross-listing issuers relative to
their domestic counterparts. Exchange-listed investment funds are excluded from the
sample. The data is taken from the annual reports of the World Federation of Exchanges
(available at http://www.world-exchanges.org) and the LSE's Main Market and AIM fact
sheets (available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com).
Year LSE Main Market LSEAIM AMEX
Don. Int'l Total Int'l % DortT Int'l Total Int' % Dor. Int'l Total Int'l %
1994 2070 464 2534 18.31 750 74 824 8.98
1995 2078 525 2603 20.17 118 3 121 2.48 727 64 791 8.09
1996 2171 533 2704 19.71 235 17 252 6.75 688 63 751 8.39
1997 2157 526 2683 19.6 286 22 308 7.14 647 63 710 8.87
1998 2087 522 2609 20.01 291 21 312 6.73 650 61 711 8.58
1999 1945 499 2444 20.42 325 22 347 6.34 589 61 650 9.38
2000 1904 501 2405 20.83 493 31 524 5.92 599 50 649 7.7
2001 1809 453 2262 20.03 587 42 629 6.68 557 48 605 7.93
2002 1701 419 2120 19.76 654 50 704 7.1 523 49 572 8.57
2003 1557 381 1938 19.66 694 60 754 7.96 502 55 557 9.87
2004 1465 351 1816 19.33 905 116 1021 11.36 503 72 575 12.52
2005 1358 334 1692 19.74 1179 220 1399 15.73 495 100 595 16.81
2006 1276 330 1606 20.55 1328 306 1634 18.73 492 100 592 16.89
Year NASDAQ NYSE
Don. Int'l Total Int'l %
4593 309 4902 6.30
4717 395 5112 7.73
5167 389 5556 7.00
5033 454 5487 8.27
4627 441 5068 8.70
4400 429 4829 8.88
4246 488 4734 10.31
3681 447 4128 10.83
3268 381 3649 11.57
2951 343 3294 10.41
2889 340 3229 10.53
2832 332 3164 10.49
2812 321 3133 10.25
Donm. Int'l Total Int'l %
1912 216 2128 10.15
1996 246 2242 10.97
2172 304 2476 12.28
2271 355 2626 13.52
2278 392 2670 14.68
2620 405 3025 13.39
2429 433 2862 15.13
1939 461 2400 19.21
1894 472 2366 19.95
1842 466 2308 20.19
1834 459 2293 20.02
1818 452 2270 19.91
1829 451 2280 19.78
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FIGURE 1: PROPORTION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUERS LISTED ON U.K.
AND U.S. MARKETS.
This figure illustrates the development of the proportion of international issuers listed on
U.K. and U.S. markets, relative to domestic issuers over the period between 1994 and 2006.
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FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUERS LISTED
ON U.K. AND U.S. MARKETS.
This figure visualizes the development of the total number of international issuers listed on
U.K. and U.S. markets relative to domestic issuers over the period between 1994 and 2006.
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FIGURE 3: INTERNATIONAL ISSUERS ON U.K. AND U.S. MARKETS.
This figure shows the total number of international issuers on U.K. and U.S. markets
between 1994 and 2006.
600
2001
I LSE Main Market i'LSE AIM 'NASDAQ - 0' NYSE 4 'AMEXI
The literature remarks that during the last decade London has recorded
a significant diminution of international listings.' °  Undeniably, the
observation is correct, but only with a focus on the City's Main Market
where the total number of international issuers declined from 533 in 1996
to 330 in 2006 (Table 1, Figure 3). Adding the numbers of AIM, London's
decline lessens. Moreover, slightly shifting the period under consideration
by incorporating the most recent developments, between 1995 and 2006 the
City actually outperformed the AMEX as well as the NASDAQ in absolute
numbers, though not the NYSE." From the perspective of the legal
bonding hypothesis, which attaches major importance to the pertinent
market's regulatory environment, such lumping together may seem undue
10. G. Andrew Karolyi, The World of Cross-Listings and Cross-Listings of the World:
Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 REV. FIN. 99, 110 (2006) (purporting that London
had experienced the largest decline in absolute numbers of foreign listings out of 60
exchanges worldwide between 1995 and 2004).
11. Table 1 indicates that between 1995 and 2006 the LSE's Main Market and AIM
combined increased the total number of international issuers by 108, whereas the AMEX
only raised its count by 36 and the NASDAQ exhibited a decrease of 74. The NYSE went
from 246 international issuers in 1995 to 451 in 2006, adding a total of 205.
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in light of the diverging legal standards applicable to issuers on the
respective market segments, although it can be shown that the differences
between the City's market segments are in fact of minor magnitude. 12 But
even if the focus is exclusively on the City's Main Market, a cautionary
remark regarding the total numbers of foreign issuers seems in order. One
must keep in mind that, until very recently, withdrawal from U.S. equity
markets faced substantial obstacles, rendering the access route to U.S.
capital markets practically a one-way street. Indeed, disclosure duties
under U.S. securities laws were almost inescapable once American
Depositary Receipt (ADR)
13  programs had been executed.
14
Consequentially, if it turns out that the ex ante hoped-for advantages of a
U.S. listing cannot be realized, a foreign private issuer still has only limited
incentives to pursue a delisting. Since this move would not unburden him
of the cost incurred under the still-applicable SEC system of continuous
disclosure, delisting would only lead to the loss of any advantage
associated with U.S.-exchange trading. Hence, foreign private issuers will
show a higher proclivity for maintaining their U.S.-listing even if they
currently deem it unprofitable.' 5  In contrast, no comparable legal
restrictions hamper the complete retraction from U.K. capital markets.
B. Proportion of International New Admissions to U.K. and U.S. Markets
Another arguably more revealing way to appraise the attractiveness of
equity markets from an issuer's vantage is to look at the number of new
admissions that the respective markets capture. Doing so further elucidates
evidence of the current appeal of certain markets. Of course, issuers
presently questioning their earlier decision to cross-list, to wit, find their
dual listing currently unattractive even in the absence of opportunistic
considerations, and might be prevented in various ways from retreating
12. See infra Part IV.C.2. (discussing admission standards).
13. ADRs are marketable instruments which represent an ownership interest in a
specified number of securities. They are generated when the securities holder deposits the
represented securities with a designated bank depositary. ADRs facilitate U.S. trading in
foreign securities by making it easier for a U.S. resident to collect dividends in U.S. dollars.
Their most important function, however, lies in integrating foreign securities into the
clearance and settlement process common for domestic securities. Hence, ADRs trade,
clear and settle within automated U.S. systems and within U.S. time periods.
14. For a detailed description of the deregistration prerequisites, see infra Part IV.C.3.d.
15. It is exactly this effect of walling-in foreign private issuers which increasingly was
regarded as inadequate and induced the SEC to promulgate relieving rule changes. See
Termination of Foreign Private Issuer's Registration and Duty to File Reports, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 55,540, 72 Fed. Reg. 16,934 (April 5, 2007) (amending rules
relating to foreign private issuers' abilities to terminate the registration of a class of equity
securities and associated reporting obligations).
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from the foreign trading venue.' 6 Similarly, analyzing only the proportion
of all domestic and international issuers listed may reveal a somewhat
distorted picture if the market for corporate mergers was unequally vibrant
between domestic and international issuers.'7  It is conceivable that
substantial going-private transactions following acquisitions may unequally
diminish the number of issuers of either fraction without any relation to a
market place's attractiveness as a trading venue. The same holds true with
regard to transactions in preparation of corporate work-outs.
The share of non-U.K. issuers introducing their equities to the City's
Main Market meanders over the period analyzed. Despite a temporary
slump in 2004, there was a relatively constant and significant rise in the
proportion of international admissions since 2001, peaking at 26.79% in
2006 (Figure 4; Table 2). Even less ambiguously and more pronouncedly,
on London's AIM a rapid and accelerating growth in the proportion of
international new admissions can be observed since 2002, reaching a record
high of 29.58% in 2006 (Figure 4; Table 2). A look at the total number of
new admissions to U.K. markets (Figure 5) shows that the recent growth in
non-U.K. listings even persisted when domestic additions to the markets
declined in 2006.
The proportion of international additions to the NASDAQ does not
exhibit a clear trend. While at the height of the "new economy" bubble in
2000, the share of non-U.S. new listings reached its peak (19.67%) and
subsequently fell to record lows in 2003 (5.36%)I 8, the following two years
saw a remarkable rebound to above-average values, followed, however, by
another decline in 2006 (Figure 4). With regard to the NYSE, the picture is
more distinct. After climbing to a staggering pinnacle of 49.18% in 2000,
the proportion of new non-U.S. admissions fell sharply, reaching the lowest
level in the sample in 2005 (13.01%). Yet, the following year saw a
remarkable recovery to 21.88%, a proportion within the range observed
prior to the year 2000 (18.54% - 23.08%) (Figure 4). In stark contrast to
the NASDAQ and the NYSE, which exhibited their record highs in the year
2000, it is exactly this year that marked AMEX's low in regard to the
proportion of international new admissions (3.57%) (Figure 4). Even more
remarkably, contrary to the trend at the other U.S. exchanges, the AMEX
was able to increase the proportion of new listings significantly after 2000:
16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. The scenario of merger waves rolling unequally over the globe could be observed in
recent years with the U.S. market for mergers and acquisitions outpacing those of other
nations significantly. See M&A Report, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN ECON. RESEARCH (2007),
available at ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/zn/en/schwerpunkte/ma-
report/mareport 052007.pdf (devising an index for regional M&A activity (U.S.A., Europe,
and Asia) for the period between January 2000 and January 2007).
18. Unfortunately, neither the NASDAQ itself nor any other available source reports
information on new admissions distinguishing between U.S./non-U.S issuers for 2002.
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in 2005 it reached a level (35.05%) only exceeded by the NYSE's record of
2000 (Figure 4). This success, however, was followed by a sharp decline
to 14.26% in 2006 (Figure 4).
A glance at the total number of new admissions (Figure 5) reveals that
the NASDAQ's apparent comeback as an attractive market for international
issuers may at least partly represent a corollary of a temporary backslide in
new U.S. admissions. Consequently, when the NASDAQ captured an
increasing number of new domestic issuers in 2006, international additions
once again started to lag (Figure 5; Table 2). Similarly, albeit less
pronouncedly, the NYSE 2006 comeback was at least partly facilitated by
the coincidence of a rather distinct decline in domestic admissions and a
less incisive increase in new international listings (Figure 5; Table 2). On
the other hand, the AMEX's rise, only at its peak in 2004 and 2005, meets
with a decline in domestic new admissions (Figure 5; Table 2).
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TABLE 2: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL NEW ADMISSIONS TO U.K. AND
U.S. MARKETS.
This table shows the total number of domestic and foreign issuers newly admitted to U.K.
and U.S. markets during the period between 1994 and 2006 and the proportion of newly
admitted cross-listing issuers relative to their domestic counterparts. The data source is the
same as in Table 1.
Year LSE Main Market
Dom. Intl Total Int'l%
1994 256 12 268 4.48
1995 190 38 228 16.67
1996 230 52 282 18.44
1997 135 41 176 23.3
1998 124 33 157 21.02
1999 106 28 134 20.9
2000 172 38 210 18.1
2001 113 14 127 11.02
2002 59 9 68 13.24
2003 32 7 39 17.95
2004 58 10 68 14.71
2005 86 19 105 18.1
2006 82 30 112 26.79
Year NASDAQ
Dom. Intl Total Int'l %
1994 419 26 445 5.84
1995 413 63 476 13.24
1996 598 57 655 8.7
1997 453 54 507 10.65
1998 437 50 487 10.27
1999 553 61 614 9.93
2000 486 119 605 19.67
2001 123 21 144 14.58
2002 121 0
2003 53 3 56 5.36
2004 147 23 170 13.53
2005 117 23 140 16.43
2006 135 21 156 13.46
LSE AIM
Dom. Int'l Total Intl %
120 3 123 2.44
131 14 145 9.66
100 7 107 6.54
68 7 75 9.33
96 6 102 5.88
265 12 277 4.33
162 15 177 8.47
147 13 160 8.13
146 16 162 9.88
294 61 355 17.18
399 120 519 23.12
338 142 480 29.58
NYSE
Dom. Int'l Total Int'l %
201 52 253 20.55
138 35 173 20.23
219 59 278 21.22
210 63 273 23.08
162 43 205 20.98
123 28 151 18.54
62 60 122 49.18
93 51 144 35.42
118 33 151 21.85
91 16 107 14.95
132 20 152 13.16
127 19 146 13.01
100 28 128 21.88
AMEX
Dom. Intl Total Int'l %
46 5 51 9.8
70 5 75 6.67
92 5 97 5.15
91 13 104 12.5
92 8 100 8
83 7 90 7.78
108 4 112 3.57
39 5 44 11.36
35 8 43 18.6
60 16 76 21.05
69 20 89 22.47
63 34 97 35.05
60 10 70 14.29
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FIGURE 4: PROPORTION OF INTERNATIONAL NEW ADMISSIONS TO U.K.
AND U.S. MARKETS.
This figure visualizes the development of the proportion of newly admitted international
issuers on U.K. and U.S. relative to newly admitted domestic issuers over the period
between 1994 and 2006.
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FIGURE 5: NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL NEW ADMISSIONS TO U.K. AND
U.S. MARKETS.
This figure visualizes the numbers of newly admitted international and domestic issuers as
well as the aggregate number of new admissions on U.K. and U.S. markets for each year
between 1994 and 2006.
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FIGURE 6: INTERNATIONAL ADMISSIONS TO U.K. AND U.S. MARKETS.
This figure compares the number of newly listed foreign issuers on U.K. and U.S. markets
during 1994 and 2006.
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The glance at the total numbers is particularly important with regard to
new admissions. It has to be kept in mind that the U.K. economy is
considerably smaller in size than that of the United States. 9
Consequentially, the U.K. should naturally produce a smaller number of
potential domestic issuers. This fact will, in turn, give international issuers
relatively more weight in calculating the proportion for U.K. markets.
Despite the quite high proportions of international new admissions
(constantly higher than at NASDAQ until 2000), the LSE's Main Market,
during the period under scrutiny, lagged behind NASDAQ (except in 2003)
and the NYSE (except in 1995 and 1999) (Table 2; Figure 6). Remarkably,
however, during the last two years, the LSE's Main Market succeeded in
catching up (Table 2; Figure 6). AIM's success is striking with the highest
absolute number of new admissions in the sample for 2006; although of
19. In terms of GDP for the year 2005 the economic power of the U.S. (13.201 billions
of U.S. dollars) was more than five and a half times as large as that of the U.K. (2.345
billions of U.S. dollars), World Bank Total GDP Statistics 2006, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (last visited
Dec. 5, 2007) (showing GDP statistics for U.S. and U.K. in 2005).
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course, the complete lack of any quantitative qualification criteria
20 largely
facilitates this success and deliberately renders AIM a trading venue
catering especially to fledgling businesses.2'
C. Trading Volume
1. Data
The data on annual trading volume in foreign equities reveals that
London's Main Market clearly constitutes a more vibrant trading platform
for cross-listed shares in comparison to NASDAQ and NYSE, which do
not capture much of the trading in foreign shares (Table 3; Figure 7). In
fact, until 2002, turnover in foreign equities exceeded that in domestic
shares on the Main Market, whereas the proportion of trading in foreign
stock on NASDAQ and the NYSE exceeded 10% only once during the
period under survey (Figure 7). Over the whole sample period, despite the
Main Market's considerably smaller total turnover (Figure 8), even the
aggregate trading volume in foreign shares observed on NASDAQ and the
NYSE never reached the magnitude found on the LSE's Main Market
(Figure 9). Interestingly, the Main Market's edge persisted or was even
expanded despite the decline in total numbers of foreign issuers on the
City's market (compare Figure 3 with Figure 9).
Unfortunately, very little data is available regarding the trading
volume of domestic and international AMEX and AIM companies
respectively (Table 3). For 1996 - 1998, the only period AMEX reported
broken-down data regarding turnover in U.S. and foreign stock, no trading
in foreign stock occurred on its market (Table 3). AIM started to report
broken down data (in GBP) only in 2000 and it was just very recently that
trading in foreign shares listed on AIM took off. Yet, AIM immediately
reached a proportion of around 20%, and thereby more than doubled the
pertinent turnover ratio observed on U.S. exchanges (Table 3).
20. For a comparison of quantitative listing standards, see infra Part IV.C.2.
21. In December 2006, of the 1632 domestic and international companies listed on
AIM, 6 had a market value of more than 1 billion £, 15 ranged between 1 billion and 500
million £, 40 between 500 and 250 million £, and 167 between 250 and 100 million £. The
great majority of AIM companies (1404) had a market value of less than 100 million £. See,
London Stock Exchange, AIM Market Statistics December 2006,
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/about/statistics/factsheets/aimmarketstats.htm
(last visited July 29, 2007) (illustrating December 2006 AIM Market Statistics).
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TABLE 3: ANNUAL TRADING VOLUME IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
EQUITIES ON U.K. AND U.S. MARKETS.
This table shows the annual turnover in equity shares or depositary receipts of domestic and
foreign issuers on U.K. and U.S. markets during the period between 1994 and 2006 and the
proportion of turnover in cross-listing issuers' securities. The turnover value is in millions
of U.S. dollars except for AIM which reported broken-down dollar values only for 2005 but
itemized trading volume in GBP for 2000 - 2006. The data source is the same as in Table 1.
Year LSE Main Market LSE AIM (GBP) AMEX
Do. Int'l Total Int'l % Dona Int'l Total Intl % Donm Intl Total lntl%
1994 464862 551408 1016270 54.26
1995 512323 626863 1139186 55.03 135 0
1996 588675 824561 413236 58.35 970 0 91330 0 91330 0
1997 833195 1156295 1989490 58.12 1208 0 143230 0 143230 0
1998 1043659 1842569 2886228 63.84 4438 0 287929 0 287929 0
1999 1425809 1952033 3 77842 57.79 13469 0
2000 1862589 2669122 4531711 58.9 6803 0 6803 0
2001 1843956 2656076 4500032 59.02 2427 0 2427 0
2002 1881103 2104628 3985731 52.8 1759 0 1759 0
2003 2143317 1463012 3606329 40.57 3308 0 3308 0
2004 2940092 2228932 5169024 43.12 9063 0 9063 0
2005 3185654 2492067 5677721 43.89 17133 4082 21215 19.24
2006 4283597 3288102 7571699 43.43 25617 7264 32881 22.09
Year NASDAQ
Don Intl Total Int'l %
1994 1374191 75109 1449300 5.18
1995 2316860 81353 2398213 3.39
1996 3179552 122225 3301777 3.7
1997 3866420 615262 4481682 13.73
1998 5294889 215849 5510738 3.92
1999 10114054 349145 10463199 3.34
200 18950660 844400 19795060 4.27
2001 10464898 469185 10934083 4.29
2002 7000343 251537 251880 3.47
2003 6703349 359851 7063200 5.09
2004 7904791 617774 8602565 7.18
2005 8605089 591029 196118 6.43
2006 9985361 712046 10697407 6.66
NYSE
Dom. Intl Total Intl %
2216042 238200 2454242 9.71
2789054 260643 3049697 8.55
3694614 334356 4028970 8.3
5255745 484908 5740653 8.45
6722420 561362 7283782 7.71
8223849 686637 8910486 7.71
9885993 1141896 11027889 10.35
9601548 787343 10388891 7.58
9410337 701696 10112033 6.94
8778300 728360 9506660 7.66
10527681 976385 11504066 8.49
16508678 1279353 17788031 7.19
19916081 1795368 21711449 8.27
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FIGURE 7: PROPORTION OF TRADING VOLUME IN INTERNATIONAL EQUITIES
ON U.K. AND U.S. MARKETS.
This figure visualizes for the period between 1994 and 2006 the proportion of annual
turnover in equities or depositary receipts captured by international issuers relative to the
trading volume of their domestic counterparts. AMEX and AIM are not included due to the
lack of sufficient data (Table 3).
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FIGURE 8: TRADING VOLUME IN INTERNATIONAL EQUITIES ON U.K. AND
U.S. MARKETS.
This figure depicts the total annual turnover in equities or depositary receipts of
international issuers relative to the total trading volume allocable to their domestic
counterparts between 1994 and 2006. Values are in millions of U.S. dollars. AMEX and
AIM are not included due to the lack of sufficient data (Table 3).
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FIGURE 9: TRADING VOLUME IN INTERNATIONAL EQUITIES ON U.K. AND
U.S. MARKETS.
This figure compares the annual trading volume in international equities observed on the
LSE Main Market, the NASDAQ, and the NYSE between 1994 and 2006. AMEX and AIM
are not included due to the lack of sufficient data (Table 3).
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2. Excursus: Market Contribution to Price Discovery and Valuation
Premiums
With regard to this Article's objective, a look at the trading volume of
the cross-listing venues is not necessarily illuminative at first glance.
Bonding premiums do not seem to depend directly on the trading volume
that accrues on the exchanges where international issuers cross-list their
equities. It has been established that after executing ADR programs
investors may still prefer to buy equities on the issuer's home market."
22. See Piotr Korczak & Martin T. Bohl, Empirical Evidence on Cross-Listed Stocks of
Central and Eastern European Companies, 6 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 121 (2005) (noting
a general increase in home-market liquidity as a result of Central and Eastern European
2007]
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Moreover, there is evidence that cross-listings generally enhance home
markets' liquidity. A large fraction of the global investor base might
therefore buy shares on the issuer's home market, where consequentially,
the bulk of possible bonding gains would be harvested. Still, some
correlation between trading volume and bonding gains may exist. A
recurring theme in the literature on cross-listings is the interdependence of
liquidity and valuation effects.23  The basic interest of market
intermediaries in performing their various functions of monitoring
management or controlling shareholders of cross-listing firms24 may partly
depend on the liquidity that arises in the market for the pertinent shares.
The intensity with which these intermediaries (which include analysts,
investment bankers, and institutional investors) fulfill their roles may also
depend on that liquidity. Whether enhanced liquidity arises, may partly
depend on the monitoring operations of such intermediaries. Changes in
spreads, trading-volume, and volatility for cross-listed equities appear to be
connected to shifts in the issuer's information environment, its ownership
structure, and perhaps its corporate governance system. The dispositive
question seems to be: which factors in a firm's trading environment can
account for such an upward trajectory and its sustained existence? If cross-
listings lead to a more liquid trading environment for the pertinent stocks in
which the new markets contribute significantly to price discovery, there is a
good chance that a greater number of monitoring intermediaries from these
markets might take an interest in the security. On the other hand, a
scenario in which cross-listings lead to greater market fragmentation, added
arbitrage opportunities, or systematic deviations from price parity might
instead scare away these agents. Consequently, it is worthwhile to look at
the contribution of cross-listing markets to price discovery for stocks as a
proxy for overall market quality in the affected shares.
Generally, the contribution of new markets to price discovery is
critically related to the fraction of global trading they capture.26 Studies
firms cross-listing); see infra notes 351 and 352 and accompanying text. Moreover, there is
evidence that cross-listings generally enhance home markets' liquidity.
23. See infra Part V.A. 1.
24. Cf infra Parts II1.B.2., III.B.3.a., and II1.B.3.b. (describing the functions of
monitoring management or controlling shareholders of cross-listing firms with regard to
enhancing the informational environment, certification, and active shareholders).
25. Karolyi, supra note 10, at 126 ("We are learning that liquidity (spreads, volume,
volatility) changes for newly cross-listed firms may very well be related closely to changes
they incur in the information environment, the firm's ownership structure and perhaps even
corporate governance systems.").
26. See, e.g., Cheol S. Eun & Sanjiv Sabherwal, Cross-Border Listings and Price
Discovery: Evidence from U.S.-Listed Canadian Stock, 58 J. FIN. 549 (2003) (Canadian
stock cross-listed on NYSE); Joachim Grammig, Michael Melvin & Christian Schlag, The
Role of U.S. Trading in Pricing Internationally Cross-Listed Stocks (February 2005) (Ariz.
State Univ., Working Paper), available at
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exploring the factors that determine the allocation of order flows found that
the timely coincidence of foreign and U.S. trading was the dominant factor
in determining where order flows gravitate.27 Other country and firm
specific factors that played a significant role were the home markets'
development (domestic trading in less developed countries remained
higher), the home markets' insider trading regime (domestic trading
remained higher where home markets had worse protections), and firm
characteristics (small, fast-growing, high-tech firms trade more on home
markets).28
Price discovery on cross-listing markets may also be explored by
looking at the activity of specialist trading in foreign stocks. Cross-listed,
non-U.S. stocks generally have wider spreads and lower depth in relation to
U.S. stocks. Studies attribute this result to more significant information
asymmetries and higher adverse selection risks that induce market-makers
to charge higher risk premiums. 29 The overall quality of markets is also
influenced by competitive elements.3° Similarly, models indicate that
trading activity is likely to migrate to markets where specialists find "peer"
companies, which can serve as an additional source of information,
http://www.public.asu.edu/-mmelvin/draftFeb05. l.pdf (Canadian, French, German and
British stock cross-listed on NYSE); Kate Phylaktis & Piotr Korczak, Price Discovery
Process in International Cross-Listings: Evidence from US-Listed British and French
Companies (March 2004) (Cass Bus. Sch., City Univ. of London, Working Paper), available
at http://kimmh.cbnu.edu/cited/cited45.pdf (British and French stock).
27. See Michael Hailing et al., Where Is The Market? Evidence From Cross-Listings
(Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 4987, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-771993 (finding that foreign trading declines sharply after cross-
listing in the U.S., with the effect being weaker or absent for firms located in different time
zones); Melek Pulatkonak & George Sofianos, The Distribution of Global Trading in NYSE-
Listed Non-U.S. Stocks (New York Stock Exch., Working Paper No. 99-03, 1999)
(discussing the way Latin American stock with home markets trading around the same time
zone show higher U.S. trading).
28. Hailing et al., supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Bacidore & George Sofianos, Liquidity Provision and
Specialist Trading in NYSE-Listed Non-US. Stocks, 63 J. FIN. EcON. 133 (2002) (identifying
higher information asymmetry and increased adverse selection risk as primary drivers of
liquidity differences between U.S. and non-U.S. stocks). But see Kate Phylaktis & Piotr
Korczak, Specialist Trading and the Price Discovery Process of NYSE-Listed Non-US
Stocks (March 10, 2006) (Cass Bus. Sch., City Univ. of London, Working Paper), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract-567104 (showing that the concentration of trading of cross-listed
stocks from one country in the hands of one individual specialist increases the share of U.S.
markets in price discovery as a result of diminished information asymmetries).
30. Pamela C. Moulton & Li Wei, A Tale of Two Time Zones: The Impact of
Substitutes on Cross-listed Stock Liquidity (May 25, 2007) (Soc. Sci. Research Network,
Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=807704 (finding lower spreads for
cross-listed European stocks in the overlapping hours of trade).
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facilitating inferences regarding prices and order flows pertaining to
equities which market-makers handle.3'
Static analyses of price discovery, as opposed to dynamic analyses,
identify significant price deviations between foreign and U.S. markets
following systematic patterns called "excess co-movements".32 However,
studies indicate that both firm-specific and systematic deviations may play
a role.33
3. Relevance of Trading Volumes
In light of the aforementioned, trading volumes cannot be ignored
with relation to the bonding-aspect under scrutiny here. It is unlikely that
the high turnover in foreign equities on the LSE's Main Market (and
recently on a smaller scale on AIM) is essentially generated by liquidity
traders. Hence, it is no daring guess to assume that on one of the world's
most developed markets, where trading in foreign shares accounts for
roughly half of the total turnover, a significant number of market-
participants are well equipped for this kind of dealing, thus collecting and
producing (e.g. through scrutinizing recent trades, their volume, their
pricing, the identity of traders etc.; through analyzing the firm's business)
information on fundamental firm valuation. This in turn should provide for
a proper informational environment and enhanced monitoring activity,
particularly regarding international issuers. Consequently, important extra-
31. Shmuel Baruch, Andrew Karolyi & Michael L. Lemmon, Multi-Market Trading
and Liquidity: Theory and Evidence (December 2003) (Soc. Sci. Research Network,
Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=567064 (explaining how "The
[theoretical model discussed and tested in the article] derives an equilibrium which predicts
that, under fairly general conditions, the distribution of trading volume across exchanges
competing for order flow is related to the correlation of the cross-listed asset returns to
returns of other stocks in the respective markets. That is, volume migrates to the exchange
in which the cross-listed asset returns have greater correlation with returns of other assets
traded on that market.").
32. See Louis Gagnon & G. Andrew Karolyi, Multi-Market Trading and Arbitrage
(June 17, 2004) (Ohio State Univ., Working Paper), available at http://www.cob.ohio-
state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2004/2004-9.htm (showing that potentially higher U.S. trading
volumes lead to higher excess co-movements of ADR shares with U.S. market index
returns); Susan Ji, Does Investor Base Influence Stock Comovement? (2004) (Zicklin Sch. of
Bus., City Univ. of New York, Working Paper), available at
http://ccfr.org.cn/cicf2005/paper/20050201123856.pdf (finding deviations from price parity
associated with higher following of U.S. institutions).
33. See Ramon Rabinovitch, Ana Cristina Silva & Raul Susmel, Returns on ADRs and
Arbitrage in Emerging Markets, 4 EMERGING MARKETS REv. 225 (2003) (showing that
during a time of fixed exchange rate between peso and dollar, six Argentinean home-
market/ADR stock pairs exhibited lower average daily spreads and more dramatic mean
reversions from significant deviations from price parity in relation to fourteen pairs of
stocks from Chile, which free-floated its exchange rate).
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legal determinants of bonding gains 34 appear to be potentially significant
with regard to the City's Main Market and its AIM.
D. Preliminary Assessment: London as a Competitor with Custom-
Tailored Offers
The data largely buttresses the notion of a reversal of fortune in the
competition for cross-listings. While U.S. market-places dominated the
1990s, at least during recent years, the City has become a serious
challenger.35 The LSE's Main Market, with a long standing tradition of
trading in foreign equities,36 incrementally lured international issuers
reaching a level of attractiveness comparable to that of the NASDAQ and
the NYSE. Yet, it is important to note, that U.S. markets still garner a
significant fraction of new international cross-listings, with one of the U.S.
exchanges-the AMEX--even exhibiting a formidable growth-rate over
the last years. In light of the aforesaid, London's success does not
necessarily compel the conclusion that it is a direct function of a decline of
U.S. markets.
The LSE's AIM market segment which performed extraordinarily
successfully during recent years draws attention to the demand-side of the
market for international cross-listings. Earlier studies have already hinted
that issuers listing equities on different foreign exchanges show diverging
firm-specific characteristics and pursue varied strategies after execution of
their cross-listing programs.37 AIM's offer seems to ideally meet the
demands of smaller, probably less mature issuers, from around the world
seeking to strengthen their prospects by means of cross-listing their equities
on one of the world's larger exchanges. It is important to note that studies
scrutinizing firm characteristics found issuers cross-listing on AIM to differ
significantly in size, sales growth, and leverage compared to issuers
seeking a secondary listing on a U.S. exchange.38
34. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Parts III.B.2. and III.B.3.
35. London's enhanced competitiveness has been noted by business magazines and
newspapers as well. Cf, e.g., Erika Brown, London Calling, FORBES, May 8, 2006 at 51-2;
What's Wrong with Wall Street, ECONOMIST, Nov 25, 2006, at 11; Is Wall Street Losing Its
Competitive Edge?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2006, at A6 (referring to COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL
MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS
REGULATION (2006) available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf).
36. See supra at Part II.C.
37. See infra Part V.A.I.c.
38. Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & Rend M. Stulz, Has New York Become Less
Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices Over Time 18 (Charles
A. Dice Center for Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 2007-9, 2007), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-982193 (finding for cross-listing issuers on AIM a median
size of only $11.5 million, sales growth of 10%, and a median leverage of 0% together with
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As the discussion of the finance literature will indicate39, the legal
bonding hypothesis is not necessarily exclusive and other explanations may
supplement or even superimpose it. Hence, with regard to individual
issuers' motives the explanation of cross-listing decisions may vary40 -at
least with regard to the weight particular aspects carry in the bundle.
Analyzing the legal framework against the background of the data showing
unequal success of the scrutinized marketplaces might enhance our
knowledge of the legal prerequisites for achieving diverging cross-listing
goals.
If the detailed analysis of the legal frameworks governing U.S. and
U.K. exchanges warrants the conclusion that the LSE offers significantly
lower standards of investor protection, then its recent success in the market
for secondary listings warrants the conclusion that it at least offers
enhanced financing conditions unavailable elsewhere4t . These conditions
render forgoing bonding-premiums acceptable for certain issuers, for
example, because the loss of bonding gains is overcompensated by the
retention of larger private benefits of control. In this scenario, cross-listing
issuers are divided into groups characterized by diverging interests that are
best served by either U.S. or U.K. markets.
If, on the other hand, similar levels of investor protection can be
reached on the relevant markets, at least at the choice of issuers, it seems
plausible that some actors on either side of the Atlantic pursue objectives
that are similar in pertinent respect. In line with the central hypothesis
advanced here, according to which investors tolerate a band of protective
standards without deducting from the legal-bonding premium, the
successful exchanges could be seen as featuring a regulatory environment
which lies within this band.
With these hypotheses framing the analytical leitmotif, it is time to
look at the relevant differences in the legal framework. Before plunging
into the regulatory environment, however, the basic economic concepts of
cross-listings are introduced in order to permit a more contextual and
focused analysis.
extremely high Tobin's q ratios compared to issuers pursuing other cross-listing activities).
39. See infra Part III.C.
40. See Stephen Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1876-79 (1997)
(arguing that separating equilibria will occur in issuer choice environments with high quality
issuers in a global search for stringent securities laws, other issuers limited to less incisively
regulated markets, and rogue issuers looking for expropriation opportunities in weak legal
environments); John C. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1814-17 (2002) (positing that both high and low disclosure exchanges could
persist in light of diverging issuer characteristics).
41. E.g., with regard to liquidity, visibility for investors.
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III. THEORY OF CROSS-LISTINGS
A. Conventional Wisdom. Market Segmentation, Risk Exposure, and
Liquidity
The long unchallenged conventional wisdom-the market
segmentation hypothesis-posited that cross-listings occur if the benefits
from broadening a finr's shareholder-base by accessing global investors,
who were kept from holding shares by the segmenting effect of investment
barriers, cancel out the costs associated with a secondary listing.42 Besides
straightforward regulatory barriers, information problems may account for
market segmentation with investors lacking quality information or plainly
not knowing about the security.43 The dispositive impact of cross-listings
was identified as the enhanced integration of the foreign shares in global
capital markets allowed for more efficient investment diversification which
in turn diminished the cross-listed securities risk. Hence, stock prices
should rise and the issuer's cost of capital should fall. a  A different angle
within this ambit is the decrease in a firm's cost of capital associated with a
decline in the costs of transacting its equities. Cross-listings that open
access to a larger base of investors potentially lower transaction costs of a
particular security by boosting trading volumes which enhances price
discovery. Moreover, exchange-specific reasons can account for lower
45transaction costs on the market where the secondary listing occurs.
42. E.g., direct listing costs, costs of harmonizing financial statements with
international accounting standards, cost of legal advice to secure compliance with reporting
and registration requirements.
43. Cf Robert C. Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with
Incomplete Information, 42 J. FIN. 483, 494 (1987) (associating a firm's investor base with
the degree of "investor recognition").
44. Consequentially, studies drawing on the market segmentation hypothesis
scrutinized stock-price reactions associated with firm's cross-listing decisions, e.g. Lome N.
Switzer, The Benefits and Costs of Listing Canadian Stocks in U.S. Markets, in CORPORATE
STRUCTURE, FINANCE, AND OPERATIONS 241-54 (Lazar Sama ed., 1986); Gordon Alexander,
Cheol S. Eun & S. Janakiramanan, International Listings and Stock Returns: Some
International Evidence, 23 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES 135, 135-51 (1988); Stephen
R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, International Listing of Stocks: The Case of Canada and
the U.S., 24 J. INT'L Bus. STUDIES 763, 763-84 (1993); Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew
Karolyi, The Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices:
Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United States, 54 J. FIN. 981, 981-1013 (1999);
Narayanan Jayaraman, Kuldeep Shastri & Kishore Tandon, The Impact of International
Cross-Listings on Risk and Return: Evidence from American Depositary Receipts, 17 J.
BANKING & FIN. 91, 91-103 (1993); Darius P. Miller, The Market Reaction to International
Cross-Listings: Evidence from Depositary Receipts, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 103-23 (1999) (all
finding positive reactions, albeit of minor magnitude, associated with cross-listings in the
U.S.).
45. Consistent with this explanation, studies found liquidity effects in the form of a
decrease in spreads and an increase in trading volumes following cross-listings, e.g. Seha M.
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B. Broadening the Scope: Corporate Governance Aspects
The rise of agency theory informed approaches in finance theory and
empirical analysis4 6 spilled over to the theory of cross-listings and led to the
occurrence of competing hypotheses, which scrutinize cross-listing
decisions against the background of different markets' corporate
governance institutions.47  The fundamental reorientation of research
triggered by these new attempts to explain the phenomenon of foreign
listings is rooted in the assumption that a firm's cost of capital is pivotally
determined by its corporate governance environment. In accordance with
this premise, taking the effects of accessing more stringent corporate
governance systems48 into account should better explain the driving forces
Tinic & Richard R. West, Marketability of Common Stocks in Canada and the USA: A
Comparison of Agent Versus Dealer Dominated Markets, 29 J. FIN. 729, 729-46 (1974)
(arguing that the price of marketability services is higher in the TSE than in the NYSE);
Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, Multimarket Trading and Liquidity: A
Transactions Data Analysis of Canada-U.S. Interlistings, 8 J. INT'L FIN. MKT., INSTITUTIONS
& MONEY 393, 393-412 (1998) (arguing that the distribution of trading volume across
foreign exchanges competing for order flow is related to the correlation of the cross-listed
asset returns that arise in the respective markets); Ian Domowitz, Jack Glen & Ananth
Madhavan, International Cross-Listing and Order-Flow Migration: Evidence from an
Emerging Market, 53 J. FIN. 2001, 2001-27 (1998) (discussing Mexican stocks).
46. The law and finance pioneers (cf supra note 1) opened the gateway to quantitative
testing of hypotheses regarding diverging ownership structures and capital market
developments under the assumption that Jensen & Meckling's insights (cf Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (analyzing agency costs and
attempting to define the nature of a "firm")) not only improve our understanding of the
conflicts between the firm's investors and its management/dominant shareholder after the
acquisition of shares but also enhance our appreciation of the ex ante incentives determined
by the institutions which are set-up to prevent expropriation.
47. The first to draw the link between the governance environment and the choice
among cross-listing locations were Rend M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and
the Cost of Capital, 12 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 8-25 (1999) and John C. Coffee, The Future
as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its
Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 683-91 (1999) (both arguing that there is a link
between issues affecting corporate governance and location choices for cross-listing). But
see Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in a
World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563, 582-83 (1998) (arguing that
U.S. securities laws may enable foreign issuers to have lower costs of capital as a result of
high quality, comprehensive disclosure prescriptions). In a purely domestic context, see
also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 3, 9 (1988) (purporting that a NYSE listing functions
as a device to effectively bond to a one-share-one-vote rule).
48. Internal and external corporate governance institutions bearing upon agency
conflicts between shareholders and management/dominant shareholders are generally and in
the pertinent context understood as encompassing rules and standards as well as non-legal
mechanisms, cf Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, in HANDBOOK OF
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIcs 371 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005)
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behind cross-listing decisions. The idea that corporate governance matters
served as a starting point for a multiplicity of studies highlighting various,
frequently complementary aspects of the common assumption.
1. Legal Bonding
It is well established that success in selling equities depends critically
on a credible commitment of the issuer's management/dominant
shareholder not to expropriate public investors ex post by consuming
private benefits. Submitting to a stringent legal regime which continuously
confines the controller's opportunities to extract resources collateralizes
public investors' interests and hence should boost the results of subsequent
share-offerings.4 9 This kind of legal bonding seems particularly important
for high-growth firms where the benefits from having better access to
external financing are by assumption significant. On the other hand, it is
conceivable that an "inferior law-discount" may be less noticeable with
regard to high-growth firms, which might be capable of raising sufficient
funds for firm specific reasons.5 °
2. Enhanced Informational Environment
According to one line of reasoning, changes in firm valuation around
cross-listings and persistent premiums for cross-listed firms relate to
improvements in the issuers' informational environment. Extensive and
continuous disclosure renders monitoring the firm less costly for investors
who in turn will be inclined to finance committed issuers at more favorable
conditions. Controlling shareholders'/managements' motivations in
choosing listing locations and incentives of multiple-market traders seeking
liquidity across exchanges are sometimes regarded as resulting in a "race to
the top." Exchanges competing for order flows will lower trading costs and
(outlining and examining factors and features affecting corporate governance).
49. In fact, investor protection is necessary to allow cooperation of investors and equity
issuers at all. It allows the deferred exchange of capital against a stake in the firm's future
cash flow to be transformed from a non-cooperative game into a cooperative one. See also
supra note 3.
50. It is important to keep in mind, that from the perspective of controlling insiders
(management/dominant shareholder), the effect of legal bonding is ambiguous from the
outset, cf William A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority
Shareholders Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity
Offerings, 66 J. FiN. ECON. 65, 78-79 (2002) (noting that enhanced investor protection
means a loss in private benefits managers/controlling shareholders can extract); Amir N.
Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L.
141, 148-49 (2003) (arguing that managerial opportunism may motivate cross-listings that
avoid more stringent governance regimes).
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will tighten disclosure requirements. 1 Others have argued that varying
regulatory standards will prevail across exchanges as stringent mandatory
disclosure rules only enhance firm value if investors are in a position to
produce quality information on the issuer (in addition to the information
compulsorily disclosed) at reasonable cost.5 2 Hence, issuers from "remote"
countries below international radars (e.g. those impaired by language-
barriers) don't benefit much from high disclosure standards.53 More
generally, mandated disclosure only constitutes a bait which potentially
lures market intermediaries who on the other hand may still abstain from
taking added interest in the cross-listed securities.
In conformity with aspects of the market segmentation hypothesis,
foreign-listings are regarded as a device affording issuers an enhanced
opportunity to credibly convey private information pertaining to their
firm's quality to outside investors.5 4  In equilibrium information,
asymmetries are diminished and market incompleteness is overridden.55
51. Steven J. Huddart, John S. Hughes & Markus K. Brunnermeier, Disclosure
Requirements and Stock Exchange Listing Choice in an International Context, 26 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 237, 237-69 (1999) (examining how public disclosure requirements affect listing
decisions). See also infra note 378. For the converse view of a "race to the bottom" in
issuer-choice scenarios, see Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market:
Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2626-27 (1997) (arguing that
political pressure will induce regulators to reduce disclosure standards to garner trading
volume); James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in US Securities Markets, 99 COLuM. L. REV.
1200, 1233-36 (1999) (concurring with Fox' argument); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV.
1335, 1410 (1999) (purporting issuers would "choose a regime requiring a level of
disclosure well below what is socially optimal for it"); see also Robert Bloomfield &
Maureen O'Hara, Can Transparent Markets Survive?, 55 J. FIN. EcoN. 425, 448-452 (2000)
(showing a preference of influential market participants for reduced transparency, because
low transparency dealers are capable of outperforming more transparent competitors).
52. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Paolo Fulghieri, Competition and Cooperation Among
Exchanges: A Theory of Cross-Listing and Endogenous Listing Standards, 82 J. FIN. ECON.
455, 472-73 (2006) (devising a model indicating that only the combination of high
transparency standards and a large base of investors who can produce additional information
on the firm at low costs increases the profitability of dual listings significantly). As a
corollary, it can be extrapolated that cross-listings on highly reputed foreign exchanges with
demanding disclosure regimes should lead to an increase in the production of supplemental
information with regard to "visible" issuers.
53. This rationale complements the idea of a separating equilibrium in which domestic
issuers rationally shun the costs of compliance with high-quality securities regulations, cf
supra note 40.
54. Studies have found the price amplitudes around the date of cross-listings, originally
revealed in Foerster & Karolyi, supra note 44 considerably higher for NYSE-listed foreign
equities than for those listed on the LSE and explained the difference by the more dense
media coverage the former stock receives, i.e. its higher visibility for investor , H. Kent
Baker, John R. Nofsinger & Daniel G. Weaver, International Cross-listing and Visibility, 37
J. FN. & QUANTIATIVE ANALYSES 495-521 (2002) (finding that firms that list on both the
NYSE and LSE experience a significant, yet distinguishable, increase in publicity).
55. The signaling equilibrium which constitutes an issuer's optimal level of disclosure
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3. Capital Markets
Furthermore, the operations of various capital market institutions
surrounding cross-listing programs serve investor interests and hence lead
to an enhanced attenuation of agency conflicts.
a. Certification: lending reputation of investment banks
By cross-listing their shares, issuers with bright prospects gain the
opportunity to convey private information on firm quality even more
credibly to global equity markets by using reputed investment banks as
underwriters for their share issuances. 6  Access to the services of
prestigious investment banks can be obtained by cross-listing on markets,
where these esteemed international players offer their certification activity.
In a sense, the certification role of investment banks serving as
gatekeepers-an alleged historically familiar function of these
institutions7-is a specific aspect of an enhanced informational
environment.
depends on market and firm specific determinants, cf the earlier works of Shahrokh M.
Saudagaran, An Empirical Study of Selected Factors Influencing The Decision to List on
Foreign Stock Exchanges, 19 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 101-127 (1988); Gary C. Biddle &
Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, The Effects of Financial Disclosure Levels on Firms' Choices
Among Alternative Foreign Stock Exchange Listings, I J. INT'L FIN. MGMT. & ACCT. 55-87
(1989); Shahrokh M. Saudagaran & Gary C. Biddle, Financial Disclosure Levels and
Foreign Stock Exchange Listing Decisions, 4 J. INT'L FIN. MGMT. & ACCT. 106-148 (1992)
(all analyzing the effects of disclosure requirements on cross-listing choices); Shahrokh M.
Saudagaran & Biddle, Foreign Listing Location: A Study of MNCs and Stock Exchanges in
Eight Countries, 26 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 319-341 (1995) (finding that costs of enhanced
disclosure were only vindicated with regard to firms with high market-capitalization on
home equity markets and significant foreign relative to total sales)
56. Clinical studies found cross-listing firms to be rather mature, domestic champions
and underwriters engaged significantly in credibly conveying the firms' commitment to
transparency, accounting accuracy and respect of shareholder rights, cf Robert Bruner,
Susan Chaplinsky & Latha Ramchand, US-bound IPOs: Issue Costs and Selective Entry, 33
FIN. MGMT. 39-60 (2004) (complementing empirical findings with interviews of involved
investment bankers).
57. Cf J. Bradford De Long, Did J.P.Morgan's Men Add Value? An Economist's
Perspective on Financial Capitalism, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF INFORMATION 205 (Peter Temin ed., 1991) (finding a 30%
increase in value for firms where J.P.Morgan bankers served on the board); Carlos D.
Ramirez, Did J.P.Morgan's Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment, Cash Flow, and
Financial Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 50 J. FIN. 661, 662 (1995) (noting
lower sensitivity to cash flow in companies affiliated with J.P.Morgan); but cf, Leslie
Hannah, What Did Morgan's Men Really Do? (Working Paper, June 2, 2007) available at
http://h-net.org/-business/bhcweb/annmeet/hannah.pdf (arguing that J.P.Morgan's main
contribution to financial development in the U.S. did not flow from information signaling
but stemmed from the successful copying of European precedents).
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b. Active shareholders
Where cross-listings attract significant share-holdings by
sophisticated, foreign institutions, more stalwart monitoring that benefits
(minority) shareholders as a class is likely to occur. However, the actual
occurrence of such advantageous monitoring activity and its effectiveness
remains unclear both in principle 58 and with regard to cross-listing issuers
in particular.
c. Market for corporate control
Cross-listings are frequently driven by the desire of foreign controllers
to create an acquisition currency to finance external growth. Outside
investors may benefit from the dilution of control positions and other
prearrangements associated with these acquisition activities.
C. Tentative Summary
The surveyed functionalist explanations feature the cost of capital
effect of cross-listings as the common denominator. Yet, the alleys through
which these efficiency gains, arguably motivating cross-listing transactions,
are effectuated differ. However, it is conceivable that issuers are capable
of reaping all the benefits concurrently: obviously, overcoming investment
barriers and enhancing investor recognition does not exclude the
simultaneous submission to a significantly more stringent legal and non-
legal set of corporate governance institutions. The flipside of the relative
independence of each specific efficiency gain is that it can be associated
with its own peculiar costs. Hence, from the perspective of those in control
of the issuer's cross-listing decision, it may prove worthwhile to incur
certain costs while avoiding others, as the respective benefits may offset
some of the detriments but may be exceeded by others. For example, while
the principal costs of maintaining an international cross-listing may be
outvalued by the benefits of improved market integration, the additional
costs of submitting to stricter disclosure standards may well surpass the
pro-rata benefits controllers can reap from the further diminution of the
issuer's cost of capital. Thus, from the perspective of cross-listing theories,
58. Compare the optimistic position of Ronald Gilson & Rainier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863 (1991) (critically evaluating and suggesting improvements to monitoring strategies),
with the skepticism of Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991) (criticizing irrational
monitoring activity); see also, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 1994) (surveying the issue
comprehensively).
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it is plausible that equally successful marketplaces cater to different sets of
issuers by offering distinct cost-benefit packages. Their successes could be
seen as evidence of the separating equilibrium devised in theoretical studies
of issuer choice.59 Where a high degree of similarity regarding cultural
background, informational environment, and market development
measured by its depth and liquidity exists, these common factors deplete
non-legal idiosyncrasies, and regulation and enforcement becomes the most
prominent setscrew. The following comparison of the legal framework will
indicate whether U.S. and U.K. markets indeed offer unequal regulatory
packages for those who internationally cross-list.
IV. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. The 90's: The American Success Story
Accessing U.S. equity markets by having shares or ADRs traded on
stock exchanges or quotation systems results in the application of U.S.
securities laws to foreign private issuers6" due to the mandatory registration
of these securities 6' with the SEC. With a momentous exemption afforded
to Canadian issuers,62 listing securities with a U.S. stock exchange requires
SEC registration under § 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.63
The listing of securities on the NASDAQ before it received exchange status
in early 200664 triggered the SEC registration requirement under § 12(g) of
the Securities Exchange Act 65 if the securities were held by more than 300
U.S. shareholders of record. The exemption granted for foreign private
issuers under Rule 12(g)3-2(b) 66 became inapplicable 67 .
59. Supra note 40.
60. Regardless of an issuer's jurisdiction of incorporation, it may be treated as a U.S.
domestic issuer if its shareholdings, operations and management are too closely related to
the U.S., cf Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 3b-
4(c), Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-
4 (2006).
61. The relevant definitions of "security" in § 2(a)(l) Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)(2) (2000), and § 3(a)(10) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(2000), explicitly mention "stock" and "certificate of deposit".
62. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
63. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
64. Cf Application of the NASDAQ for Registration as a National Securities
Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 34-53128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 13, 2006)
(discussing the NASDAQ request to be registered under the Exchange Act).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
66. Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.
240.12(g)3-2(b) (2006).
67. Cf Rule 12(g)3-2(d)(3), Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 240.12(g)3-2(d)(3) (2006).
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In a thought-provoking article, supporting the legal bonding
hypothesis from a lawyer's perspective, John C. Coffee outlined several
features of U.S. securities laws, unparalleled in the rest of the world, which
arguably accounted for the success of U.S. markets in attracting foreign
issuers.68  Other members of the legal academy followed suit and
introduced additional unique aspects of U.S. securities regulations that
facilitate legal bonding.69
The fundamental problem with linking the surge in international
listings on NASDAQ and NYSE during the 1990s
7" to a supposedly
superior set of corporate governance institutions lies in the potential
exaggeration of this rationale when exclusively relied upon. Clearly, the
impact of enhanced investor protection on a firm's cost of capital
potentially represents a meaningful determinant in the decision to cross-
list.7' Yet, as long as other aspects figure in the selection process,
72 it
cannot be extrapolated from the choice of a certain market alone that the
legal determinants of the corporate governance package associated with the
listing are by all means superior. Even if decision makers strive for
nothing but an enhancement of the issuer's utility, suboptimal outcomes
with regard to the choice of law remain plausible. It is conceivable that
other equity markets offer equally good or better corporate governance
arrangements with functional equivalents accomplishing the agency
conflict-reducing role just as efficiently as their U.S. counterparts do, but
that these markets lag in other regards. If, for example, recognition among
68. Cf Coffee, supra note 47 (noting the following unique features of U.S. securities
laws: strict reporting requirements under § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000), tender offer rules under § 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2000), SEC authority to regulate going private transactions
under § 13(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004), broad liability for fraudulent statements under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
240.1 Ob-5 (2006), corporate governance prescriptions in the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules,
and preclusion of bribery and similar practices by prohibiting off book accounts under §
13(b)(2)(A)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)(B) (2000
& Supp. IV 2004), and Rule 13b2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2006)).
69. E.g., Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible
Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 675 (2002) (arguing
that high hurdles to escape continuous disclosure requirements under § 12(g)(4) and § 15(d)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) and § 78o (2000 & Supp. IV
2004), make the commitment of foreign issuers especially credible).
70. It is interesting that new research even doubts the success of U.S. exchanges during
the 1990's; see Eric J. Pan, Why the World No Longer Puts its Stock in Us 1-18 (Cardozo
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 176, December 2006) available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-951705 (purporting that the movement of foreign companies away
from U.S. equity markets already began in the early 1990's).
71. An ambiguous one, though, as proponents of the legal bonding hypothesis do not
fail to acknowledge, cf supra note 50.
72. See infra Part V.A.2.
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the global investor community remained significantly lower after a
secondary listing on the LSE than cross-listing ADRs on the NYSE or the
NASDAQ, then perfectly rational issuers might accept a slightly inferior
corporate governance regime provided that the market integration effects
outweighed the disadvantage and the bundle of cross-listing effects
associated with a U.S. exchange listing represented the best overall offer.
It is a plausible consequence that with enhanced integration of the world's
major trading forums, U.S. exchanges may have incrementally lost the
margin they derived from offering access to the world's deepest and most
liquid equity markets. Hence, the relevance of the corporate governance
regime issuers submit to when they cross-list may have increased.
B. Backlash: Corporate Scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley, and a Strong
European Competitor
Since the millennium, the regulatory environment pertaining to issuers
cross-listing shares on U.S. and U.K. markets changed substantially in two
ways. U.S. legislators promulgated a sweeping reaction to the infamous
accounting scandals associated with the names of Enron, Worldcom, Tyco,
and the like. On the other side of the Atlantic, ambitious initiatives were
taken by European institutions to modernize and enhance European
securities laws. Given the fact that the City-with regard to international
cross-listings-became a rival to U.S. markets only in recent years, it
appears particularly important to give these regulatory developments and
their consequences a closer look and link them to the data discussed earlier.
1. Tightening the Thumbscrew: Costly U.S. Regulatory Reactions
to Corporate Scandals
It is well known that the Federal regulators in the wake of corporate
scandals responded to perceived shortfalls in U.S. corporate governance by
cutting deeply into the realm of state corporate law.73 With regard to this
Article's object of investigation, it is especially the tightening of reporting
standards that affected foreign private issuers cross-listing their equities on
U.S. exchanges. 4  The mandated CEO and CFO certification as to the
73. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One
Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003) (gauging the magnitude of the shock this
legislative initiative sent to the settled tectonic arrangement of U.S. corporate law).
74. For the rise in costs of maintaining a U.S. cross-listing after Sarbanes-Oxley, see,
e.g., Xi Li, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Cross-Listed Foreign Private Issuers (June 2006)
(SSRN Working Paper) available at http://ssm.com/abstract-952433 (finding a 10%
negative abnormal return associated with Sarbanes-Oxley); Geoffrey Peter Smith, A Look at
the Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Cross-Listed Firms (Jan. 2007) (SSRN working paper)
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accuracy of the information published in the issuers Form 20-F annual
report75 did not substantially alter these persons' private liability risk.76
However, a key intensification of an issuers obligations stemming from
Sarbanes-Oxley lies in the extensive disclosure and auditing requirements
with regard to an issuer's system of financial control and risk management.
Under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley,77 a foreign private issuer's
management is required to prepare a report on internal controls set up to
secure reporting accuracy starting with the annual report for the fiscal year
ending after July 7, 2006.78 Importantly, they must also have the report
assessed by auditors.79 In fact, the auditors' assessment represents an audit
of the internal controls, coercing the issuer to produce a vast amount of
documentation on the firn's controls simply to prepare the ground for such
auditing.
2. Catching Up: European Reforms and Innovative Variations
The U.S. developments concurred with major changes in European
securities laws originating slightly earlier and independent from specific
inducements.
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-931051 (finding the highest negative and significant
cumulative abnormal returns on Sarbanes-Oxley related announcement dates for exchange
cross-listed firms from jurisdictions with high-standard regulatory and accounting systems
in a sample including OTC-listed firms as control group). But see infra note 392 and
accompanying text.
75. Cf Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004).
76. An important addendum has to be made, however, because the CEO/CFO
certification enhances the risk of criminal punishment for a willful violation of the
Securities Exchange Act, cf § 32(a) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(Supp. IV 2004).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004).
78. Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers and
Foreign Private Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 8545, Exchange Act Release No.
51,293, 70 Fed. Reg. 11528 (Mar. 8, 2005). Small foreign private issuers, who are non-
accelerated filers (see Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2006)) are exempt
from Section 404 disclosure requirements until the fiscal year ending on or after July 15,
2007. Internal Control over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-
Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8760,
Exchange Act Release No. 54,942, 71 Fed. Reg. 76,580 (Dec. 21, 2006).
79. Compliance with the independent auditor attestation requirement is suspended until
July 15, 2007 for foreign private issuers that are accelerated filers, but not large accelerated
filers. Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of
Foreign Private Issuers That Are Accelerated Filers, Securities Act Release No. 8730,
Exchange Act Release No. 51,293, 71 Fed. Reg. 47,056 (Aug. 15, 2006). With regard to
non-accelerated filers, the suspension extends until Dec. 15, 2008. Internal Control over
Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers and
Newly Public Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8760, Exchange Act Release
No.54,942, 71 Fed. Reg. 76,580 (Dec. 21, 2006).
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Ever since Great Britain joined the European Community, the strategy
behind European securities regulation aimed at closely integrating national
securities markets without sacrificing their principal autonomy.8" Hence, in
contrast to the U.S. system where a sole legislator promulgates preemptive
capital market regulations on the Federal level that are then further
substantiated and administered by a single Federal agency, the E.U. largely
relies on the transformation of rules and standards spelled out in various
directives into the member states' securities laws. These national
implementations are subsequently administered by domestic authorities in
each member state. Clearly, in principle, the European system leaves
greater latitude for member states and exchanges to tinker with different
approaches to capital market regulation.8' Yet, the process of integration
through harmonized rules and standards was resumed vigorously during
recent years, which saw an extensive consolidation, amendment, and
extension of existing directives.82 This completion of the new architecture
of E.U. securities laws laid out in the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan
(FSAP)83 and later promulgated in accordance with recommendations in the
80. Cf RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HoPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN
EUROPE AND THE U.S.A. 1-23, 280-83 (1988) (examining the division of governmental
powers between the Federal (Community) and state (member state) level in both the United
States and Europe); Commission of the European Economic Community, The Development
of a European Capital Market: Report of a Group of Experts Appointed by the EEC
Commission (Segr Report) (Nov. 1966) (discussing the earlier goal of a single European
market under the supervision of a sole authority).
81. See Jim Bartos, Esther Jeapes & Peter King, Obligations of Issuers with Full
Listings-US/EEA Comparative Review, 1 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 32, 33-34 (2006) (providing a
practitioner's view stretching the lack of "regulatory certainty" characterizing E.U.
securities laws).
82. Council Directive 2001/34, On the Admission of Securities to Official Stock
Exchange Listing and on Information to be Published on Those Securities, 2001 O.J. (L
184) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Consolidated Admission and Reporting Directive]; Council
Directive 2003/6, Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L
96) 16 (EC) [hereinafter Market Abuse Directive]; Council Directive 2003/71, Prospectus to
be Published when Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and
Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC) (transposition deadline July 1,
2005) [hereinafter Prospectus Directive]; Council Directive 2004/25, Takeover Bids, 2004
O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC) (transposition deadline May 20, 2006) [hereinafter Takeover
Directive]; Council Directive 2004/39, Markets in Financial Instruments Amending Council
Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC and Repealing Council
Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC) (transposition deadline Jan. 31, 2007)
[hereinafter Markets in Financial Instruments Directive]; Council Directive 2004/109, The
Harmonization of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information about Issuers
whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive
2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC) (transposition deadline Jan. 20 2007) [hereinafter
Transparency Directive].
83. Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232
final (Nov. 5, 1999) (outlining the purpose, measures, conditions, and strategies to
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Lamfalussy Report,84 in fact, rendered the law governing capital markets
one of the most densely harmonized areas of the member states' legal
systems. However, its multivoiced interpretation, application and
enforcement remained an important hallmark.85
C. Substantive Rules Compared
Analyzing the most important divergences in U.K. and U.S. securities
laws including the relevant exchanges' listing-rules over the period of
interest will reveal which legal framework accompanied the increased
success of London's markets in relation to its U.S. competitors. The
specific lesson with regard to law's relevance is one of two options. The
lesson may be to enhance the understanding of the band of protective
standards investors are willing to tolerate without charging a significantly
higher risk premium. If, however, the cost of capital is measurably higher
on either market, the lesson may be to learn about the standards corporate
insiders are willing to accept in order to address a global investor base
although they concomitantly may wish to retain as much of their private
benefits as possible.
1. General Scope of Application
While the rigid grasp of federal U.S. securities laws leaves only minor
latitude for U.S. exchanges to design the legal framework governing the
issuers' duties and the trading activity on their markets, European national
regulators and exchanges find significantly more leeway to vary important
parts of the legal package they wish to offer to cross-listing firms. In
contrast to U.S. securities laws which generally do not distinguish between
market segments and simply apply to all securities admitted to an official
implement the new regulatory regime).
84. See Final Report of The Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets (Feb. 15, 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal -market/securities/docs/amfaussy/wisemen/fina-report-wise-
menen.pdf (reporting that the Committee of Wise Men, chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy,
proposed to purge the legislative process and leave most of the technical details covered by
E.U. securities laws for the determination by certain non-parliamentary regulatory bodies).
85. Several Pan-European bodies are supposed to ensure the coherent interpretation and
administration of E.U. law. One such body is the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR) established by Committee Decision of June 6 2001. See Council
Directive 2001/527, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43 (EC); see also ElLis FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU
SECURITIES MARKET 78-81 (2004) (discussing CESR's role as a coordinating network); Iris
H-Y Chiu, Three Challenges Ahead for the New EU Securities Regulation Directives, 17
EUR. Bus. L. REv. 121, 128-32 (2006) (outlining the various obstacles CESR faces in its
strive towards regulatory convergence which is dependent on national regulators'
ungrudging cooperation).
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stock exchange,86 European laws regulate, with declining intensity,
securities" which are admitted to official listing or are the subject of an
application for admission to official listing on a stock exchange,88 securities
trading on regulated markets or multilateral trading facilities,89 and
securities admitted or seeking admission to other capital market segments.
The distinction between official listing and regulated market trading
historically set the course with regard to the magnitude of European
regulatory predetermination. However, recent reforms largely leveled the
differences. Today, only a few obligations imposed by European law still
remain reserved for issuers with or in search of official listing.90 Although
this expansion of the regulatory grip only occurred over the last few years
and very recently established the most extensive scope of legal bonding
instruments at hand for issuers seeking listings on an E.U. regulated
market,9 this instance will not perceptibly affect the analysis conducted
here. Shares admitted to the LSE's Main Market were admitted to official
listing. In contrast, securities trading on AIM are neither admitted to
official listing nor to a regulated market in terms of E.U. securities laws.92
By establishing AIM outside the official list and the regulated market, the
LSE afforded itself the highest degree of regulatory flexibility conceivable.
However, conflict of laws considerations are important with regard to
European securities regulation. The traditional rules are based upon the
principle of market affection. To wit, the legal regime of the market being
affected most eminently will govern the pertinent conduct or transaction.
86. Supra Part IV.A.
87. With relevance to the issues discussed here, the core definition of what constitutes a
security governed by European capital market regulations is shares in companies and
depositary receipts in respect to shares. See Markets in Financial Instruments Directive,
supra note 82, art. 4(l)(18)(a). Prior to the promulgation of the Directive, an identical
definition could be found in Council Directive 93/22/EEC of May 10, 1993 on investment
services in the securities field. See Council Directive 93/22, art. 1(4), 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27
(EC) [hereinafter Investment Services Directive].
88. Cf. Consolidated Admission and Reporting Directive, supra note 82, art. 2(1).
89. Cf. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, supra note 82, arts. 1(14), (15).
90. European law, while leaving conditions for admission into other market segments in
the member states' discretion, mandates admission to official listing and sets out the
conditions for it in the Consolidated Admission and Reporting Directive. See Consolidated
Admission and Reporting Directive, supra note 82, arts. 5-19, 42-63.
91. Moreover, the deadlines for transposition of certain directives passed just very
recently. Cf Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, supra note 82, art. 70 as amended
by Directive 2006/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006
amending in regards to certain deadlines Council Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in
financial instruments, as regards certain deadlines (defining a transposition deadline of
January 31 2007); Transparency Directive, supra note 82, art. 31 (bearing a transposition
deadline of January 20 2007).
92. For a complete list of E.U. regulated markets, see Annotated Presentation of
Regulated Markets and National Provisions Implementing Relevant Requirements of
Investment Service Directive (93/22/EEC), 2007 O.J. (C 38) 5.
2007]
134 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:1
Hence, in the context of exchange traded securities, admission to a certain
exchange in principle determines the applicability of the entire law of the
market.9 3 Yet, the post-FSAP conflict of laws rules differ in important
respects, as they bundle pivotal parts of securities laws with the issuers'
jurisdiction of incorporation if the latter lies in the European Economic
Area (E.E.A.). 94  In particular, initial disclosure under the Prospectus
Directive, continuing reporting duties under the Transparency Directive,
and rules concerning mandatory bids and board obligations under the
Takeover Directive are governed by the securities laws of an E.E.A.
issuer's jurisdiction of incorporation, which will be administered by the
pertinent member state's competent authorities. 95 As a consequence, opting
into U.K. securities laws governing the LSE's Main Market 96 has become
far more cumbersome for E.E.A. issuers, who would not only have to
cross-list their equities but also transfer their registered offices. 97 On the
other hand, life for third-country issuers remains as easy as before since
after cross-listing they are governed by the securities laws of the E.E.A.
host market. 98 Yet, even with regard to E.E.A. issuers, the relevance of the
change in conflict of laws rules associated with the FSAP implementing
measures is limited with regard to this paper's objective. The transposition
deadlines of the pertinent Directives only passed very recently, some even
after the period under scrutiny here.99 Hence, during most of the time,
93. See, e.g., Consolidated Admissions and Reporting Directive, supra note 82, arts.
2(1), 3(1), 11(1), 105 (prescribing primary and secondary market disclosure in accordance
with the law and under the supervision of the competent authority of the member state
where admission to listing is sought).
94. Agreement on the European Economic Area, Jan. 1, 1994, art. 7, 1994 O.J. (L 1) 3,
9 (iterating that the relevant E.U. Directives are binding for E.E.A. member states and have
to be incorporated into domestic law).
95. As an underlying principle, the applicable law is determined by administrative
competence which relieves the supervising bodies from applying foreign law. Cf
Prospectus Directive, supra note 82, arts. 2(l)(m)(i), 13; Transparency Directive, supra note
82, arts. 2(1)(i)(i),cl.1, 19(1), 2 1(1); Takeover Directive, supra note 82, art. 4(2)(e).
96. With AIM falling outside the scope of the FSAP-implementing Directives, it is also
not subject to their conflict of laws rules. Cf supra note 92 and text accompanying it
(standing for the proposition that AIM falls outside the scope of FSAP-implementing
Directives). As a consequence, the traditional rule of market affection applies.
97. For a detailed analysis, cf Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Tr6ger, Issuer Choice in
Europe, 17-22 (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No.
90, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract - 1032281.
98. See, e.g., Prospectus Directive, supra note 82, art. 2(1)(m)(iii) (defining the "home
member state" for third-country issuers as where the securities are to be offered first or
where the first application for admission to trading on a regulated market is made);
Transparency Directive, supra note 82, art. 2(l)(i)(i) indent 2 (defining the "home member
state" for a third-country issuer as the member state where it must file mandatory annual
information, i.e. the "home member state" under the Prospectus Directive).
99. See supra note 82 (listing the transposition dates for the various Council
Directives).
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E.E.A. issuers were afforded the full scope of bonding opportunities
available under U.K. securities laws when they had shares cross-listed on
the Main Market.
2. Admission Standards
Substantive minimum standards for admission to a stock exchange do
not add much to investor protection against ex-post expropriation. Neither
does the financial standing of the company, nor its trading record say much
about the threat of controller opportunism. Furthermore, requirements of a
substantial free-float at best provide a viable, albeit tardy, exit opportunity
if corporate insiders are observed exhibiting rent-seeking behavior. Yet,
examining the relevant markets' admission standards is interesting as it
hints at the regulatory strategy pursued by market operators.
The substantive admission standards for the LSE's Main Market are
set by the U.K. Listing Authority (UKLA), a branch of the Financial
Services Authority (FSA), which grants admission to the official list.'00
The LSE does not set higher standards. Under UKLA standards, eligible
issuers are required to have a market capitalization of £700,000
($1,375,000).'0' Also, 25% of the securities 2 for which admission is
sought have to be distributed in public hands. 0 3 The securities of a non-
EEA issuer prior to admittance to secondary listing in the U.K. must also
be listed in the issuer's country of incorporation or the country where the
majority of shares are held.'04 Issuers can opt for stronger checks at the
initial stage of their cross-listing program (as well as later down the road)
by seeking a primary listing'0 5 where they must prove to the UKLA that
100. The Financial Services and Markets Act [FSMA] 2000, c.8, §§ 73(1), 74(4), sched.
1 (Eng. 2005) (amending section 1 (1) to state the desirability of facilitating innovation and
competition in listed securities and repealing section 74(4)).
101. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 2.2.7.(1)(a) (2007) (prescribing minimum
market capitalization). FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 14.2.1 (2007) (explaining
that for overseas listing companies, i.e. non U.K. issuers, the requisites set up for U.K.
issuers in Listing Rule 2 generally apply).
102. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS, "transferable securities" (2007)
(note stating that the term as used in the Listing Rules refers to the European definition laid
out in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, supra note 87, and its predecessors,
so that it encompasses stock and depositary receipts).
103. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 14.2.2 (2007).
104. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 14.2.4 (2007) (attempting to prevent
those issuers from gaining access to U.K. equity markets who fail to comply with their
home country standards of investor protection, although the requisite can be waived if the
UKLA is convinced that it is not a lack of compliance with investor protection standards
that accounts for the absence of a listing).
105. Cf FIN. SERVS. AuTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 14.2.6 (2007) (giving overseas listing
companies the choice to opt for a secondary listing in which case they only must meet the
requisites set forward in FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 2, or to seek a primary
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they have sufficient working capital for at least 12 months 0 6 and have
audited accounts for a three-year period which ends no earlier than 6
months before the prospective admission.'0 7 Moreover, they should have
an independent trading and revenue-earning record for at least 75% of their
business covering the same period that is required for audited accounts.1 °8
As a trading platform catering to smaller, fast-growing companies,
AIM deliberately has minimal substantive admission standards. It does not
require a minimum company size, a minimum fraction of publicly held
shares, or a trading record.
Accessing NASDAQ for the first time through its Capital Market
segment'0 9 requires foreign private issuers to have stockholders' equity of
at least $5 million, a market value of the listed securities of at least $50
million, or a net income from continuing operations in the latest fiscal year
or in two of the last three fiscal years of $750,000."10 Moreover, NASDAQ
requires 300 round-lot holders"'. (300 holders of at least 100 securities),
1 2
1 million publicly held shares with a market value of $5 million,"13 and a
minimum bid-price for the stock or ADR of $4.'14 In case of ADR-listings,
100,000 of the receipts shall actually be issued at initial inclusion." 5 An
operating history" 6 is not required for foreign issuers other than Canadian
companies.
Equity securities or DRs of foreign issuers may be admitted to trading
on the AMEX under Initial Listing Standard 1 if the issuer had a pre-tax
income from continuing operations of at least $750,000 during the last
fiscal year or in two of the last three fiscal years, a market value of the
public float of $3 million, a minimum bid price for the stock or DR of $3,
and shareholders' equity of at least $4 million." 7  Alternatively, issuers
qualify for admission under Initial Listing Standard 2 if the market value of
listing which requires full compliance with FIN. SERVS. AuTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 6-13).
106. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 6.1.16 (2007).
107. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 6.1.3 (2007).
108. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 6.1.4 (2007).
109. The NASDAQ operates two other market segments with higher admission
requisites: the Global Select Market and the Global Market.
110. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4320(e)(2)(A) (April 15, 2004).
11. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4320(e)(4) (April 15, 2004).
112. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4200(a)(33) (April 15, 2004) (stating
that a round lot holder is a holder of a "normal unit of trading"); NASDAQ, INC., MARKET
PLACE RULES, Rule 4200(a)(3 1) (April 15, 2004) (meaning that a round lot holder amounts
to 100 securities).
113. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4320(e)(5) (April 15, 2004).
114. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4320(e)(2)(E) (April 15, 2004).
115. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4320(e)(7) (April 15, 2004).
116. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4310(c)(3) (April 15, 2004) (requiring
U.S. issuers to have an operating history of at least one year or a market value of at least $50
million US dollars).
117. AMEX, LLC, COMPANY GUIDE, § 10 1(a), § 102(b), § 110(a) (2007).
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their public float is at least $15 million, they have an operating history of at
least 2 years, set the minimum bid price at $3, and have shareholders'
equity of no less than $4 million." 8 Securities can also be admitted under
Initial Listing Standard 3 if the issuer exhibits a market capitalization of
$50 million, the market value of the public float does not fall short of $15
million, the minimum bid price is set at $2, and shareholders' equity is at
least $4 million." 9 Finally, under Initial Listing Standard 4, issuers with a
market capitalization of at least $75 million or total assets and revenue of
no less than $75 million each in the last fiscal year or in two of their last
three fiscal years can apply for admission of their equity securities to the
AMEX if the market value of the public float is at least $20 million and the
securities are offered at a price of $3 or more. 2° In addition to the
requirements set forth in any of the Initial Listing Standards, the issuer
must have at least 800 U.S. public shareholders together with a public float
of 500,000 shares or 400 public shareholders together with either 1,000,000
publicly traded shares or 500,000 such shares if a daily trading volume of
at least 2,000 shares was observed during the six months preceding the
intended listing. 2' Alternatively, foreign issuers can satisfy the distribution
requirements by showing that they had 800 round-lot public shareholders
worldwide, 1 million shares were held publicly worldwide, and that the
global public float had a market value of at least $3 million.
22
Foreign issuers can seek admission to the NYSE by fulfilling either
the Domestic Listing requirements or the Alternate Listing standards for
foreign private issuers. Compliance with the Domestic standards requires
meeting the distribution criteria with regard to U.S. shareholders of record
(or for Mexican and Canadian firms with regard to North American holders
of record). In contrast, the Alternate Listing standards focus on worldwide
distribution. 1
23
To be admitted to the NYSE in accordance with the Domestic Listing
requirements, a foreign private issuer must have 400 U.S. holders of a
trading-unit. 24 Such unit is generally assumed to consist of 100 or more
shares, 2,200 total U.S. stockholders and an average monthly trading-
volume of 100,000 shares for the last six months, or 500 total U.S.
stockholders and an average monthly trading volume of 1,000,000 shares
118. AMEX, LLC, COMPANY GUIDE, § 10 1(b), § 102(b), § 110(a) (2007).
119. AMEX, LLC, COMPANY GUIDE, § 101(c), § 102(b), § 110(a) (2007).
120. AMEX, LLC, COMPANY GUIDE, § 101(d), § 102(b), § 110(a) (2007).
121. AMEX, LLC, COMPANY GUIDE, § 101(a)(3), (b)(3), (c)(4), (d)(3), § 102(b), § 110(a)
(2007).
122. AMEX, LLC, COMPANY GUIDE, § 110(a) (2007).
123. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 103.00 (2007).
124. The NYSE has recently lowered the requirement from 2000 round lot holders it
demanded until August 2006.
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for the most recent 12 months. 25 Issuers must publicly hold 1,100,000
shares 2 6 with an aggregate market value of $100 million. This market
value may also be $60 million if the listing occurs at the time of an IPO, as
a result of a spin-off, or under the Affiliated Company standard.2 7 Finally,
the issuer has to meet one of the following financial requirements. 28 The
issuer must meet the earnings test, which requires either featuring an
aggregate pre-tax income of at least $10 million for the last three years with
a minimum of at least $2 million in the two preceding years and positive
amounts in all three years or at least an aggregate of $12 million for the last
three years with a minimum of $5 million in the recent year and $2 million
in the next most recent fiscal year. 29 Two other ways for the issuer to
fulfill the financial standards for a NYSE listing is to either meet the
valuation/revenue with cash flow test or the pure valuation revenue test.
The valuation/revenue with cash flow test requires that the eligible issuer
has a global market capitalization of at least $500 million, at least $100
million in revenues during the most recent 12 months, and at least $25
million in aggregate cash flow for the last three fiscal years with positive
amounts in all three. The pure valuation/revenue test requires issuers to
have $750 million in global market capitalization and at least $75 million
in revenues during the most recent fiscal year.1
30
To be admitted to NYSE in accordance with the non-U.S. listing
requirements, foreign private issuers must have 5,000 holders of 100 or
more shares worldwide 3 ' and no less than 2.5 million shares held publicly
worldwide. 3 2 With regard to the aggregate market value of publicly-held
shares, non-U.S. listing requirements conform to domestic standards.'33
Finally, demanding financial standards apply. 3 4  Issuers must meet an
125. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 102.01(A) (2007).
126. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 102.01(A) (2007).
127. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 102.01(B) (2007).
128. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 102.01(C)(III) (2007) (detailing the
affiliated company test which is omitted here for the sake of brevity).
129. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 102.01(C)(1) (2007). The second
alternative of the earnings test was introduced only in August 2006. Until January 2004, the
NYSE required $2.5 million in the latest fiscal year together with $2 million in each of the
preceding two years or $6.5 million in the aggregate for the last three fiscal years together
with a minimum of $4.5 million in the most recent fiscal year, and positive amounts for each
of the preceding two years.
130. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 102.01(C)(II) (2007). Until January
2004 the NYSE required at least $200 million in revenues within the valuation/revenue with
cash flow test and reserved the pure valuation/revenue test for issuers with a global market
capitalization of $1 billion and $100 million in cash-flow.
131. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 103.01(A) (2007).
132. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 103.01(A) (2007).
133. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 103.01(A) (2007) (requiring either $100
million and $60 million in case of IPO, spin-off, or affiliation).
134. See also NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 103.0 1(B)(l1I) (2007) (detailing
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earnings test requiring an aggregate pre-tax income of at least $100 million
for the last three years with a minimum of at least $25 million in the two
preceding years. 35 They can also meet the financial listing requirements if
they meet one of two tests. One is the valuation/revenue with cash flow
test, which requires issuers to feature a global market capitalization of at
least $500 million, at least $100 million in revenues during the most recent
12 months, and at least $100 million aggregate cash flow for the last three
fiscal years, where each of the two most recent years is reported at a
minimum of $25 million. The other is the pure valuation/revenue test,
which requires issuers to have $750 million in global market capitalization
and at least $75 million in revenues during the most recent fiscal year.'
3 6
In sum, the NYSE has by far the most demanding admission
standards. U.S. exchanges generally erect higher hurdles for international
issuers seeking access to their markets. As was hinted before, however, the
effect of such relatively demanding listing requirements lies mainly in
sorting out smaller, less mature issuers, rather than adding much to the
mitigation of agency conflicts between shareholders and corporate insiders.
From an investor's perspective, the higher risk typically associated with
investments in fledgling businesses, which cannot be executed through
U.S. exchanges by virtue of their more preclusive admission standards,
does not represent a detriment to investment as long as investors are
supplied with the information necessary to facilitate adequate adjustments
in the financing contract.
3. Disclosure Duties
a. Mandatory disclosure for new issuers (prospectus) and
continuing disclosure requirements
Since the passage of the cardinal legislation of the 1930s, a supporting
pillar of U.S. securities laws is to mandate comprehensive disclosure to
secure adequate investor information.'37 At the initial stage, issuers must
prepare disclosure documents when offering securities to the public
regardless of whether or not they conduct an exchange offering."'
the affiliated company test, which is again omitted here).
135. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 103.01(B)(I) (2007).
136. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 103.01(B)(I1) (2007).
137. Besides the historical fundamental controversy about the need to regulate securities
markets to prevent information underproduction (supra note 5), there is also a modem
debate relating to the merits of the compulsory U.S. system. See, e.g., Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359
(1998) (advocating institutional competition in securities law); Fox, supra note 51
(defending the U.S. system).
138. Essentially, § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000)) prohibits
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Similarly, irrespective of the manner of distribution, European law
proscribes the offer of securities to be made to the public within a member
state's territory without prior publication of a prospectus. 39 Basically, any
new equity offerings on AMEX, NASDAQ, NYSE, LSE Main Market or
AIM require a prospectus. The respective exemptions for private
placements to sophisticated investors are of negligible relevance in this
context. 140 The registration document and prospectus must contain detailed
statements about the offered securities, the intended use of the proceeds,
the nature and performance of the issuer's business as well as the identity
of managers and large blockholders.' 41 As aforementioned, under conflict
of laws provisions contained in the Prospectus Directive, after July 2005,
E.E.A. issuers could not escape their home country's prospectus regime by
cross-listing shares on the LSE's Main Market. 142 However, the Prospectus
Directive applies equally to all affected issuers and represents a maximum
harmonization effort: it aims to implement identical substantive standards
in all member states. 43  Hence, regulators are stripped of latitude for
national variations restricting regulatory arbitrage considerations to
differences in the common rules' administration and enforcement.
Although differences between competent authorities and member states'
liability systems exist, the potential for accomplishing significant
improvements with a London cross-listing seems rather limited. This is
particularly true as the UKLA is not the keenest watchdog and private
enforcement in the U.K. is largely non-existent.
144
public offerings to U.S. investors by domestic and foreign private issuers when no
registration statement complying with §§ 6 and 7 (15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77g (2000 & Supp. IV
2004)) has been filed with the SEC. Neither § 3 nor § 4 of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. §
77c-d (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)) provides any categorical exemption for offerings of foreign
private issuers.
139. Prospectus Directive, supra note 82, art. 3(1).
140. For details, cf Regulation D, especially Rules 505 and 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505
(2006), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006), as well as Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2006) for
the U.S., and Prospectus Directive, art. 3(2), FSMA, § 85(1) for the U.K..
141. For details, cf. § 7 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2000); Schedule A, 17
C.F.R. § 230.610a (2006); Regulation S-K Items 501-512, 17 C.F.R. § 229.501-229.512
(2006) (U.S.); Prospectus Directive, supra note 82, arts. 5, 7, and Annex I; Commission
Regulation (EC) 809/2004 of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses as
well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and
dissemination of advertisements, arts. 3-28, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1. Cf Simon Gleeson &
Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Public Offer of Securities in the United Kingdom, 27 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 359 (1999); Mark I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global
Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Communality and Reciprocity,
20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 (1999) (both providing partly outdated in-depth comparisons).
142. Supra Part IV.C.1.
143. For an assessment, cf FERRAN, supra note 85, at 143.
144. See infra Parts IV.C.6. and IV.C.9.
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With regard to continuous disclosure requirements, foreign private
issuers enter the U.S. system under § 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
by registering ADRs with the SEC pursuant to § 12 of the Act.
Consequently, issuers cross-listing shares on the AMEX, the NASDAQ, or
the NYSE are obliged to file annual reports according to Rule 13d-1145 on
Form 20-F 14 6 within six months after the end of the fiscal year covered in
the report. They are, however, exempt from the requirement to file
quarterly reports under Rule 13d-13,147 but must file on Form 6-K 148 the
information the issuer makes or is required to make public by law at home,
the information the issuer files or is required to file with the stock exchange
where his securities are listed if the pertinent information was made public
by the exchange, and the information the issuer distributed or had to
distribute to its security holders.149 NASDAQ requires its listed companies
to publish (and submit on Form 6-K) an interim balance sheet and income
statement as of the end of its second quarter no later than six months after
the end of the second quarter. 5 ° However, foreign private issuers can
follow their home country's practices in lieu of Market Place Rule 4350 if
they disclose their non-compliance. 5' Similarly, foreign private issuers on
AMEX can waive the duty to publish quarterly earnings statements if they
provide written certification from independent local counsel that the non-
complying practice does not infringe upon domestic laws. 5 2 The NYSE,
however, does not impose any duty to publish interim statements.
Akin to the relaxations of the duty to file quarterly reports, current
reports of significant events on Form 8-K are not required from foreign
private issuers who make reports on Form 6-K.1
53
The European Transparency Directive, which applies to issuers of
securities trading on a regulated market, compels companies to publish
annual reports within four months after the end of the fiscal year. These
annual reports must be comprised of the audited financial statements and
the management report, among other things. 54  Semi-annual reports,
including condensed financial statements and interim management reports,
must be published within two months after the end of the second fiscal
quarter. 155 Granted, this rather stringent regime only very recently replaced
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2006).
146. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f(2006).
147. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d (2006).
148. 17 C.F.R. § 249.306 (2006).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-16(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 249.306 (2006).
150. The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., Market Place Rules, Rule 4350(b)(4) (2004).
151. The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., Market Place Rules, Rule 4350(a) (2004).
152. AMEX, LLC, Company Guide, § 110 (2007).
153. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 1(b) (2006).
154. Transparency Directive, supra, note 82, art. 4(1).
155. Transparency Directive, supra note 82, art. 5(1).
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the Interim Report Directive"5 6 and its successor, the Consolidated
Admission and Reporting Directive. However, even before the scope of
application was extended to regulated markets, issuers cross-listing their
shares on the LSE's Main Market were subject to respective interim
reporting duties as admission to the main market represented an official
listing in terms of the directives.'57 AIM companies were not included in
the disclosure obligations mapped out by European law, as AIM neither
belongs to the official list nor constitutes a regulated market. However, the
AIM rules require companies to publish not only annual accounts but also
half-yearly reports within three months after the end of the respective six-
month period.'58
In terms of significant events that arise during the issuer's normal
course of business, the Market Abuse Directive establishes a
comprehensive regime of ad hoc disclosure of non-public information with
relevance to stock prices applicable to securities admitted to a regulated
market. 59 The European disclosure obligation has been incorporated into
U.K. securities laws in the Disclosure Rules applying to foreign issuers that
have their shares cross-listed on the LSE's Main Market. 60 The stringent
U.K. regime also extends to AIM companies whose securities do not trade
on a regulated market.' 6' Consequently, with regard to significant events,
the U.K. disclosure regime seems far stricter. The law on the books offers
more bonding opportunities than the one applicable under U.S. securities
laws, which exempts foreign private issuers from original ad hoc disclosure
duties on Form 8-K.
156. Council Directive 82/121/EEC of 15 February 1982 on information to be published
on a regular basis by companies the shares of which have been admitted to official stock-
exchange listing [hereinafter Interim Reporting Directive], art. 2, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26.
157. Id., art. 2; Consolidated Admission and Reporting Directive, supra note 82, art. 70.
For the implementation of the obligations, see FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rules
9.8.1., 9.8.2. (2007) (covering overseas issuers with primary listings); FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,
LISTING RULES, Rules 14.4.8-14.4.13 (2007) (covering overseas issuers with secondary
listings, in force until Jan. 19, 2007).
158. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 18 (2007).
159. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 82, art. 6. Materially identical regulations
could be found in both the Consolidated Admission and Reporting Directive, supra note 82,
art. 68 (covering official listings), and Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989
coordinating regulations on insider dealing, art. 7, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30 (governing
regulated markets).
160. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY RULES, Rule 2 (2007).
161. Originally, AIM ad hoc disclosure standards were laid out in statutory law, cf The
Traded Securities (Disclosure Regulations) Statutory Instrument 1994 No. 188, Reg. 3,
(1994) (Eng.). These provisions were repealed in 2005; see The Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2005, Reg. 9 (2005) SI 2005/381 (Eng.).
The pertinent disclosure duties are now contained in the LSE's self-regulation; see LONDON
STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 11 (2007).
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Commentators have pointed to the fact that while the contents of
annual and interim reports (where required) generally are roughly
equivalent across the jurisdictions compared here, significant differences
persist in forward-looking information. 62 Although particularly short-term
prognoses of earnings per share are incrementally regarded as supporting
undesirable myopic speculation, surveys among issuers indicate the
growing importance of more complex long-term forecasting. 63 While U.S.
law requires issuers rather extensively to discuss "known trends or
uncertainties" in the management discussion and analysis report ('MD&A-
report'),' 64 European law is less stringent in this respect.1
65
Another regulatory aspect worth noting pertains to the disclosure
duties of a specific group of foreign private issuers under U.S. securities
laws. Studies reveal that Canadian issuers comprise by far the largest share
of international new admissions to U.S. exchanges. 166  This insight is
particularly important from the bonding angle: the Multijurisdictional
Disclosure System (MJDS), 167 first adopted by the SEC in 1991, establishes
a regime of far reaching mutual recognition, which allows eligible
Canadian issuers to fulfill both disclosure obligations to primary markets
and continuous disclosure requirements pertaining to secondary markets by
providing Canadian prospectuses and ongoing disclosure instruments that
are subject only to Canadian authorities' oversight. 168 Although the MJDS
has had the side-effect of bringing Canadian securities laws closer to U.S.
162. Gdrard Hertig, Rainier Kraakman & Edward Rock, Issuers and Investor Protection,
in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 193, 199-200 (2004).
163. Cf NATIONAL INVESTOR RELATION INSTITUTE (NIRI), 2007 Earnings Guidance
Practices Survey Results, 5-6 (2007), available at
http://www.niri.org/news_mediacenter/ea07O6O4data.pdf (finding 58% of respondents
providing only annual earnings estimates compared to 27% also publishing quarterly
forecasts and 50% of respondents supplying other quantitative financial data than earnings
per share, revenue and cash flow).
164. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006).
165. In fact, the interim management statements mandated by the Transparency
Directive, art. 6, do not compel an extensive discussion of the issuers prospects. The state
familiar from the Consolidated Admission and Reporting Directive has not changed.
166. Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, supra note 38, at 49-50, Tables 2 & 3 (showing 399
exchange cross-listings from Canada and a total of 1244 between 1990 and 2005).
167. Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications of the Current Registration and
Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 29,354, 56 Fed. Reg.
30,036 (proposed July 1, 1991).
168. For details, cf 17 C.F.R. § 239.40 (2006) (regarding registration statements on
Form F-10); 17 C.F.R § 249.240f (2006) (covering annual reports on Form 40-F); 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.306 (pertaining to interim disclosure on Form 6-K). For a detailed description of the
MJDS eligibility criteria, see Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, The
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System and other Cross-Border Offerings, 20 DENy. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 551, 557-64 (1992); Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments in International
Securities Regulation, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 347, 385-87 (1995).
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standards,169 thereby producing changes in Canadian firms' governance
environment via harmonization, the pivotal aspect regarding the bonding
hypothesis persists: nearly one-third of the foreign issuers cross-listing on
U.S. exchanges are not compelled to submit to critical parts of U.S.
securities regulation. Hence, a huge fragment of issuers cross-listing in the
U.S. in fact are not afforded a strong bonding opportunity from the
pertinent transactions in terms of black-letter law and public enforcement.
However, the aspect of enhanced deterrence of false or incomplete
disclosure as a result of significantly stricter penalties for violations in
private litigation remains. 17 0
b. Related-party transactions
Ex post expropriation of investors looms large when controllers
(management and dominant shareholders) engage in transactions with the
company. Hence, important legal bonding devices can accrue from
safeguards applicable with regard to related-party transactions.
U.S. securities laws require a domestic issuer to disclose its top five
managers' compensation in its annual report."' U.S. issuers must also
disclose all transactions between the issuer and its managers if the latter
had a material interest in the transaction and it exceeded $120,000 in
value. 17 2 The latter disclosure duty also applies if the transaction involves a
5% shareholder as referred to in Item 403(a) of 
Regulation S-K.
17 3
However, foreign private issuers are largely exempt from this regime.
First, U.S. law does not compel the disclosure of the individual
remuneration of executives if the issuer does not provide this information
for other reasons anyway. 7 4 Second, instead of hinging on a rather low,
bright-line threshold, the duty to disclose information on transactions of the
169. Douglas W. Amer, Globalisation of Financial Markets: An International Passport
for Securities Offerings?, 35 INT'L LAW. 1543, 1551 (2001) (finding increased
harmonization in U.S. and Canadian regulation with "Canadian authorities making most of
the compromises").
170. See infra Parts IV.C.6. and IV.C.9.
171. Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2006).
172. Certain Relationships and Related Transactions: Transaction With Management and
Others, 17 C.F.R. §229.404(a) (2006) (requiring disclosure where "the registrant was or is to
be a participant and the amount involved exceeds S 120,000, and in which any related person
had or will have a direct or indirect material interest."). Until November 2006, the threshold
was set at $60,000, cf. SEC Release Executive Compensation and Related Person
Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 174,53158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (proposing amendment increasing
threshold to adjust for inflation).
173. 17 C.F.R. §229.404(a) (2006).
174. See Form 20-F, Item 6B, 17 C.F.R. § 240.220f (2006) (requiring individual
disclosure of executive compensation only if it is required in the issuer's home country or is
otherwise publicly disclosed).
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issuer with its officers, directors and control persons depends on a
fluctuating materiality test or the conditions of the transaction. 175 Similarly,
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the U.S. require
annual disclosure of all "material" transactions between the company and
its directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.'7 6 Finally, while U.S.
issuer's directors, officers, and principal shareholders who hold a stake of
at least 10% must report any of their transactions in the issuer's shares
within two business days,'77 no such duty applies to these persons in
relation to a foreign private issuer. 7 8  Substantive safeguards beyond
disclosure (like approval made by a disinterested board or shareholder
ratification) fall within the ambit of corporate law 179 and are hence
unavailable as bonding devices for cross-listing issuers incorporated
outside the U.S.
In Europe, disclosure duties with regard to related-party transactions
have traditionally been chary. Issuers with shares trading on regulated
markets only have to disclose transactions with managers that are unusual
in their nature or conditions, along with aggregate remuneration paid to
members of management and the executive board, and the total of
outstanding loans to these persons.80 A tighter regime is likely to find its
way into pertinent European securities laws only through the prescription
175. Form 20-F, Item 7B, 17 C.F.R. § 240.220f (2006) (requiring disclosure of related-
party transactions involving foreign private issuers only if they "are material to the company
or the related party, or ... are unusual in their nature or conditions").
176. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 57, RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURE (Mar. 1982) ("Financial
statements shall include disclosures of material related-party transactions, other than
compensation arrangements, expense allowances, and other similar items in the ordinary
course of business.").
177. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2000 & Supp IV
2004). The two business-day filing requirement was introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 745, 746
(2002).
178. Rule 3a12-3, 17 C.F.R. § 229.3a12-3 (granting foreign private issuers exemption
from Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16).
179. State laws do not submit related-party transactions to mandatory board or
shareholder approval but provide protection against shareholder suits challenging the
fairness of conflicted transactions by applying the business judgment rule in case of prior
consent of independent board members or shareholders. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, 2000 WL
710199 (Del. Ch. 2000) (discussing board approval); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327
(Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing shareholder approval of board compensation); In Re
Wheelabrator Technologies Inc., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995) (discussing shareholder
approval). For a general discussion, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions
In Corporate Law, 13 J. CORP. L. 997 (1988).
180. Consolidated Admission and Reporting Directive, art. 67, Annex I, Schedule A,
6.2.0, 6.2.2., 6.2.3. (EC) (requiring annual accounts and reports to provide a "true and fair
view of the company's assets and liabilities, financial position and profit or loss," which
includes the mentioned information).
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of International Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting
Standards (IAS/IFRS)' 8' for international issuers. These standards,
however, will not be effective for years82
Yet, for international issuers on the LSE's markets, somewhat stricter
disclosure rules are spelled out in domestic securities regulations. Issuers
listing on the Main Market and seeking only a secondary listing'
8 3 are not
subject to the pertinent parts of the U.K. listing rules.'84 But overseas
issuers that obtained a primary listing are subject to a sophisticated
regime,"' governing related-party transactions, 116 except where the
transaction is of insignificant proportion in relation to the issuer's key
data8 . or is of a specified kind and does not contain any unusual features.'8 8
181. Cf International Accounting Standards Board, International Accounting Standard
No. 24, Related Party Disclosure. (U.K.) (enumerating stringent disclosure requirements for
related-party transactions).
182. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
183. Cf supra note 105.
184. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11 (2007).
185. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11 (2007) (becoming applicable in case of
a primary listing of an overseas issuer); cf FIN. SERVS. AuTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 14.2.6.
(2007) (indicating rules that must be complied with by "[a]n overseas issuer with a
secondary listing of equity securities applying for a primary listing of its securities").
186. For the broad definition, see FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11.1.5 (2007).
187. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11.1.6(1) (2007) and FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,
LISTING RULES, Rule 11 Annex IR (1) (2007). The rule exempts any related-party
transaction where each of the applicable percentage ratios is below 0.25%. The implicitly
referred-to class tests are determined in FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 10 Annex 1
(2007). The gross-asset test (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 10 Annex 1 (2R)
(2007)) looks at the ratio of the gross assets involved in the transaction to the issuer's gross
assets. The profit test (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 10 Annex I (4R) (2007))
conducts the same calculation with regard to the profits attributable to the assets subject of
the transaction and the issuer's total profits. The consideration test (FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,
LISTING RULES, Rule 10 Annex 1 (5R) (2007)) relates the consideration received in the
transaction to the aggregate market value of the issuer's ordinary shares (excluding treasury
shares). Finally, the gross-capital test (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 10 Annex 1
(7R) (2007)) divides the gross capital of the acquired entity by the gross capital of the
issuer.
188. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11.1.6(2) and Rule 1 1 Annex IR (2)-(l0)
(2007). Under usual conditions, the rule exempts the participation of a related party in the
issuance of new securities and the sale of treasury shares (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING
RULES, Rule 11 Annex 1 R (2) (2007)), in employee share schemes and long-term incentive
schemes (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 1 1 Annex 1R (3) (2007)), in the
extension of credit (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11 Annex 1R (4) (2007)), in
granting directors' indemnity (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11 Annex lR (5)
(2007)), in underwritings (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 1 1 Annex lR (6)
(2007)), and in smaller joint investment activities (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule
11 Annex 1 R (8) (2007)). With regard to 50:50 joint ventures, any transaction not relating
to the joint venture is also exempted (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11 Annex IR
(7) (2007)). Finally, transactions with parties whose relation is only to an insignificant
subsidiary (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11 Annex 1R (9) (2007)) or results
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Issuers engaging in related-party transactions included in the regime have
to publicly disclose'89 and circulate to their shareholders'9" a detailed
description of the pertinent dealings. Most importantly, the issuer must
seek shareholder consent in a general meeting in which neither the related
party nor any associate is allowed to cast its vote.' 9' Where the related-
party transaction is of minor magnitude, the issuer does not have to seek ex
ante shareholder approval but is only obliged to provide the FSA with a
detailed description and an independent fairness assessment of the
transaction. 92 In the latter case the issuer must disclose the relevant details
of the transaction in his next annual accounts.
93
Issuers cross-listing on AIM are required to disclose details of related-
party transactions that surpass a 5% threshold in any of the class tests
94
without delay once the terms are fixed, along with the related party's
identity and her interest in the transaction.' 9' Furthermore, disinterested
directors have to consult and decide on the fairness of the transaction in so
far as it affects the interests of the issuer's shareholders. 196 Moreover, AIM
companies are, without relevant exception, subject to stringent accounting
standards.' 97  Hence, they fall within the ambit of their demanding
disclosure requirements with regard to related-party transactions. Finally,
AIM-listed issuers have to disclose without delay any information they
have on their directors' dealings in the companies' shares. 98
Compared to the U.K. related-party transaction regime, the U.S.
system applicable to foreign private issuers does not rely on significantly
more stringent disclosure duties. Moreover, it stops there, whereas the
from an insignificant joint venture (FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11 Annex I R
(10) (2007)) are also not subject to the rule.
189. For the precise content, cf FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11.1.7(1)
(2007) and FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 10.1.4 R (2007).
190. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11.1.7(2); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING
RULES, Rules 13.3 and 13.6 (2007).
191. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11.1.7(3)(4) (2007).
192. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11.1.10(2)(a)(b) (2007) (covering
transactions that do not reach a 5% ratio in any class test, but exceed the 0.25% ratio); FIN.
SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11.1.10(1) (2007).
193. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 11.1.10(2)(c) (2007).
194. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Schedule Three
(2007) (showing that besides the class tests familiar from the Listing Rules (supra note 187)
the AIM rules provide a turnover test in which the ratio of the turnover attributable to the
assets subject of the transaction to the total turnover of the issuer is determined).
195. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 13, indents I
and 2 (2007).
196. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 13, indent 3
(2007).
197. See infra Part IV.C.7.
198. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 17, indent 1
(2007).
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rules governing cross-listing issuers on the LSE's Main Market that have
sought a primary listing provide considerably stronger bonding possibilities
by requiring disinterested shareholder approval in some instances.
c. Significant holdings
Dispersed shareholders and potential investors have a substantial
interest in learning early about the assembling of substantial block
holdings, which may indicate takeover ambitions or at least the emergence
of a stronger concentration of power within the firm. U.S. securities laws
accommodate this interest in information by imposing a duty under § 13(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act to disclose any acquisition of a 5% stake in
registered equities within ten days to the issuer, the exchange where the
security is traded, and the SEC. 99 A similar obligation to report such
shareholding within 7 days to the issuer and the competent authority exists
pursuant to art. 9(1) of the Transparency Directive with regard to shares
trading on regulated markets. Yet it is important to remember that,
according to the Major Holding Directive and the Consolidated Admission
and Reporting Directive, effectively superseded by the Transparency
Directive only in 2007, until very recently the reporting threshold was set at
10%.200 Furthermore, the pertinent rules applied only to officially listed
companies incorporated under the laws of the member states, to wit, were
ultimately part of corporate law.2°1  Consequently, shareholders of
European issuers were exposed to a much higher risk of sneak-ups, and
shareholders of non-E.E.A. issuers were left practically unprotected.
Although the United Kingdom has a long-standing tradition of compelling
public disclosure of substantial beneficial share-ownerships, 22 this does not
alter the picture with regard to the aim of this paper. The important aspect
here is that the autonomous U.K. disclosure rules, which bit at a proportion
of 3% of the nominal value of shares, were part of English company law:
applied only to issuers incorporated in the United Kingdom.
203
Consequentially, they did not protect the shareholders or potential investors
of cross-listing international issuers, regardless of whether they were listed
199. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000).
200. Council Directive 88/627 of 12 December 1988 on the Information to be Published
when a Major Holding in a Listed Company is Acquired or Disposed of [hereinafter the
Major Holding Directive], art. 4(1), 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62 (EC). The Consolidated
Admissions and Reporting Directive in art 89 maintained the reporting threshold.
201. Cf Original Transparency Directive, art. 1(1); Consolidated Admissions and
Reporting Directive, art. 85(1).
202. The U.K. rule originated from the recommendations of the so called Cohen
Committee in 1945; cf REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT, 1945
Cmd. 6659 at 39-45.
203. Companies Act, 1985, c.6, §§ 198-220 (Eng.).
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on the LSE's Main Market or on AIM. The new European regime applying
to issuers admitted to regulated markets, regardless of their jurisdiction of
incorporation 2 °4 compelled the U.K. to adopt a new system of notification
as of January 20, 2007, which, naturally, is of no relevance in explaining
past events.2°5 However, an attenuated version of the strict U.K. regime of
disclosure of 3%-holdings was always imposed on issuers cross-listing on
AIM.206 It has significantly less bite insofar as it attaches the disclosure
obligation only to the issuer and compels it only to disclose the information
on significant shareholdings it actually has.
In light of the inapplicability of the European and most of the English
provisions in force during the period of interest with regard to foreign
issuers, it is of marginal importance that the scope of disclosure under the
U.S. system was and will be much broader than the pertinent European and
English provisions. In Schedule 13D, the acquirer of a substantial
shareholding must not only disclose his identity but also the source and
amount of funds deployed to buy the securities, the purpose of the
acquisition, and the nature of any arrangements relating to the target's
future to which he is a party. 207 Neither European nor U.K. law knows any
equivalent. It is here in particular that the limitations of the disclosure
regime imposed on AIM issuers becomes most palpable. Even if the issuer
knows of any significant block-building it will not typically be familiar
with the shareholder's interests in the transaction which would have to be
disclosed were they known to the issuer.20 8
d. Exit from the disclosure regime
It has been purported that one of the most important bonding
opportunities that U.S. securities laws provided-until June 2007209_
204. See Transparency Directive, supra note 82, art. 2(1)(d).
205. The U.K. regulator chose to implement the rules in chapter 5 of the new Disclosure
and Transparency Rules sourcebook. FSA, Transparency Obligations Directive (Disclosure
and Transparency Rules) Instrument 2006, available at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/handbook/Ll/2006/2006 70.pdf (showing that, with regard to
non-U.K. issuers, the FSA simply copied the E.U. directive).
206. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 17 indent 2
(2007). On the other hand, FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 9.6.10, which applies to
overseas issuers with a primary listing on the LSE's Main Market (supra note 105), does not
impose any disclosure requirements beyond the issuer's domestic law. Hence, it does not
provide a legal bonding device.
207. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (2000); 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Schedule 13D, Items 2-6 (2006).
208. Cf LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 17 indent 2
and Schedule Five (f) (2007).
209. Termination of Foreign Private Issuer's Registration and Duty to File Reports,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 55,540, 72 Fed. Reg. 16,934 (April 5, 2007).
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resulted from the inescapability of their disclosure regime.2" ° This feature
arguably rendered international issuers' commitment to continuous high
quality investor information particularly credible and, consequently, should
have resulted in high bonding premiums for U.S. listings.
Under the regime in force during the whole period under scrutiny
here, the first step for cross-listing issuers wishing to terminate their
reporting duties under U.S. securities laws was to cancel their listing with
the U.S. exchange in order to end registration under § 12(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act.2 11 Rule 12d2-2(c) 2 1 2 provided that at least ten
days prior to filing for delisting with the SEC, the issuer had to notify the
exchange and the public via a press release and a posting on its website of
its intentions to withdraw a class of securities, and reveal the reasons for
such a withdrawal. 2 3 However, withdrawal from listing did not entail the
ultimate discontinuance of disclosure duties under § 13(a)214 or § 15(d) 215 of
the Securities Exchange Act. According to Rule 12g-2216, upon termination
of registration under § 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the affected
securities were deemed to be registered under § 12(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act if they were originally exempt from such registration solely
because of the now terminated registration under § 12(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, no other exemption from the registration requirement
applied," 7 and the shares were held by at least 300 persons of record. As a
consequence, continued reporting duties under § 13(a) of the Act applied.
Similarly, reporting duties under § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
were suspended with regard to a registration pursuant to § 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act and became active again in case such registration
was terminated.
Hence, the ultimate termination of reporting duties was only possible
if the affected securities were held by less than 300 persons of record or
210. Rock, supra note 69.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
212. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2(c) (2006).
213. Cf NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 808.00, 809.00 (2007); NASDAQ,
INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4380 (NASDAQ) (showing also that neither the NYSE
nor the NASDAQ impose any further substantive delisting prerequisites).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2000).
216. 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-2 (2006).
217. Foreign private issuers are in principle exempt from the registration duty under Rule
12g3-2(b), 17. C.F.R. §240.12g3-2(b) (2006), as long as they provide the SEC with the
mandated documents from their home jurisdictions. Yet, as a consequence of the
qualifications under 17 C.F.R. 12g3-2(d)(1)(2006), the exemption is of no practical
relevance. To wit, an obligation to register securities under § 12(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act accrues if during the most recent 18 months securities were registered under §
12 of the Securities Exchange Act, or during this period an active or suspended reporting
duty under § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act existed.
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less than 500 such persons if the issuer had assets of less than $10 million
on the last day of each of the three most recent fiscal years.218 Contrary to
the practice for U.S. issuers where shares held by brokers, dealers, banks or
nominees for their clients in street name are counted as belonging to one
holder, 219 foreign private issuers had to satisfy the holder-requirements with
regard to individual U.S. beneficial owners. 220 In preparatory squeeze-out
transactions, comprehensive disclosure duties under Rule 13e-3 221 applied;
222their violation gave shareholders a private right of action. Finally,
reporting duties under § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act could only be
suspended after the filing of at least one annual report and could never be
irrevocably terminated. The latter compelled issuers to check the number
of U.S. beneficial owners at the end of each fiscal year as such investors
might have acquired outstanding shares on the issuer's home market.
On the other side of the Atlantic, disclosure duties under European
and U.K. securities laws depend on a sustained listing, i.e. cross-listing
issuers "go dark" automatically after delisting from the LSE's markets.
Hence, the pivotal aspect with regard to investor protection and legal
bonding is how easily cross-listing issuers can terminate their U.K. listings.
Cross-listing issuers on the LSE's Main Market who wish to cancel
their listing have to send to their shareholders a circular disclosing this
intention and all relevant information pertaining to it.223 The circular has to
be approved by the FSA prior to its publication.224 Concomitant with the
information sent to shareholders, the intention to de-list has to be made
public. 225  Furthermore, the issuer has to seek prior approval of the
cancellation by no less than 75% of the shareholder votes cast in a general
meeting.226 The cancellation cannot take effect until 20 business days after
the shareholder resolution is passed. 27  Shareholder approval is not
required if the securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in an
E.E.A. member state when cancellation takes effect.2 28 Finally, shareholder
218. 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-4 (2006); 17 C.F.R. 240.12h-3 (2006).
219. 17 C.F.R. 240.12g5-1 (2002).
220. Cf Rule 12g4(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. 240.12g4(a)(2) (2006); 17 C.F.R. 240.12h-3(b)(2)
(2006).
221. 17 C.F.R § 240.13e-3 (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 Schedule 13E-3 (2006).
222. Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1474 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd 927
F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1991). In essence, the threat here is that shareholders claim a violation of
the disclosure duty because the issuer omitted facts with relevance to the transaction's
material fairness, i.e. they do not have to claim or even prove the transaction's unfairness.
223. FrN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 5.2.5(1)(a); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING
RULES, Rule 13.3.1, 13.3.2.
224. FN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 5.2.5(l)(b).
225. FN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 5.2.5(3).
226. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 5.2.5(2).
227. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 5.2.5(l)(c).
228. FN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 5.2.6. The underlying principle of mutual
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consent is dispensable if delisting is vital in a corporate work-out of the
issuer or its group. In this case, the issuer has to give notice of his
cancellation intentions at least 20 business days prior to the completion of
such cancellation and is subject to comprehensive disclosure duties relating
to the reasons and merits of delisting and why shareholder approval is not
sought.229
Cross-listing issuers on AIM have to notify the exchange of their
intentions 20 business days in advance and have to seek consent of no less
than 75% of the shareholder votes cast in a general meeting. 230 The LSE
may grant exemptions from the latter requirement. The practice in this
respect is based on the principles spelled out in the Listing Rules.
With regard to the escape from disclosure duties, from a bonding
vantage the picture is mixed. U.S. securities laws largely upheld disclosure
duties even after cross-listing issuers had retreated from the AMEX, the
NYSE or the NASDAQ. Yet, the effectiveness this protection afforded to
investors seems at least partly dubious since shareholders can use the
information only to trade on the issuer's home (or new host) market.
Consequentially, the main function of the adherence to the ongoing
disclosure duties should be viewed in light of its deterring effect: by
burdening issuers with the costs of continuous reporting under the
Securities Exchange Act, it arguably chilled de-listings in the first place.
U.K. regulators, on the other hand, pursue a similar objective by creating
comparably high hurdles for the retraction of the exchange listing. They
also try to secure for investors the deep and liquid trading environment of
the host market. Obviously, however, the procedural preconditions do not
constitute a significant impediment for dominant shareholders, large
enough not to fear the supermajority vote.
4. Takeovers and Public Tender Offers
Public tender offers pose various threats to dispersed shareholders
who are confronted with informational asymmetries, face collective action
problems, and hence tend to be prone to coercive offer designs.23'
Provisions promulgated to prevent expropriation of public shareholders in
tender offers are an important feature of U.S. securities law. In particular,
recognition of securities regulations within the E.E.A. goes as far as practically admitting
issuers to terminate their U.K. listing within 24 hours; cf FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING
RULES, Rule 5.3.5.
229. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 5.2.7.
230. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 41 (2007).
231. Cf Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9
YALE J. REG. 119-179 (1992); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 612-22 (2002) (both providing an overview of the policy concerns public tender
offers raise).
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the Williams Act of 1968 introduced § 14(d) to the Securities Exchange
Act, 232 which compels the bidder to comprehensively disclose his plans
with regard to the target corporation, his own financial standing, etc. 233 if
after consummation of the offer he would be the beneficial owner of more
than 5% of the target's securities.234 Moreover, the traffic rules reacted to
the infamous street-sweeps of the early days and largely cut-off coercive
practices.235 The decisive aspect relating to this paper's objective is that the
provisions of the Williams Act apply to foreign private issuers with
securities registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act of 1934236 (i.e.
investors holding ADRs of issuers cross-listed on either the AMEX, the
NASDAQ, or the NYSE enjoy full protection under U.S. securities laws in
tender offers).237
In contrast, the European Takeover Directive treats public tender
offers ultimately as a matter of corporate law. Hence, it only applies to
takeover bids for the securities of companies governed by the laws of a
member state, where all or some of those securities are admitted to trading
on a regulated market in one or more member states.238 With regard to
investor protection in tender offer scenarios, issuers cannot normally gain
from cross-listing their shares on the LSE's Main Market, because if
issuers are governed by the (corporate) law of a member state, as the
Takeover Directive requires, they will typically have shares listed on their
domestic regulated market. Consequently, issuers will already be governed
by the directive and its national implementation. Cross-listing shares on
AIM cannot afford the protection of the Takeover Directive anyway, as
AIM is not a regulated market. Yet, London has a highly-regarded
takeover regime at its disposal in the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers
[City Code] administered by the Takeover Panel.239 However, the City
232. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000).
233. Securities Act of 1934 § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000); Schedule TO, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2006).
234. In case of "mini tender-offers" where the bidder would hold less than 5% after
consummation of the offer, Commission Guidance on Mini-Tender Offers and Limited
Partnership Tender Offers, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,581 (July 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 241 and 271), applies, which requires certain disclosures with regard to the terms of the
offer.
235. The offeree has, for example, a right to withdraw under Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-7, benefits from the best-price rule, Securities Act of 1934 § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)(7) (2000) and can rely on the pro-rata rule, Securities Act of 1934 § 14(d)(6), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (2000).
236. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1934 § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (2000).
237. See also Licht, supra note 50, at 150 (arguing that the legal safeguards governing
takeover-offers may be less relevant for shareholders of foreign private issuers as a
consequence of more concentrated ownership structures which preclude public tender offers
anyway).
238. Takeover Directive, supra note 82, art. 1(1).
239. THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE (8th ed. 2006).
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Code only applies to issuers with a registered office in the U.K. (and the
Chanel Islands or the Isle of Man) or in a member state of the E.E.A., if the
latter have shares admitted to a regulated market in the U.K.2 40  Again,
although well equipped with seasoned devices for sophisticated investor
protection, English securities laws do not contribute significantly to a
heightened protection of shareholders of cross-listing international issuers.
5. Insider Trading
Critical voices in the academic debate have deemed restrictions on
insider trading superfluous or even pernicious.2 41 However, a consensus
that rests upon the converse position has emerged in regulatory practice and
adjudication, arguing that both individual fairness and market efficiency
require intervention.242
The U.S. legal response to insider trading relies partly on discouraging
certain transactions typically involving insider information, regardless of
whether they actually do.243  Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act244  captures 'round-trip' purchase-and-sale or sale-and-purchase
transactions within a six-month period and ejects short-swing profits
garnered by corporate insiders, including 10% beneficial owners (principal
shareholders). The interpretation of the terms 'equity security' and
'purchase and sale' are both rather extensive, and include trading in
derivatives that track the characteristics of an issuer's security and certain
transactions of securities in conjunction with a merger.245 Yet, as noted
240. Id., at A3.
241. E.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 78-104 (1966)
(arguing that insider trading ameliorates price discovery and enhances allocation efficiency);
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 870-873 (1983) (assenting positive effects of insider trading opportunities on
managements' risk preference); Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysis:
An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 127 (1984) (arguing that insider trading occasions induce managers to produce
valuable information by offering immediate compensation for their efforts which benefit
shareholders); Kenneth J. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule J0b-5, Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980) (positing that diversified investors on active markets
would not be hurt by insider trading because share-prices would be discounted accordingly).
242. Cf Reinier Kraakman, The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the
United States, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING 39-55 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch
eds., 1991) (giving an overview of regulatory practices and adjudications regarding
restrictions).
243. Kern County Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973) (finding that
the rule does not apply only where the nature of the transaction eliminates the involvement
of insider knowledge).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000).
245. See Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 951 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing the
voluntary conversion into debt securities in a similar situation); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
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earlier, registered securities of foreign private issuers are generally exempt
from the provisions of § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act.24 6  This
lenience may not be critically important, however, because the most
important and far more extensive sanctions for insider trading apply under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 2
47 and SEC Rule I Ob-5 248
promulgated thereunder anyway. In a series of grands ardtes, U.S. Federal
Courts broadly banned trading on undisclosed material information. These
courts mainly based their holdings on a presumed duty of insiders either to
make undisclosed information public or to refrain from trading on it
altogether. 49 Consequently, insiders who do not stick to the rule, but rather
trade on non-public information, are deemed to commit a fraud on the
market. Even market participants who do not rely directly on false
representations are presumed to be deceived because they believe that the
price of the pertinent stock reflects all available material information
regarding the issuer and its business. 250 As a matter of practice, Rule I Ob-5
reaches shares of a foreign private issuer cross-listed on a U.S. exchange.25'
The European insider trading regime is mapped out in the Market
Abuse Directive. The complete ban on insider trading spelled out in the
directive via legislative fiat,252 similar to the preceding Insider Dealing
253Directive, only applies to securities admitted or about to be admitted to a
regulated market.254 Furthermore, European law only mandates effective,
proportionate, and dissuasive administrative measures or sanctions where
the prohibition of insider trading was infringed upon,25 ' but leaves the
Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975) (describing the voluntary sale of
securities by the bidder in the face of a failing takeover attempt).
246. See supra note 178.
247. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
248. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2006).
249. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (in which the
Second Circuit assumed a duty of all traders owed to the market under an equal access
theory). But see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (in which the Supreme
Court later clarified that the duty to disclose or abstain is based on a relationship of trust and
confidence between corporate insiders and shareholders).
250. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (holding that omitted facts are
material if a reasonable investor would have viewed the fact as significantly altering the
"total mix" of the available information), which is not a binding precedent on the Supreme
Court as the majority of justices did not join on the decision's reliance deliberations. But cf
Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990) (showing that the latter
commands the adjudication of lower courts in a case discussing the reliance element in a
misrepresentation fraud claim under Basic Inc. v. Levinson).
251. See infra Part IV.C.6., Liability for False Statements.
252. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 82, art. 2.
253. Council Directive 89/592/EEC, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989
O.J. (L 334) 30-32 (EC).
254. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 82, art. 9; Council Directive 89/592/EEC, arts.
5 and 2(2), 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30, 31 (EC).
255. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 82, art. 14.
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determination of adequate sanctions generally to the member states
discretion. The older conception on the appropriate legal reaction to
insider trading in the U.K. regarded trading on non-public information as
an improper conduct of directors. Hence, insider trading was treated as a
matter of corporate law, with pertinent rules applying only to U.K.
companies and consequentially lacking relevance in the cross-listing
context.256 The FSA today requires overseas issuers with a primary listing
to adopt a Model Code for Securities Transactions for Directors [Model
Code], which bans any dealing of directors in the issuer's securities within
the 60 days preceding the preliminary announcement of the annual and bi-
annual results.257 However, the respective director duty is owed to the
company and not the FSA as enforcer.25 8 AIM companies are under a
similar regime established by the AIM Rules.259 Clearly, the core of the
U.K. insider dealing regulation can be found in Part V of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1993, which penalizes "[a]n individual who has information
as an insider . . . if . . . he deals in securities that are price-affected
securities in relation to the information., 260  Any market that was
established under the rules of the LSE is governed by the provision,2 6'
rendering both the Main Market and AIM subject to the rule. With the
enactment of the FSMA in 2000, insider trading also became a form of
market abuse governed by Part VIII of the Act.262  The important
consequence of the latter is the full availability of administrative sanctions
conferred on the FSA.263
While the general intolerance of insider dealing constitutes a
commonality reflected in the applicable rules, the mode of enforcement is
notably different. A hallmark of the U.S. insider trading regime is that it
relies on both the SEC 264 and private enforcement. 265 U.K. legislators, on
256. See, e.g., Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 323 (U.K.) (creating a criminal offense for
the taking of certain options relating to shares of the company for directors of listed
companies); Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 324 (U.K.) (mandating disclosure of directors'
dealings in the company's securities).
257. For details and exceptions, cf. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 9.2.7-9.2.10,
and Rule 9, Annex I, The Model Code. Overseas issuers maintaining only a secondary
listing are exempt from compliance with FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 9 (supra
note 105) and hence are not obliged to conform to the Model Code.
258. Chase Manhattan Equities Ltd. v. Goodman, [1991] B.C.C. 308, [1991] B.C.L.C.
897 (holding that under the Model Code, there is a duty to disclose to the board of directors
of the company in securities dealings, but not to the market-maker).
259. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 21 (2007).
260. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, 1993, c. 36, § 52(1) (Eng.).
261. Cf. Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets), 1994, SI 1994/87, art. 10.
262. FSMA, §§ 118, 118b, 118c.
263. Cf. infra Part IV.C.6., text accompanying notes 290-296.
264. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-376, 98 Stat 1264 (1984)
(giving the SEC standing to sue for treble damages). The Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-704, §4 102 Stat 4677 (1988) (empowering the
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the other hand, focus on imposing criminal and administrative sanctions. It
is not necessary to decide the fundamental controversy over the relative
efficacy of different enforcement mechanisms here.266 Yet, although the
evidence regarding the impact of U.S. insider trading restrictions in
particular is mixed,267 they are widely believed to be more of a deterrent
than their European equivalents, including the criminal law-centered
approach in the U.K.268
6. Liability for False Statements (Antifraud Provisions)
Disclosure duties arguably do not receive much energy as viable
instruments of investor protection until they are collateralized by strong
liability provisions. The U.S. system of overlapping private and public
SEC to seek fines of up to $1 million and jail sentences up to a maximum of 10 years).
265. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (establishing the
right of private action under Rule 10b-5).
266. E.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 1 at 14-23 (presenting data
suggesting that private enforcement via class-actions is strongly related to the development
of deep and liquid securities markets); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public
Enforcement of Securities Laws: Preliminary Evidence 15-29 (Working Paper 2007)
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1000086 (devising public enforcement variables
based on securities regulators' staffing levels and budgets that exceed and often dominate
private enforcement measures in explaining capital market development); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement 28-35 (Columbia Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 304, 2007) available at http://ssm.com/abstract-967482 (showing that
public enforcement in the U.S. is significant with regard to resources devised and penalizing
output created).
267. Cf H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J. L. &
ECON. 149 (1992) (presenting data suggesting that, despite regulation in the 1980s, insider
trading has actually increased); and Thomas H. Eyssell & James P. Rebum, The Effects of
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984: The Case of Seasoned Equity Offerings, 16 J.
FIN. RES. 161 (1993) (giving evidence that, following the passage of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, insider trading has declined).
268. For this assessment, see, e.g., Gdrard Hertig, Convergence of Substantive Law and
Convergence of Enforcement: A Comparison, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 328, 340-42 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004);
Gfrard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions, in RAINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL.,
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 101, 112-14 (2004); PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND
DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 774-75 (7th ed. 2003); Luca Enriques, EC
Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, in AFTER ENRON, 641,
653 note 56 (John Armour & Joseph McCahery eds., 2006) (the previous four sources all
pointing to the high burden of proof under criminal law which arguably complicates
enforcement); FERRAN, supra note 85 at 33 (contrasting 19 convictions in Britain, Germany,
France, Switzerland and Italy in 1997-2001 with 46 successful prosecutions under the
jurisdiction of a Manhattan District Court). These assessments, however, might be outdated
in light of the newly available administrative enforcement mechanisms, which, if nothing
else, at least lower the burden of proof for imposing sanctions; see infra at note 291 and
accompanying text.
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enforcement of antifraud provisions under Rule 1Ob-5 269 is supposed to
secure the accuracy and integrity of information disclosed to the investing
public. This system of safeguarding informational integrity, among others,
with shareholder class-suits received a sweeping extraterritorial reach in
U.S. Federal courts.270 U.S. courts assumed jurisdiction in a case involving
a foreign plaintiff and a non-U.S. defendant. The dispute arose from a
purchase of shares issued by a U.K. company. The Second Circuit upheld
subject matter jurisdiction mainly on the ground that a substantial amount
of the shares (10%) traded on U.S. public markets.271  Hence, from a
bonding angle, foreign private issuers can successfully submit themselves
to the stringent regime of liability for misleading information under Rule
lOb-5 and add extra credibility to their communications. It must be kept in
mind that Rule lob-5 liability attaches to the person responsible for the
deceptive communication,272 although corporate insiders rarely bear the
costs of their wrongful actions due to indemnification arrangements and
liability insurance coverage.273 Moreover, it is worth noticing in this
context that the now mandated CEO and CFO certification as to the
accuracy of the information published in the issuer's Form 20-F annual
274 ireport, at least in principle, reinforces these persons' personal liability
and facilitates criminal punishment-a declared goal of SOX.
269. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2006). See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
270. For a detailed analysis, see Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous
Extraterritoriality of American Securities Laws, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 215-19
(1996) (explaining that American courts apply a two-prong test on a case-by-case basis to
determine the extraterritoriality of section lOb-5). See also Coffee, supra note 47 at 690-91
(the first to relate this finding to cross-listings).
271. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group Plc, 54 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that material
issues of fact existed regarding whether or not the British issuer had committed securities
fraud, and therefore precluded summary judgment).
272. Currently, it is unclear how broadly the circle of responsible persons can be
construed. In Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 443 F.3d 987 (8th
Cir. 2006), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a class-action suit in which plaintiffs
sought to hold liable the suppliers of an issuer under Rule lob-5 who helped inflate
revenues, although the defendants did not make any fraudulent statements themselves. If
the Supreme Court goes along with the plaintiffs' argument of "scheme liability" and holds
the defendants responsible, even though it held in an earlier case that aiding and abetting
does not trigger liability under Rule lob-5 (cf Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994) (holding that a private plaintiff may not maintain
an aiding and abetting suit under lOb, because the act does not specifically prohibit aiding
and abetting)), then the risk of suppliers as well as of advisers would rise tremendously,
adding another layer of (costly) liability exposure designed to eradicate false or misleading
statements.
273. John C. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and its Implementation 45-48 (Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 293,
2006) available at http://ssm.com/abstract-893833.
274. Cf Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004) (listing
requirements of corporate responsibility for financial reports).
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Both the Prospectus Directive and the Transparency Directive leave
the tailoring of adequate sanctions for infringements on disclosure duties
largely to the discretion of member states, mandating only that effective,
proportionate and dissuasive administrative measures be taken or
administrative or civil sanctions of such quality be imposed.2 75 The Market
Abuse Directive,276 which so far is, in pertinent part, not further
substantiated by implementing measures on the E.U. level, potentially
covers false statements as a form of prohibited market manipulation with
regard to securities trading on a regulated market.277 Yet again, the
tailoring of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions is left to the
member states' discretion.278
With regard to prospectus duties, besides the administrative and
criminal sanctions at hand for the FSA, the FSMA 279 and-until its repeal
in the course of the implementation of the Prospectus Directive in 2005-
the Public Offers of Securities (POS) Regulations 28° erect a liability of
those responsible for the prospectus to any person who has acquired
securities to which the prospectus relates and suffered loss as a result of a
misleading statement.281  However, the enforcement level in general is
believed to be lower in the U.K. than in the U.S., 282 let alone with regard to
cross-listing foreign issuers. The same holds with regard to the ongoing
275. Prospectus Directive, supra note 82, art. 25; Transparency Directive, supra note 82,
art. 28.
276. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 82, arts. 1(2)(c), 5 (proscribing the
dissemination of false or misleading information where the person making such
dissemination knew or ought to have known that the information was false or misleading).
277. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 82, arts. 1(2)(c), 5, 9(1). Commission
Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of
inside information and the definition of market manipulation, arts. 4, 5, 2003 O.J. (L 339)
70, 72 only substantiate Market Abuse Directive, arts. 1(2)(a) and (b).
278. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 82, art. 14.
279. FSMA, § 90(1) (the section refers in terms to listing particulars but is extended to
prospectuses, (see FSMA § 90(11)) thereby covering all instances in which a prospectus is
required (see FSMA § 85(1) and supra note 140). On the limited practical relevance of the
provision, see Eilis Ferran, Cross Border Offers of Securities in the EU: The Standard Life
Flotation 17-18 (University of Cambridge, Centre for Corporate and Commercial Law
Working Paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=955252 (reporting that no single
claim was brought successfully under FSMA § 90 or its predecessor and that investors tend
not to even commence such claims).
280. Public Offers of Securities (POS) Regulations, Reg. 13-15, (1995) S1 1995/1537
(Eng.) repealed by The Prospectus Regulations 2005, Sched. 3, Reg. 2, (2005) SI 2005/1433
(Eng.).
281. For details, see DAVIES, supra note 268 at 671-73.
282. Hertig, Kraakman & Rock, supra note 162 at 212. See also Ferran, supra note 279
at 17-22 (arguing that although private enforcement of prospectus duties has left only
marginal traces in UK case law so far, it may still play a more significant role in forcing
compliance).
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disclosure duties. Most notably, it was only in January 2007, at the
occasion of the implementation of the Transparency Directive,
283 that a
liability of issuers to investors for misleading statements in the periodic
disclosure documents was established with regard to foreign issuers
admitted to U.K. regulated markets as well.
284  Similarly, under the
Transparency Directive, executive officers' certifications as to the accuracy
of the issuer's financial statements became mandated for issuers with
shares admitted to regulated markets.285 Yet, the U.K. legislator does not
attach any personal liability of directors in case these certifications are
misleading, but contents himself with a personal liability of directors for
knowing or reckless misrepresentations grounded 
in company law.
286
Hence, this liability is only of relevance to U.K. incorporated issuers.
287
283. Transparency Directive, supra note 82, art. 7, mandates
that responsibility for the information to be drawn up and made public in accor-
dance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 16 lies at least with the issuer or its administra-
tive, management or supervisory bodies and shall ensure that [the member
states'] laws, regulations and administrative provisions on liability apply to the
issuers, the bodies referred to in this Article or the persons responsible within
the issuers.
In the eyes of the Commission, this leaves member states considerable leeway in tailoring
the liability sanction they deem appropriate. Cf letter from Alexander Schaub (European
Commission) to Lord Woolf (UK Financial Markets Law Committee), available at
http://www.fmlc.org/papers/Ltr2WoolfFromSchaub.pdf (reinforcing the idea that member
states are free to determine the extent of liability and noting that no standard "duty of care"
is imposed on issuers with regard to investors when making mandatory public information
available).
284. FSMA, § 90A. It is remarkable that the passage of this liability rule triggered a
debate over whether it was reasonable to extend the provision's implicit safe-harbor for
corporate directors to other types of disclosure. The controversy ultimately lead to the
appointment of an expert who was mandated with a comprehensive examination of the
policies underlying the established liability regime for corporate disclosures: see Paul
Davies, Davies Review of Issuer Liability: Final Report (June 2007), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/medial4/7/davies review finalreport 040607.pdf
(recommending to extend the liability regime under FSMA § 90A to all forms of periodic
disclosure relating to any securities traded on exchange-regulated markets (e.g. AIM), to
retain the high liability standard of fraud, and to confine liability to issuers only).
285. Transparency Directive, supra note 82, art. 4(2)(c).
286. Companies Act 2006, § 463, 2006 c. 46 (Eng.) (in effect as of January 20, 2007).
287. Even without civil liability under U.K. law, the possibility of private enforcement to
secure accurate and comprehensive disclosure as prescribed by U.K. law may exist, at least
on a theoretical level. Qualifying actions of public investors relating to false or misleading
statements and omissions in issuers' disclosures as tort claims may lead to jurisdiction of the
courts at the location of the harmful event which encompasses the place where the harm is
suffered (e.g. EC Regulation No. 44/2001 of 20 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 5(3), 2001
O.J. (L 12) 1; Case C-21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasse, 1976 E.C.R. 1735). Conflict of laws
rules may rely on similar criteria for the choice of applicable law (e.g,. Commission
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable
to non-contractual obligations ("Rome I1"), art. 3(1), COM (2003) 427 final (Jul 22, 2003)).
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Still, international issuers stand to gain some bonding opportunities
from the U.K. regime on market manipulation. With regard to the E.U.-
mandated prohibition of the dissemination of false or misleading
information as a form of market manipulation, the U.K. implemented the
Market Abuse Directive by incorporating a precise copy of the European
rule into Part VIII of the FSMA.288 The pertinent part of the FSMA, which
includes several other prohibitions of manipulative behavior, applies to
securities trading on both the Main Market and on AIM.28 9 The bulk of
enforcement is burdened on administrative sanctions, the imposition of
which has been placed in the hands of the FSA.290  The FSA has to be
satisfied to the civil standard of proof that a person has engaged in an
abusive conduct.29 ' The geographical jurisdiction of the FSA covers,
among other things, market abuse wherever it occurs, if it relates to
qualifying securities traded on a prescribed market situated in, or operating
in the U.K.292 Hence, the U.K. regime should have an international scope
comparable to the U.S. model under Rule lOb-5, i.e. it applies to false
information related to securities cross-listed on either the LSE's Main
Market or on AIM. The FSA can also seek injunctions and restitution
orders issued by the High Court.293 Importantly, however, the FSMA does
not confer a right of private action on aggrieved market participants.294
Finally, sanctions for more severe instances of abusive practices potentially
including the dissemination of false information, like under the earlier
Consequently, investors who bought the cross-listing issuer's shares on its home market
may address domestic courts to pursue claims arising from false or misleading statements in
disclosure documents filed under U.K. law under the relevant provisions of the law of the
market.
288. FSMA, § 118(7) (introduced with effect of July 1, 2005 by the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/381 (Eng.)).
289. Both market segments constitute 'prescribed markets' as they are established under
the rules of the LSE, a recognized investment exchange. See generally FSMA, §
130A(l)(a); Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Prescribed Markets and Qualifying
Investments) Order 2001, (2001) SI 2001/996, Reg. 4(1)(a).
290. FSMA, § 123. For details, see Enforcement Manual (ENF) of the Financial
Services Authority, available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/ENF, in
particular ENF 14 (sanctions for market abuse).
291. Mohammed v. FSA, Fin. Serv. & Mkts. Tribunal, March 29, 2005, unreported,
available at
http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/decisions/documents/Fin%20serv/0 12.pdf. See
also Stephen W. Mayson, Derek French & Christopher L. Ryan, COMPANY LAW 416 (23rd
ed. 2006).
292. FSMA, § I 18A(l)(b).
293. FSMA, §§ 381, 383.
294. In particular, no such right accrues under FSMA § 150 because abusive practices do
not contravene FSA rules in the first place, constituting a violation of statutory proscriptions
instead. For the latter, the legislator arguably did not intend to create a right of private
persons to sue for damages, cf DAVIES, supra note 268 at 788, note 25 (holding that private
cause of action was not valid).
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regulations, follow from criminal law with its high burden of proof.
295 The
territorial reach of the more important offence of creating a false market is
defined by the requirement that the penalized act or course of conduct
occurs in the U.K. or the misleading impression is created in the U.K.
2 96
In sum, the most important difference between the two systems seems
to lie in the far broader reliance on private enforcement exhibited by U.S.
securities regulations. Yet it must be kept in mind that the efficacy of the
latter has been contested for a long time.297  In any case, the issue of
enforcement will be revisited in more detail and in a broader context in Part
IV.C.9.
7. Accounting Principles
It has been illustrated above, in Part IV.C.3, that significant variations
in the intensity of an issuer's transparency duties do not occur at either the
initial introduction of cross-listed securities to foreign equity markets or
later under the obligations of continuous disclosure. Yet, with regard to the
bonding-consequences of cross-listings, an important determinant lies in
the accounting methodology that applies when international issuers prepare
their financial statements. It would be an impudent undertaking to dare to
determine the superiority of either U.K. or U.S. GAAP or IAS/IFRS.
However, it can be said regarding the aim of this analysis that the bonding-
effect of cross-listing equities is higher where the foreign issuer is obliged
to at least comply with any of the mentioned accounting methodologies.
United States securities laws essentially require financial statements
for admission or continuous disclosure purposes to be prepared in
accordance with U.S. GAAP, but leave issuers the latitude to stick to the
familiar accounting standards from their home waters. Yet, if foreign
private issuers choose to prepare their financial statements in accordance
with their domestic accounting rules that provide substantially similar
informational content, they still have to reconcile them with U.S. GAAP.
298
295. Cf FSMA, § 397(2)(3). For the equally structured offence under the FSMA's
predecessor, cf FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986, § 47(2), 1986, c. 60 (Eng.).
296. FSMA, § 397(7).
297. For recent critical assessments, see, e.g., Coffee, supra note 273 at 67 (concluding
that the contemporary system of U.S. securities litigation "benefits three sets of actors:
corporate insiders, plaintiffs attorneys, and insurance companies-but not shareholders");
Jackson & Roe, supra note 266 at 5-9 (surveying the legal literature that finds the efficacy
of many American private securities lawsuits compromised because the system frequently
yields meager compensation to wronged plaintiffs, the cost of wrong-doings are not
imposed on the acting insiders but result in a transfer of losses among groups of innocent
investors).
298. See Form 20-F, Items 17 and 18, 17 C.F.R. § 240.220f (2006).
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European law (at least until January 1, 2009) exempts foreign issuers
from the obligations to prepare financial statements in accordance with
articles 4 and 5 of the Transparency Directive and the E.U. regulations
referred to therein, if the issuer satisfactorily proves that its domestic
regulator is undertaking efforts to converge the domestic standards with
IFRS.299 Consequentially, European law has not granted and does not grant
much of a bonding opportunity. However, the relevant listing particulars of
the pertinent market segments do a slightly better job. With regard to
issuers listing shares on the Main Market, the Listing Rules allow financial
statements to be prepared in accordance with the issuer's national law and
accounting standards or IAS. Regardless, they must at least provide
enough information to give a true and fair view of the issuer's state of
affairs.300 Far more stringent bonding is possible for AIM companies.
Until August 2006, AIM companies' accounts had to be prepared in
accordance with U.K. or U.S. GAAP or IAS, but equivalence of Canadian
GAAP and Australian IFRS was recently acknowledged. Issuers
incorporated in a member state of the European Economic Area (EEA),
however, as a result of European legislation, 0 must prepare and present
their annual accounts in accordance with International Accounting
Standards.0 2
8. Corporate Governance Provisions
One of the most direct forms of legal bonding occurs where issuers
submit to certain corporate governance standards prescribed in the
respective exchanges' listing rules. In addition to the indispensable duties
spelled out by U.S. securities laws, the NASDAQ requires its listed
companies to make public the receipt of an audit containing a going
concern qualification.3 3 Furthermore, NASDAQ issuers must have an
audit committee comprised of independent directors,30 4 a requirement
299. Commission Decision 2006/891 on the use by third country issuers of securities of
information prepared under internationally accepted accounting standards, art. 1(c), 2006
O.J. (L 343) 96, 98 (EC) (outlining the conditions under which foreign accounting standards
are deemed to be in compliance with EC transparency requirements).
300. FrN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rules 9.8.2.; 14.2.2 (2007) (prescribing United
Kingdom listing rules).
301. Cf Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 on the application of international accounting
standards, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1, 3 (describing the new standard for consolidated
accounts).
302. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rule 19, at 8 (2007)
(requiring AIM companies to publish audited accounts).
303. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4350(b)(I)(B) (Apr. 15, 2004)
(outlining certain procedures for an issuer who receives an audit with a going concern
qualification).
304. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4350(d)(2)-(3) (Apr. 15, 2004)
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called for by SOX.30 5 Foreign private issuers may waive the rest of the
governance prescriptions in favor of their domestic rules if they give proper
notice of such deviation.30 6 Similarly, NYSE-listed foreign private issuers
may waive most of the corporate governance standards stipulated in the
Listed Company Manual except the provisions on the independent audit
committee.307 Finally, foreign issuers admitted to AMEX may also remain
in non-compliance with the exchange's corporate governance
prescriptions.3 °8
The main governance tool imposed on issuers listed on the LSE's
markets is mandatory shareholder approval prior to certain significant
transactions.30 9 Yet, some remarkable differences can be observed. Issuers
listing shares on the LSE's Main Market who have opted for a secondary
listing310 do not incur any such obligation. On the other hand, overseas
issuers who opted for a primary listing are required to seek advance
shareholder approval if they wish to execute acquisitions or disposals of
interest in an undertaking where the transaction surpasses a 25% magnitude
in relation to the issuer's business as determined by several class tests laid
out in Annex I of the Listing Rules, Rule 10. Furthermore, Main Market
companies have to address shareholders prior to executing a reverse
takeover.3 1' Analogously, while ex ante shareholder approval is
dispensable for the majority of transactions involving AIM companies,
consent given in a general meeting is mandatory. No opt-out is possible in
case of reverse takeovers and disposals resulting in a fundamental change
of business.31 2 In determining whether a transaction passes the 100%
(reverse take-overs) or 75% (fundamental change of business disposals)
(describing audit committee composition and responsibility).
305. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301 and SEC Rule 10A-3, (codified as amended at
17 C.F.R § 240.1OA-3 (2006)).
306. NASDAQ, INC., MARKET PLACE RULES, Rule 4350(a)(1) (Apr. 15, 2004) (allowing
foreign issuers to use accepted business practice from their own countries).
307. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 303A (2006) (describing corporate
governance standards for foreign private issuers).
308. AMEX, LLC, COMPANY GUIDE, §§ 110 (2007) (outlining rules for private issuers
listed on AMEX).
309. From June 29, 2008, onwards, European law will mandate audit committees for
"public interest entities", i.e. in pertinent context, issuers having shares admitted to a
regulated market. Yet, only one committee member will have to be independent. Council
Directive 2006/43, on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, art.
41(1), 53(1), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 87, 103, 107. (amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC
and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC).
310. Cf supra note 105.
311. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 10 (2007) (covering significant
transactions); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., LISTING RULES, Rule 14.2.6 (2007) (stating that Rule 10
applies to overseas issuers with a primary listing).
312. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rules 13 & 14, at 5
(2007) (discussing reverse takeovers or fundamental changes of business).
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thresholds that trigger the approval requirements, several class tests laid out
in Schedule 3 of the AIM-Rules apply.
313
9. General Assessment in the Light of Diverging Enforcement
Intensity
The survey of U.K. and U.S. securities laws with relevance for legal-
bonding results in an illuminative picture. In some respects, U.S. law
allows foreign private issuers to bond themselves more strongly by
subjecting their businesses to more stringent provisions. The major
differences with relevance to the legal bonding hypothesis can be observed
by looking to the publication of significant shareholdings, the escape from
disclosure requirements, takeover-rules, and the liability for false
statements. Yet, U.K. markets, far from being laxly regulated, allow
issuers to opt for similarly high standards with regard to black letter law.
To clarify, overseas issuers exempt themselves from many pivotal parts of
U.K. securities laws by seeking only a secondary listing under the Listing
Rules. Those overseas issuers that pursue a primary listing, however,
become subject to rather stringent provisions.3 14 This is particularly true
with regard to initial and ongoing disclosure where the City exhibits a more
stringent regime of mandatory interim reports and ad hoc disclosure of
significant events. Similarly, issuers with primary listings have to ensure
shareholder approval prior to significant transactions and are bound by
more constricting rules in case of related-party transactions. In sum, it
seems hard to gauge a doubtless superiority of any one legal system. This
is all the more true since some of the U.S. margins are ambivalent. The far
reaching private liability for fraudulent statements must not necessarily
bring net gains as a result of facilitated bonding but may also result in
heightened litigation expenses bome by the issuer that are apt to consume
313. The Gross Asset, Profit, and Turnover tests respectively relate the gross assets, the
profits attributable to the assets, the turnover attributable to the assets, and the subject of the
transaction to the particular figures of the AIM company. The Consideration test relates the
consideration of the transaction to the aggregate market value of all ordinary shares
(excluding treasury shares) of the AIM company. Finally, the Gross Capital Test relates the
Gross capital of the company or business being acquired to the gross capital of the AIM-
company. Cf LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PLC., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Schedule 3, at
19 (2007).
314. It is a shortfall of otherwise impressive studies that they do not fully embrace the
entire scope of options offered under the U.K. regulatory regime but focus instead
exclusively on the lowest available standards for admission to the LSE's Main Market,
although foreign issuers can opt for significantly more stringent rules. See Coffee, supra
note 266, at 11 n.17; Doidge et al., supra note 38 at 9-10 (both relying on lain MacNeil &
Alex Lau, International Corporate Regulation: Listing Rules and Overseas Companies, 50
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 787, 795-806 (2001) who only discuss the status quo prior to incisive
European and U.K. reform efforts).
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contingent bonding gains.315 Taking an even tougher stance in this respect
in reaction to corporate scandals certainly shifted the balance even more.
These burdens represent an addition to the heightened compliance costs
under Sarbanes-Oxley that potentially reduce the benefits of a U.S. listing.
However, even if securities law regimes governing U.S. and U.K.
exchanges provide, at least at the issuers' choice, standards of investor
protection that are largely equivalent, a striking difference still emerges if
the topic of enforcement is further explored. Regardless of the controversy
surrounding the superiority of a specific mode of enforcement, 31 6 the
undisputed underlying assumption of all pertinent studies is: enforcement
matters a great deal.31 7 Recent research reveals that the U.S. clearly trumps
the U.K. when it comes to enforcement activity, particularly regarding
enforcement "output" measured in numbers of public enforcement actions
brought, aggregate financial sanctions levied, and financial penalties
(settlements, trial and arbitration awards) imposed in private enforcement
actions.3"8 A similarly staggering margin of enforcement output can be
observed with regard to criminal sanctions.319 Obviously, the significantly
higher threat of strict enforcement under U.S. securities laws and the
punitive character of the sanctioning system account for a palpable
difference in the regulatory environment governing New York's and
London's exchanges. While substantive rules may stipulate largely
equivalent standards, at least for benign issuers willing to submit to
investor-protective securities laws, it is the considerably larger deterring
effect of enforcement under U.S. regulation that marks a clear difference
between U.S. and U.K. markets. Moreover, it is likely that enforcement of
many regulations principally apt to protect investors but stipulated only in
AIM listing rules (e.g. interim reporting obligations (Part IV.C.3.a), rules
on related-party transactions (Part IV.C.3.b), reporting duties for significant
315. See supra note 297, and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 266.
317. E.g., Jackson & Roe, supra note 266, at 3 (arguing that private and public
enforcement play a complementary role in building strong securities markets). For further
evidence, see also Licht, supra note 50, at 154 (arguing that adherence to and enforcement
of the law are of critical importance in corporate governance); Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem
Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 78 (2002) (finding - in a global
sample of 87 countries - that while the mere existence of insider prohibitions did not affect
the cost of equity, the first prosecution did).
318. Howell E. Jackson, Variations in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications, 27-29 (John M. Olin Center for Law Economics, and
Business Discussion Paper No. 521, 2005) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=839250
(period between 2000 and 2002); Coffee, supra note 266 at 36-44 (period between 2002-
2006).
319. Compare the numbers reported in Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S.
Martin, The Legal Penalties for Financial Misrepresentation, 42 Panel B (Working Paper,
2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-933333, with FERRAN, supra note 85, at 33.
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holdings (Part IV.C.3.c), and the prescription of accounting standards (Part
IV.C.7)) will suffer from severe enforcement deficiencies. This is because
the LSE (a self-regulatory body without significant public support from the
FSA) is badly equipped to crack down on foreign issuers and administer
truly deterring sanctions on its own.
V. LONDON'S SUCCESS IN THE MIRROR OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON
CROSS-LISTING IMPACTS AND MOTIVES
Recent data indicates that the LSE's Main Market and AIM emerged
as competitors to U.S. equity markets in the pursuit of international cross-
listings. By and large, very similar non-legal institutions and determinants
such as capital market development, informational environment, and
cultural group affiliation, characterize the pertinent equity markets and
provide a promising background for specifically assessing the relevance of
securities laws and their bearing upon sophisticated capital markets. I
present the hypothesis that despite transparent differences in the regulatory
framework-particularly at the enforcement level-London's success can
be explained by issuers' diverging motives, and results from a regulatory
offer to a demand side significantly distinct from that of U.S. markets. To
test this hypothesis, I will link the results of the analysis conducted thus far
to the abundant empirical data presented in finance literature on cross-
listings.
A. Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence indicates that capital markets indeed honor
legal and non-legal improvements in a firm's corporate governance
environment. Nevertheless, neither all nor even the bulk of positive
abnormal returns associated with cross-listings may be attributable to this
kind of bonding effect.
1. Evidence: Cross-Listing Issuers Can Reap Legal-Bonding
Premiums
Empirical observations about the bearing of cross-listing programs on
a firm's financial standing have generated major indicators of the law's
relevance to a firm's cost of capital. A growing body of complex finance
literature presents a multitude of pertinent data that is somewhat
ambiguous, especially within the context of specific legal environments,
and bolsters the notion that the competing theories are not mutually
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exclusive. 320 But the empirical evidence generally supports the hypothesis
that an observable legal-bonding effect exists as a result of U.S. cross-
listings.
a. Inferences from older studies
The results from older analyses, which were conducted with the goal
of appraising the market segmentation hypothesis, can be studied under the
new bonding theory. Event studies scrutinizing share price reactions
around the announcement of ADR programs exposed positive abnormal
returns at significantly higher rates for exchange and NASDAQ listings321
compared to private placements under SEC Rule 144A 22 and minimally
regulated Over the Counter (OTC) offerings.3 23  The longer-run price
reactions and more permanent, positive long-run returns for Asian firms
3 24
reflect particularly large benefits in investor protection, which issuers from
jurisdictions with reputedly poor corporate governance institutions325 stand
to reap from ADR programs.
3 26
b. Testing the legal-bonding hypotheses directly
Research conducted under Ren6 M. Stulz's fundamental critique
directly scrutinizes the legal bonding hypothesis, and finds that companies
from jurisdictions with what the La Porta et al. index considers to be weak
320. For a comprehensive survey of this literature, see G. Andrew Karolyi, Why Do
Companies List Shares Abroad?: A Survey of the Evidence and its Managerial
Implications, 7 FIN. MKTS., INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 1 (1998) (tracking a chronology of
research studies on cross-border listings of stocks); Karolyi, supra note 10 (synthesizing
research initiatives relating to the bonding hypothesis).
321. U.S. securities laws are applicable with regard to foreign private issuers (cf Rules
and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 3b-4(c), 17 C.F.R. §
240.3b-4 (2005)) whose shares are to be admitted for exchange trading. For details cf supra
at Part IV.A.
322. Private Resales of Securities to Institutions Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2006).
323. Miller, supra note 44.
324. See Foerster & Karolyi, supra note 44 (drawing inferences from eleven Asian firms
included in a study on stock price performance and risk exposure of non-U.S. stocks cross-
listed in U.S. markets).
325. The ranking of jurisdictions by investor protection, as mentioned in the studies here,
generally follows the "Antidirector Rights Index" presented in La Porta et al., supra note 1,
at 1134. For an astute critique of this index, cf Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance
and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al. 's 'Antidirector Rights Index' Under Consistent
Coding 1-84 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 67/2006,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-894301 (concluding the index was
systematically measured incorrectly and thus an invalid indicator of shareholder protection).
326. See also Coffee, supra note 40 (discussing the corporate governance implications of
cross-listing on a U.S. exchange).
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investor protection are generally more likely to cross-list in the United
States. Moreover, equity offerings that followed such cross-listings
occurred much more frequently, this observation being sensitive to the
quality of minority shareholder protection in the issuers' home
jurisdictions.327
On average, a U.S. cross-listing valuation-premium of around 16%
was documented in terms of Tobin's q,328 which met concerns regarding the
explanatory power of event studies; the premium was significantly greater
(37%) for issuers from countries with weaker investor protection and for
firms opting for exchange listings instead of Rule 144A private placements
or OTC listings.329 Subsequent studies confirmed the valuation premium
for U.S. exchange listings for each year between 1991 and 2005.330 Recent
studies, however, have called into question the persistence of this
valuation-premium by revealing that Tobin's q rose significantly both
before cross-listing ("internationalization") and during the year in which
the program was executed, but subsequently fell to previous levels.
Ultimately, cross-listing firms are left without a sustained valuation
premium compared to their domestic peers.33' Yet, the paper was
327. Reese & Weisbach, supra note 50, at 80-104 (finding issuers from weak investor
protection jurisdictions are also more likely to conduct their post-cross-listing offerings in
their home markets outside the United States). But see Licht, supra note 50, at 161
(interpreting the fact that cross-listing issuers prefer to conduct equity offerings on their
home markets as evidence of a lack of strong bonding).
328. Firm valuation in terms of Tobin's q is calculated as the ratio of the company's
market value to its asset value. More precisely, the numerator reflects the book value of
equity subtracted from the book value of total assets, to which the market value of equity is
added. The denominator consists of the book value of total assets. James Tobin, A General
Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, 1 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 15 (1969)
(illustrating a general framework for monetary analysis). Thus, high ratios above one
suggest that management maximizes shareholder value by making the firm's market value
substantially exceed the replacement value of its assets.
329. Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & Rend M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms that
Are Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (2004) (conducting Tobin's q-
analysis for the year 1997 of a worldwide sample of 712 issuers relative to a global
benchmark sample of 4078 publicly-traded firms).
330. See Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, supra note 38, at 33 (estimating that cross-listed U.S.
exchange firms were on average worth 17.5% more than non-listed firms between 1990 and
2001, and worth about 14.3% more between 2002 and 2005, a difference that is statistically
insignificant and disappears completely if the values from the exceptional year 1999 are
eliminated from the sample).
331. Juan Carlos Gozzi, Ross Levine & Sergio L. Schmukler, Internationalization and
the Evolution of Corporate Valuation 1-47 (World Bank, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 3933, 2006), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/extemalldefault/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/05/30/000016406 2
0060530160901/Rendered/PDF/wps3933.pdf (scrutinizing 9096 firms from seventy-four
countries from 1989-2000 and finding that cross-listing facilitates corporate expansion by
persistently raising market capitalization and increasing corporate assets, but does not
consistently enhance firm valuation).
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legitimately criticized for lumping together diverging exchange listings
from different jurisdictions. Valuation premiums associated with U.S.
exchange listings were shown to be persistent.332
In apparent discord with the bonding hypothesis, issuers from
reputedly weak legal systems with high ownership concentration who
pursue Rule 144A private placements experience positive valuation effects
without becoming subject to the more stringent U.S. securities laws
enforced with exchange listings.333 On one hand, the latter may be ascribed
to reputational bonding that signals truthfulness at a very early stage in a
firm's history.334 On the other hand, a decomposition of valuation effects
reveals the following: regardless of whether equities are offered through
exchange-listings or OTC offerings and Rule 144A private placements,
U.S. securities markets generally afford firms more financial room to
exploit growth opportunities, while only exchange listings substantially
reduce firms' cost of capital.335 Hence, although positive valuation effects
stem from unregulated share offerings, the legal bonding hypothesis
remains intact: positive abnormal returns result from cash-flow effects and
bonding-premiums, as well as potential gains from enhanced market
integration.
Voting premiums in dual-class shares were significantly lower for
foreign firms with shares cross-listed in the United States than for firms
with no such secondary listing, the difference being even larger for firms
from jurisdictions assigned to low minority protection.336 A tiny sample of
Mexican firms, however, experienced a total absence of voting premiums
in dual-class stocks where both classes of shares were cross-listed.37 The
332. Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, supra note 38, at 33-40.
333. See J. Michael Pinegar & Ravi Ravichandran, When Does Bonding Bond? The Case
of ADRs and GDRs, 1-40 (May 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indian
School of Business), available at http://wwxv.isb.edu/caf/docs/MichaelPinnegar.pdf (arguing
that firms substitute voluntary disclosure for legal bonding).
334. Cf supra Part III.B.3.a. (describing methods that facilitate reputational bonding).
335. See Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Cost of Capital Effects and Changes in Growth
Expectations Around U.S. Cross-Listings, 1-47 (European Corporate Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 46/2004, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=938230
(documenting substantial cash-flow effects for all kinds of cross-listings, but significantly
reduced cost of capital for exchange listings). See also supra note 331 and accompanying
text.
336. Craig Doidge, U.S. Cross-Listings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence
from Dual-Class Firms, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 519, 520-21 (2004) (finding premiums 43% lower
for 137 cross-listing issuers compared to 745 domestic firms whose voting premiums
decreased around the announcement date).
337. J. Michael Pinegar & R. Ravichandran, US. Investors' Perceptions of Corporate
Control in Mexico: Evidence from Sibling ADRs, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 213
(2003) (finding within a sample of five Mexican sibling-ADRs that those backed by
superior voting shares traded at a discount inexplicable by differences in cash-flow rights,
market risks, liquidity, voting control of major shareholders, or ownership limitations).
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latter finding may be rationalized to reflect the (rather unlikely) total
disappearance of consumable private benefits following cross-listing, or to
question the viability of voting premiums as an indicator of available
private benefits.338 Yet, such a proposition contradicts several theoretical
models that establish control premiums as a measure for the availability of
private benefits.339
Dominant shareholders shun the stern institutions of investor
protection in the United States. 340  Their decision to not cross-list is
sometimes interpreted as a signal that the dominant blockholder wishes to
reveal the high private benefits of control available in his or her firm.
3 41
Control changes associated with cross-listing decisions reputedly indicate
that new dominant shareholders who operate under the more confining U.S.
corporate governance regime place a lower value on the private benefits of
control.342
338. For a survey of literature on how U.S. cross-listings affect the availability of private
benefits, see Evangelos Benos & Michael S. Weisbach, Private Benefits and Cross-Listings
in the United States, 5 EMERGING MKTs. REVIEW 217 (2004) (concluding empirical evidence
makes a "compelling case" for the bonding hypothesis).
339. E.g., Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An
International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537 (2004) (providing alternate estimates of private
control benefits across thirty-nine countries); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One
Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1988) (using
the one share-one vote rule to study private benefits under corporate control); Tatiana
Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68
J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003) (using a vote-value approach to study private benefits).
340. See Craig Doidge et al., Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-
Listing Decision 1-38 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11162, 2005),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 11162 (using a sample of 4000 firms from thirty-
two countries to show the likelihood of cross-listing decreases where controlling
shareholders exist).
341. Michal Barzuza, David C. Smith & Elio Valladares, Signaling a Lemon: The
Decision Not to Cross-List and High Private Benefits of Control 16-21 (Soc. Sci. Research
Network, Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914000 (finding a
positive and significant change in the frequency of control transactions among firms that
chose not to cross-list).
342. Craig Doidge, What is the Effect of Cross-Listing on Corporate Ownership and
Control? 1-43 (August 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
Toronto Rotman School of Management), available at
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/-CDoidge/Files&Documents/draft v020805.pdf (finding
that, upon cross-listing, controllers of emerging market firms significantly reduce their
stake, while family owners and partnerships transfer their blocks to foreign public
corporations, resulting in an average abnormal return of 6.31% around the announcement of
the control change). See also Meghana Ayyagari, Does Cross-Listing Lead to Functional
Convergence? Empirical Evidence, 1-64 (World Bank, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 3264, 2004), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/W3P/IB/2004/05/20/000009486-2
0040520151243/Rendered/PDF/wps3264convergence.pdf (listing firm-specific factors such
as smaller size, low debt-levels, and high growth of foreign income, as meaningful
predictors of a control change for foreign investors).
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c. Challenges
A core criticism of the legal bonding hypothesis argues that
enforcement of U.S. securities law regarding foreign issuers is poor at
best.3 43 Not surprisingly, however, warranted counter-criticism, supported
by empirical evidence,344 points to the deterrent effect of high profile cases
and the statistically distorting effect of silent settlements.345 Moreover,
even though the pressure to comply with U.S. securities regulations may be
less coercive for foreign than for domestic issuers ,346 cross-listings might
still lead to an improved protection of minority shareholders' interests, as
compared to the standards prevailing in the cross-listing issuers' home
jurisdictions. Putting emphasis on the relative enhancements, it is of minor
relevance that cross-listing may not yield legal safeguards to protect
shareholders of foreign private issuers as equally efficient as those of U.S.
issuers. In light of this "incomplete bonding hypothesis," it is not
surprising that the value of cross-listed shares as acquisition currency is
enhanced relative to domestic shares, but still depends on the quality of
investor protection in the issuer's home jurisdiction.347
343. See Amir N. Licht, David's Dilemma: A Case Study of Securities Regulation in a
Small Open Market, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES OF LAW 673, 708 (2001) (examining the
Israeli dual listing project to explore challenges faced by regulators in small, open markets);
Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing: Some Direct Evidence, 22
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 325, 347 (2001) (finding that the dual listing project suggests
"managerial opportunism is a significant factor in the decision-making processes in public
organizations"); Licht, supra note 50, at 143 (identifying a "hands-off' policy at the SEC
with regard to foreign issuers); Jordan Siegel, Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively
by renting U.S. securities laws?, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 319-59 (2005) (finding neither the SEC
nor private actors effectively enforcing U.S. securities law against cross-listing firms, nor
preventing insiders of Mexican firms from tunneling assets).
344. Hermann P. Tribukait-Vasconcelos, The Invisible Enforcer: Price Behavior of
Mexican Firms Cross-listed on the NYSE around Corporate Announcements (Harvard
Economics Dep't, Working Paper, 2002)), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/corporate-govemance/papers/Tribukait-
Paper.pdf (attributing the movement of significant price reactions closer to the actual date of
cross-listed Mexican firms' earnings announcements to U.S. securities laws that inhibit
insider trading).
345. Coffee, supra note 40, at 1794-96 (elaborating on several legal enforcement
techniques used with regard to foreign companies that are often unknown to the public); see
also Coffee, supra note 266, at 56 (naming prominent instances of settlements and public
enforcement actions against foreign private issuers, and noting that securities fraud may
well receive more attention in the U.S. than abroad).
346. See Donald C. Langevoort, Structuring Securities Regulation in the European
Union: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, in INVESTOR PROTECTION IN EUROPE: CORPORATE
LAW MAKING, THE MIFID AND BEYOND 485, 496-501 (Guido Ferrarini & Eddy Wymeersch
eds., 2006) (showing reasons for a "home bias" in SEC enforcement actions, owing in part
to the costs and benefits of such actions in a context where enforcement resources are
scarce).
347. Natasha Bums, The Role of Cross-Listed Stocks as an Acquisition Currency:
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Valuation premiums for Canadian firms cross-listing in the U.S.
accrue only to issuers who obtain sufficiently large order flows in the
U.S.348  While this lack of a legal-bonding premium is readily explained
with the impact of the MJDS that allows Canadian issuers to avoid U.S.
disclosure rules altogether,3 49 this rationale is not available where similar
studies of emerging markets (i.e. Korea) found value-enhancing effects of
cross-listing events (among other circumstances reflecting openness to
foreign equity investors) related to the size of U.S. portfolio flow.35° Still,
the findings can be rationalized as yet another manifestation of the
bundling phenomenon: some valuation effects, which issuers from remote
home jurisdictions incur, certainly stem from improved market integration,
for which turnover generated by U.S. investors represents a proxy.
Moreover, it seems plausible to argue that only significant U.S. trading-
which does not need to occur in U.S. markets 35 -enables foreign issuers to
piggyback on the highly efficient informational environment and the
improvements in outside monitoring associated mainly with U.S.
institutions (such as analysts, institutional investors, etc.), whose appetite
Evidence from Takeovers of U.S. Firms (Terry College of Business, Working Paper, 2004),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=587921 (finding that in a sample of 438 bids between
1984 and 2000, foreign acquirers of U.S. firms with listed ADRs used equity far more
frequently than non cross-listed buyers (48% compared to 3%) and paid lower premiums
(23.7% versus 29.5%)).
348. Michael R. King & Dan Segal, International Cross-Listing and the Bonding
Hypothesis (Bank of Canada, Working Paper No. 2004-17, 2004), available at
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/res/wp/2004/wp04-17.pdf.
349. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
350. Kee-Hong Bae, Warren Bailey & Connie X. Mao, Stock Market Liberalization and
the Information Environment, 25 J. INT'L MONEY & FiN. 404, 425-27 (2006) (reporting on
the associations between the information environment and "the degree of openness to
foreign equity investment across a sample of emerging markets").
351. U.S. investors' choice to buy ADRs in U.S. markets or the underlying shares on the
issuers' home markets depends on both the level of legal protection-which may still be
lower in foreign markets even though the pertinent governance and minority protection
provisions affect ADRs and the underlying shares equally-and the ease of trading (i.e.
transaction cost, liquidity). See V.T. Alaganar & Ramaprasad Bhar, Diversification Gains
from American Depositary Receipts and Foreign Equities: Evidence from Australian
Stocks, 11 J. INT'L FIN. MARKETS, INST. & MONEY 97-113 (2001) (stating that the
economically significant higher reward/risk ratio of ADRs compared to the underlying stock
is partly due to lower transaction cost). Cf Reena Aggarwal, Sandeep Dahiya & Leora
Klapper, American Depositary Receipts (ADR) Holdings of U.S. Based Emergi."g Market
Funds, (The World Bank, Working Paper No. WPS3538, 2005), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/l 2/28/000112742_2005122
8122622/Rendered/PDF/wps3538.pdf (examining American investors' motivations for
holding ADRs rather than the underlying stock of foreign issuers). For evidence of
integrated global trading environments in contrast to segmented markets, see David Ely &
Mehdi Salehizadeh, American Depositary Receipts: An Analysis of International Stock
Price Movements, 10 INT'L REV. OF FiN. ANAL. 343 (2001) (finding ADRs co-integrated
with ordinary shares trading in the U.K., Japan, and Germany).
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for foreign equities increases after a U.S. cross-listing.
352 If, however, the
benefits from cross-listing do at least partly depend on turnover, this can be
regarded as clear evidence that other factors apart from legal bonding,
which homogenously affects all cross-listing issuers, figure in the
determination of the precise valuation premiums accruing to these firms.
The query becomes: what firm specific reasons determine the success of
an issuer in attracting order flow? Clearly, a thriving business does not
hurt in this respect. It opens up the possibility of extensive disclosure
beyond the mandated levels, which notably constitutes the indispensable
starting point for establishing a reputation as an issuer who is open-minded
about investor interests.
2. The Impact of Non-Legal Institutions
Even though the survey of the empirical evidence suggests that legal-
bonding premiums accrue to cross-listing issuers, the discussion has
already hinted that non-legal institutions responsible for improvements in
investor protection also play a role. This finding can also be documented
with regard to the relevant non-legal institutions outlined earlier.
353
a. Informational environment
It is intuitive that prospering firms which can credibly communicate
their high profitability can reap the largest benefits from disseminating
private knowledge into an enhanced informational environment capable of
accurately validating the issuer's statements.354  In accord with this
argument, during the 1986-97 period, when European disclosure duties
were undoubtedly less developed than their U.S. counterparts, finance
scholars observed European companies listing abroad-mainly in the
U.S.-while U.S. companies' share-registrations in Europe slumped.
European companies, typically being export-oriented firms from the high-
352. Cf Reena Aggarwal, Leora Klapper & Peter D. Wysocki, Portfolio Preferences of
Foreign Institutional Investors, 29 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 2919-46 (2005) (finding that U.S.
investment funds prefer to invest in emerging market firms that issue ADRs); John Ammer
et al., Look at Me Now: The Role of Cross-Listing in Attracting U.S. Investors, (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 815,
2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2004/815/default.htm (using a
1997 survey to demonstrate U.S. investors' preference for cross-listed foreign equities and
finding differences based on the country of origin).
353. Supra Parts llI.B.2 and IlI.B.3.
354. Oren Fuerst, A Theoretical Analysis of The Investor Protection Regulations
Argument for Global Listing of Stock (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper,
1998), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-139599 (predicting high operational profits for
(growth-oriented) firms cross-listing in the U.S. because of America's stricter legal regime
and lack of extraordinary results of operation for (mature) U.S. firms listing overseas).
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tech industries, frequently pursued a strategy of rapid expansion and
initiated large equity issues after listing abroad,355 while U.S. companies
did not aim at extraordinary growth, but instead increased their leverage
significantly after cross-listing.356 The latter findings obviously hint at a
looming self-selection bias relating to U.S. cross-listing firms' valuation.
Empirical studies substantiating the improvements in a firm's
informational environment associated with U.S. listings found not only an
increase in the number of analysts following cross-listed foreign stock, but
also an enhanced forecast accuracy translating into higher firm
valuations.357 The same studies found accounting data of U.S cross-listing
issuers more closely related to share prices and less prone to earnings
management.358  Closer conformity with U.S. GAAP whets U.S.
institutional investors' appetite for cross-listed securities. 359  This
potentially reinforces the governance aspects of enhanced accounting
standards. Yet, an important caveat with regard to the explanations of
valuation premiums for cross-listers relates to the previously mentioned
self-selection bias. It is conceivable that increases in valuation represent
the result of management efforts to dress-up the bride prior to the wedding.
355. The latter characteristics, not surprisingly in light of the strategic orientation of the
pertinent market, also applied to NASDAQ-listed Israeli companies. Cf Blass & Yafeh,
supra note 8, at 555 (stating that companies choosing to list in the U.S. are often young and
high-tech oriented, willing to incur additional expenses to distinguish themselves).
356. Pagano, Roell & Zechner, supra note 8. See also Stijn Claessens & Sergio L.
Schmukler, International Financial Integration through Equity Markets: Which Firms from
Which Countries Go Global? (IMF, Working Paper 07/138, June 2007), available at
http://sccie.ucsc.edu/webpages/Schmuklerpaper.pdf (finding for the 1991-2000 period, in a
set of 2,546 firms pursuing capital raising activities on international markets (though not
only via cross-listings), a generally larger market capitalization and greater liquidity, as well
as higher leverage, valuation, performance and foreign sales compared to a benchmark of
36,971 purely domestic firms).
357. See Mark H. Lang, Karl V. Lins & Darius P. Miller, ADRs, Analysts and Accuracy:
Does Cross-Listing in the United States Improve A Firm's Information Environment and
Increase Market Value?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 317-345 (2003) (using a sample of 235 U.S. listed
foreign stocks relative to a benchmark of 4,859 equities from 28 countries to conclude that
cross-listed firms have better information environments, which is associated with higher
market valuations); Mark H. Lang, Karl V. Lins & Darius P. Miller, Concentrated Control,
Analyst Following and Valuation: Do Analysts Matter Most When Investors Are Protected
Least?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 581-623 (2004) (showing that increases in analyst following often
lead to an increase in firm valuation, and that such increases are greater if issuers have
dominant blockholders or come from countries with poor minority protection).
358. Mark H. Lang, Karl V. Lins & Darius P. Miller, ADRs, Analysts and Accuracy:
Does Cross-Listing in the United States Improve A Firm's Information Environment and
Increase Market Value?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 317-345 (2003) (using a time series study to show
changes that occur after cross-listing, such as analyst following and forecast frequency).
359. Mark T. Bradshaw, Brian J. Bushee & Gregory S. Miller, Accounting Choice, Home
Bias and U.S. Investment in Non-U.S. Firms, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 795-841 (2004) (finding
greater conformity to U.S. GAAP standards usually means higher levels of U.S. institutional
ownership, owing to familiarity, lower processing costs, and to a perceived higher quality).
2007)
176 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:1
From this angle, changes in analyst accuracy may be generated
endogenously.
3 6 °
b. Investment banks
Empirical studies found (SEC Rule 144A) privately-placed firms from
developed countries that were cross-listing shares in the U.S.
underperformed more significantly than public-offerings of exchange-listed
ADRs (Level 3 ADR programs3 61).
362 This finding is consistent with the
certification hypothesis, if it is assumed that public offerings represent a
tougher task to investment banks, because they require comprehensive
disclosure and due to their size, have to attract a larger number of investors,
both institutional and retail.
c. Active Shareholders
Studies have found a strong preference of U.S. institutional investors
for ADRs over purely domestic stock.
3 63 More precisely, U.S. investors
prefer ADRs especially where foreign ordinaries are issued by firms with
limited analyst following on domestic markets and where issuers come
from countries with poor investor protection, low liquidity, and high
transaction costs.364 Although some evidence of a beneficial effect from
the presence of foreign investors exists,
365 it is largely unclear how much
360. Cf Karolyi, supra note 10, at 123-24 (exploring sources of endogeneity on the firm
and country level).
361. The most important distinction of so called "Level 3 ADR-programs" is that the
foreign private issuer publicly offers new shares in the U.S., instead of simply depositing
shares already issued on the company's home market with a U.S. depositary (the Level 2
ADR program). The foreign company is required to draw up a registration statement and an
offering prospectus compelling comprehensive disclosure in accordance with Form F-i,
similar to Form S-1 which applies to domestic issuers.
362. Stephen R. Foerster & Andrew G. Karolyi, The Long-Run Performance of Global
Equity Offerings, 35 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 499-528 (2000) (using a sample of
333 global equity offerings with ADR tranches from Asia, Latin America, and Europe
between 1982 and 1996 to show that companies from segmented markets issuing equity in
the U.S. under-perform local market benchmarks over the following three years).
363. See Hali J. Edison & Francis E. Warnock, U.S. Investors' Emerging Market Equity
Portfolios: A Security-Level Analysis, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 691-704 (2004) (showing
that U.S. cross-listed emerging market firms are held in accordance with the international
capital asset pricing model, while purely domestic firms are underrepresented); Ammer et
al., supra note 352, at 2 (stating that 17% of the shares outstanding of foreign firms cross-
listing in the U.S. are held by U.S. investors, while the fraction at purely domestic firms
amounts to no more than 3%).
364. Aggarwal, Dahiya & Klapper, supra note 351.
365. Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, Does Corporate Governance
Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 366, 403
(2006) (finding foreign share ownership positively correlated to firm valuation of Korean
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mitigation of agency conflicts increased stockholdings of U.S. institutional
investors can accomplish. At the very least, the danger of expropriation
still looms large with cross-listing firms, where the ownership structure
(large shareholdings of managers or families) suggests an increased risk of
private benefit consumption.366
d. Mergers and acquisitions
In fact, cross-listed foreign firms are more likely to engage in
acquisition activity and to finance their transactions with equity at lower
premiums than non-cross-listed foreign bidders.367 Importantly, foreign
firms that exhibit a higher likelihood to acquire a U.S. target within three
years after cross-listing typically initiate secondary offerings which dilute
cash-flow and control rights of dominant shareholders, institute other
government improving actions, and have higher valuations (Tobin's q)
before and after the cross-listing and the offering.368
B. Assessment
In sum, the empirical evidence supports the availability of bonding
premiums for cross-listing issuers. However, it remains unsettled whether
the complex governance repercussions of cross-listings translate into
valuation premiums which accord to an exact taxonomy of the precise
merits of and differences in the institutional packages involved. In
particular, the alterations in the issuer's legal environment seem to elude
perfectly accurate assessment. At first glance, this touches to the core of
firms and rationalizing these findings as being attributable to enhanced market integration
(access to diversified investors) and/or corporate governance induced by the foreigners,
amongst other factors).
366. Christian Leuz, Karl V. Lins & Francis E. Warnock, Do Foreigners Invest Less in
Poorly Governed Firms? (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No.
43/2004, April 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-677642 (using a sample of 4,411
firms from 29 emerging market countries to show that foreigners invest significantly less in
firms that are poorly governed, the governance being directly effected by a country's
information rules and legal institutions).
367. See Pasi Tolmunen & Sami Torstila, Cross-Listings and M&A Activity:
Transatlantic Evidence, 31 FIN. MGMT. 123-142 (2005) (finding no increased likelihood for
European cross-listing firms to engage in acquisition activity but validating the observation
that equity-financing of the pertinent transactions is facilitated); cf Bums, supra note 347
(finding that cross-listed firms using equity pay an average of 10% less than non-cross-listed
firms paying in cash, but noting that the cross-listed firms use equity less often than U.S.
firms).
368. Praveen Kumar & Latha Ramchand, Takeovers, Market Monitoring, and
International Corporate Governance (University of Houston, Working Paper, May 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so1 3/papers.cfm?abstract id=901525.
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the efficient market hypothesis. 369  Yet, the supposition becomes less
radical if it is taken into account that the appraisal of specific legal
arrangements, more often than not, is controversial among lawyers,
economists, etc.37 ° This can be illustrated with the contentious assessment
of the mandatory bid rule,3"' the debate regarding board passivity in
372
takeover situations, the controversy regarding the most efficient way to
enforce securities laws, 373 or the overall assessment of SOX
374. As a
consequence, there is frequently no clear information pertaining to the
details of the legal framework which could be impounded into share-prices.
Hence, it is no surprise that there is ample evidence that even highly
efficient capital markets do not respond to rather minor changes in the law
governing a firm's internal operations.375  Studies arguably indicating the
369. Simply put, markets are assumed to reflect available information in share prices
instantaneously. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FrN. 383 (1970). For a lawyer's perspective, see Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984)
(discussing the institutional preconditions and limits of efficient capital markets). For a
discussion of the efficient capital market hypothesis in light of the behavioral finance
literature, see Ronald J. Gilson & Rainier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715, 722-37 (2003)
(arguing that cognitive biases as well as agency and incentive problems put limits on
security pricing by professionally-informed trading but do not generally impede efficient
markets within these binding institutional constraints).
370. See Licht, supra note 47 at 612-13 (pointing to the complexity of assessing law's
merits).
371. For an illustration, see the extensive discussion of the two schools of thought
marked by William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale
of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505, 515-45 (1965) (arguing for an equal opportunity rule) and
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J.
698 (1982) (arguing against any obligation of controllers to share control premiums). See
also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J.
ECON. 957 (1994) (concluding that the efficiency of the equal opportunity rule, which can
be implemented by a mandatory bid rule, depends on the efficacy of the other institutions
devised to contain controller opportunism).
372. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case against Board Veto in Corporate
Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 973 (2002) (advocating to limit the board's role to facilitating
an informed shareholder decision); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate
Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Pre-Commitment, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 473 (2003) (explaining board entrenchment as satisfying shareholders' desire to install
a strong bargaining agent in takeover situations).
373. See supra note 266.
374. For a survey of the evidence regarding SOX's effects on U.S. firms, see Christian
Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really this Costly? A Discussion of Evidence
from Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. AcCT. & ECON. 146 (2007)
(cautioning that, in light of the existing evidence, the overall cost-effect of SOX with regard
to U.S. firms remains unclear).
375. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Corporate
Law: A Study of Investors'Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551
(1987) (finding no market reaction to unforeseen decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court);
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opposite with regard to U.S. firms' incorporation choices,376 at best
measure the overall effect of the bundle of changes in the corporations'
institutional environment associated with the change in jurisdiction.377 Yet,
they leave law's contribution to the whole unspecified. In fact, investors
might rather look at the overall reputations of the pertinent legal systems
which emerge over time.3 78  But they are in a bad position to gauge the
exact consequences of particular variations in the weaving structure of the
seamless web constituted by specific norms and standards. To be clear,
sweeping changes in investor protection standards have observable effects
on firm valuation. But this need not be the case for less grave
discrepancies. This hypothesis once again receives some support from
research scrutinizing the U.S. incorporation scenery, where despite
remaining variations in state corporate statutes, Delaware's valuation
premium disappeared. 79  In light of these findings, it is plausible that
success on international capital markets with regard to legal-bonding
premiums requires only submission to certain minimum standards which lie
within a band of regulatory models that equally enjoy investors'
Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 181-85
(1987) (uncovering market indifference towards the enactment of antitakeover statutes); see
also Licht, supra note 47 at 617-21 (showing that interaction between different legal
regimes in the cross-listing context renders accurate pricing of individual rules difficult).
376. Robert M. Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FrN. ECON. 525
(2001) (finding a 5% positive effect of reincorporation in Delaware using Tobin's q
analysis).
377. Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate
Law, 162 J. INST. & THEO. ECON. 134 (2006) (arguing that Delaware firms' higher Tobin's q
may be attributed not only to its corporate law, but also to network externalities and the
legal infrastructure offered and that Delaware has incentives to underprice this package in
the incorporation market to chill competitors).
378. With the important qualification that investors' ability to assess the general quality
of a pertinent set of securities rules and standards allows for an upward mobility, the
hypothesis advanced here is not in disaccord with fundamental views submitted by
advocates of issuer-choice in international securities regulation. See Romano, supra note
137, at 2366-67 (arguing that informed investor assessments of the governing legal
framework will make issuers internalize the expropriation potentials under "bad" securities
laws and will induce them to seek "good" regulatory domiciles); Roberta Romano, The
Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 387,
390, 493 (2001) (arguing the same proposition); Choi & Guzman, supra note 270 at 227
(arguing that diverging issuers' properties and investors' risk preferences will lead to the
persistence of various securities law regimes alongside each other with investors making
informed decisions taking the differences in the legal framework into account); see also
Choi & Guzman, supra note 40, at 1878 (arguing the same proposition); Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 942-44 (1998) (refining their key argument that
investors are in a position to make informed investments).
379. See Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
32 (2004) (presenting evidence that Delaware firms' higher Tobin's q disappeared over the
course of the 1990s).
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appreciation. As an important consequence of this view, the prospect of a
race to the absolute top in regulatory standards38 looks somewhat clouded.
It is important to note that the latter conclusion even holds, if contrary
to the argument presented here, bonding premiums precisely metered to
regulatory variations indeed existed. Just like it. has been argued with
regard to corporate decision makers in the context of incorporation
choices,38' corporate insiders may refrain from subjecting the company to
the most stringent, investor-friendly legal regime thereby deliberately
sacrificing extra bonding gains-which they would have to share with
minority shareholders-in order to retain more of their private benefits of
control. Accounting for the looming self-selection bias denoted earlier382,
the scenario is especially plausible as long as the costs of inferior bonding
are counterbalanced by firm-specific factors (e.g. high-growth
opportunities) that allow for sufficient financing at overall acceptable
conditions. Buying the entrance ticket to highly developed, globalized.
capital markets, hence, could still be seen as linked with a suboptimal
mitigation of agency conflicts from an investor's perspective.
Highly topical studies indicate that the LSE's success corresponds to
the latter explanation. While significant and permanent valuation
premiums for U.S. exchange listings could be demonstrated over a longer
period, no such premiums were found for a London listing.383 To be sure,
the evidence with regard to AIM is scarce and some reservations with
regard to the grouping of Main Market listings seem warranted.384 Yet,
380. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
381. It is a particularly dominant shareholders'/managers' aptitude to seek insulation
from the market for corporate control in conjunction with reincorporation transactions that
warrants the proposition of suboptimal outcomes on the U.S. market for corporate law. For
recent expansions and refinements of this argument, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell,
Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999) (arguing that regulatory competition works to produce
takeover law that excessively protects managers); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen
Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1775 (2002) (producing evidence for the pro-managerial tilt); Bar-Gill, Barzuza & Bebchuk,
supra note 377 (developing a formal model explaining why State competition favors
managers). For an alternative interpretation, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 372 (arguing
that shareholders may wish to endow their board with sweeping takeover-defenses and have
it serve as a bargaining agent pursuing value-increasing selling strategies).
382. See supra Part V.A.2.
383. Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, supra note 38, at 31.
384. A lack of sufficient data compels the study to report regression results for AIM only
for 2005. Id. at 30. Moreover, the authors distinguish ordinary shares and depositary
receipt listings (id. at 9), which seems to miss the regulatory characterization of different
forms of Main Market admissions. Regardless of the type of security listed, shares or
depository receipts, the regulatory divide runs between primary and secondary listings. Cf
supra notes 102 and 105. As a consequence, in both groups, high-standard issuers with
primary listings are pooled with low-standard issuers entertaining only secondary listings.
Clearly, such inadequate composition of the dataset is apt to distort outcomes.
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older studies can be interpreted in a similar manner: the significantly
higher price amplitude surrounding a NYSE-listing compared to a LSE-
listing385 indicates the absence of a bonding component contributing to the
valuation effects associated with a London cross-listing. Moreover, in light
of the significant differences in enforcement levels outlined earlier,386 the
result of diverging bonding premiums seems plausible even under the
hypothesis that exactly metered bonding premiums do not exist: we are
confronted with a palpable and easily assessable divergence in the
regulatory framework, the lack of enforcement constituting an
uncontroversial shortfall of the one securities law regime.3 87 Hence, by
cross-listing in London, controlling insiders sacrifice an available reduction
in the firm's cost of capital in order to safeguard more of their private
benefits. This assumption is reinforced if it is taken into account that for
other related reasons, the U.S. is arguably a significantly less comfortable
place for CEOs than the U.K.3 88
Still, the purely functionalist approach looking primarily at costs of
capital, firm valuations, and bonding costs in explaining cross-listings
might not capture the whole picture anyway. Studies found that geography
matters in listing choices. Cultural proximity seems to constitute a driving
force in listing decisions. 389 However, cultural proximity may only serve as
a proxy for general economic integration which seems to be an important
determinant of the success of cross-listings.39 ° Yet, these additional aspects
385. See supra note 54.
386. See supra Part IV.C.9.
387. As outlined earlier (supra note 266), a controversy centers on the proper mode of
enforcement. However, no dispute exists regarding whether the lack of enforcement is
suboptimal from an investor's perspective.
388. Ugur Lel & Darius P. Miller, International Cross-Listing, Firm Performance and
Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis (U.S. Fed. Reserve Bd. Int'l
Fin. Discussion Paper No. 877, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-926606 (finding
that foreign issuers with U.S. exchange cross-listings shed underperforming CEOs with
higher likelihood than those with listings in London).
389. Pagano et al., supra note 8 (finding a 33% higher likelihood for firms to list within a
group of culturally homogenous countries); see also Sergei Sarkissian & Michael Schill,
The Overseas Listing Decision: New Evidence of Proximity Preference, 17 REV. FIN. STUD.
769-809 (2004) (finding proximity, i.e. the distance between capitals, an important factor in
listing choices especially for non G-5 (U.S.A., U.K., France, Germany, Japan) countries);
Jordan I. Siegel, Amir N. Licht & Shalom H. Schwartz, Egalitarianism and International
Investment (Working Paper, 2007) available at http://ssm.com/abstract-899082 (arguing
that issuers' home. and host countries' orientation towards egalitarianism, i.e. their
intolerance for abuses of economic or political power, explains choices of cross-listing
locations).
390. Sergei Sarkissian & Michael Schill, Are There Permanent Valuation Gains to
Overseas Listing? Evidence from Market Sequencing and Selection (Darden Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=395140 (finding the
decline in cost of capital more significant for listings across strongly connected product
markets, which they attribute to the importance of investor familiarity).
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that seem to be critical in determining the overall success of a secondary
listing-just like the propositions of the still relevant market segmentation
hypothesis-are less significant with regard to the more focused goal of
this paper. The hypothesis here is that, all else equal, legal-bonding
premiums of similar magnitude accrue with regard to different markets'
regulatory offerings although these offerings vary within a band of
acceptable standards. With regard to the significant differences in
enforcement level, this hypothesis could not be tested against the
background of the varying success of U.S. and U.K. markets. However, we
gain evidence that trading venues with inferior legal standards can
successfully coexist with high-quality suppliers in the market for secondary
listings, as long as inferior law-discounts imposed are of minor magnitude
and do not meaningfully hamper the issuers' financing needs. The
impressive success of AIM is consistent with the latter proposition, as
particularly high-growth firms that dominate AIM are capable of digesting
higher risk-premiums.39' Interpreted from this perspective, AIM's success
does not accrue due to a competitive advantage because it offers a different
product than the one U.S. exchanges supply.
Despite the deficits in enforcement levels which affect both London
markets, the Main Market's less significant, but still cognizable upswing
could at least partly be attributed to competitive forces. Obviously, the
magnitude of the cross-listing premiums determines the point at which, at
the margin, the sacrifice of private benefits is warranted. Hence, if the
valuation premiums associated with a U.S. exchange listing had fallen as a
result of SOX, some issuers would arguably face different trade-offs now.
The evidence on such SOX-related discounts is mixed, however,3 92
proscribing sustainable general conclusions in this regard. Yet, it is likely
that SOX brings about unequal compliance costs depending on the
corporate law of the cross-listing issuer's home jurisdiction.3 93
391. See Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, supra note 38, at 18 (finding AIM issuers to have
extremely large Tobin's q ratios compared to issuers that pursue cross-listings at the Main
Market, AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE).
392. See Kate Litvak, Sarbanes Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1857, 1860-61 (2006) (finding Tobin's q and market-to-book values decline
significantly for cross-listing issuers subject to SOX during 2002, particularly at more
profitable issuers with high levels of pre-SOX disclosure from countries with high
transparency standards); Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing its Competitive
Edge? 13 (Univ. of Chi., Working Paper, 2006) available at
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/luigi.zingales/research/PSpapers/competitiveness.pdf.
(reporting a relatively larger decline in the cross-listing premium post-SOX for finns with
better corporate governance); Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, supra note 38, at 37 (finding no
impact of SOX on the cross-listing premium).
393. See Larry E. Ribstein, Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, I REV. L. &
ECON. 97, 124-27 (2005) (showing examples of potential conflicts between SOX
prescriptions and specific foreign corporate laws).
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Consequentially, a larger chilling effect with regard to issuers from certain
incorporation domiciles is conceivable and awaits future testing.
VI. CONCLUSION
To foster its conclusions, this Article has looked at the comparative
success of U.S. and U.K. equity markets. These markets feature the closest
real-world examples of exchanges situated identically with regard to
cultural background, market development, depth and liquidity,
informational environment, etc. This resemblance in the basic parameters,
although imperfect in detail, is suitable to scrutinize law's impact in
particular. In this scenario, the regulatory framework governing exchange-
listed394 equities becomes a central distinguishing feature, far less
superimposed by other factors. Hence, differences in applicable securities
laws should be reflected more directly in the pertinent exchanges' success
in the competition for international cross-listings. Consequentially, law's
influence could be scrutinized especially meaningfully by relating the
relative success of U.S. and U.K. markets to the divergences and changes
in the pertinent legal frameworks.
A survey of the legal environment framing the respective equity
markets showed that U.K. exchanges did not offer palpably inferior
standards of investor protection when judged by the law on the books. The
latter is all the more true if it is recalled that it were the ongoing reforms of
European and U.K. securities laws that incrementally brought about more
demanding regulations. Yet, persistent and substantial divergence was
identified with regard to the levels of enforcement of securities laws.
The latter finding cautions an interpretation that understands London's
emerging success as a result of both a skillful enhancement of U.K.
regulatory standards and a less felicitous overregulation of U.S. markets.
Another interpretation is favored here. There is good reason to believe that
capital markets do not exactly measure the bonding gains associated with a
specific legal framework if it does not deviate from a band of accepted
rules and standards. The underlying rationale stems from the hypothesis
that even informed investors do not assess individual rules and standards
but reflect only the general reputation of regulatory packages in their
pricing. In this scenario, issuers can capture bonding premiums of
comparable magnitude by cross-listing on equally prestigious markets in
spite of regulatory differences in detail. Yet, the differences in
394. Studies comparing U.S. exchange cross-listings with Rule 144A/OTC-offerings
(supra Part V.A.I.b.) have to deal with the fact that the respective markets differ
significantly not only with regard to the regulatory framework. Contrasting
NYSE/NASDAQ and LSE cross-listed securities on the other hand produces insights for
public trading venues with largely similar market structure.
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enforcement levels are of a magnitude and visibility that can be expected to
leave traces in firm valuation. In the taxonomy of international capital
markets advanced in the literature3 95 , both the New York and London
markets constitute high-quality trading venues in a position to attract
foreign national champions. Still, U.S. exchange cross-listings expose the
issuer and controlling insiders to the world's most austere enforcement
regime and hence require significantly less aversion to stringent investor
protection than London listings. Consequentially, the emergence of a new
competitive player only indicates that an arrangement of legal institutions
incrementally gained recognition that satisfies alternative demands
investors pose to capital market regulation and that it has earned prestige in
its ambit. The fact that U.S. markets are anything but dead and still attract
international issuers alongside the success of U.K. markets lends
plausibility to this interpretation. Moreover, it militates against the
assumption of an institutional competition between equity markets with
high cross price elasticity where changes in the legal environment, which
increase the cost of cross-listings, are immediately translated into a higher
demand for the substitute. In effect, the surge in London listings cannot be
explained mainly as a function of U.S. overregulation. On the other hand,
if the LSE was inclined to compete with U.S. exchanges for issuers
featuring identical preferences it could mount its enforcement efforts
accordingly.
The absence of a legal-bonding premium that accrues in the event of a
London cross-listing suggests that corporate decision makers have motives
to sacrifice bonding gains, like retaining private benefits under a legal
regime less hospitable to investor interests, as long as the other reasons for
pursuing a foreign listing (e.g. to enhance the shares' liquidity, to improve
their global market integration etc.) can be met at a less incisively regulated
market. Similarly, another possible explanation of London's success
largely disappears, even though it takes the relative inferiority of the U.K.
securities law regime into account. To be sure, it is not counterintuitive
from the outset that issuers and their management found a way to
compensate for losses which would otherwise result as a consequence of
weaker legal bonding opportunities, e.g. the efficient deployment of
reputational bonding devices such as voluntary disclosure beyond
mandated standards and the like. Yet, the lack of valuation premiums for a
London listing suggests the failure of such reputational mechanisms.
Finally, London's recent success indicates that a race to the absolute
top with regard to disclosure and corporate governance standards in
securities laws will not occur. The City's recent upswing hints that at least
395. Cf supra note 40.
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some corporate decision makers in fact prefer somewhat inferior financing
conditions. Consequently, a separating equilibrium is likely to evolve.
